tilSTORYn 


GERMAN  POLICY  BEFORE  THE  WAR 


GERMAN  POLICY  BEFORE 
THE  WAR 


By  G.  W.  PROTHERO 

LITT.D.,  HON.  LL.D,  (EDINBURGH  AND  HARVARD),  F.B.A. 

HON.  FELLOW  OF  KINg's  COLLEGE,  CAMBRIDGE,  HON.  VICE-PRESIDENT 

OF  THE    ROYAL    HISTORICAL    SOCIETY,  CORRESPONDING    MEMBER  OF 

THE  MASSACHUSETTS  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY 


NEW  YORK : 

E.  P.  DUTTON  AND  COMPANY. 

1916 


5\5 


ALL    RIGHTS    RESERVED 


*ii^iOK/»£ 


PREFATORY  NOTE 


The  following  pages  are  somewhat  expanded, 
especially  in  the  latter  part,  from  notes  of  a  lecture 
given  before  the  Royal  Historical  Society  in  January 
last  year.  The  main  thesis  which  I  endeavoured 
then  to  put  before  my  audience,  namely  that  the 
establishment  of  German  influence  in  the  Balkans 
and  in  the  Turkish  Empire  is  the  fundamental  object 
of  German  policy,  appears  to  me  to  have  received 
corroboration  from  recent  events  in  South-Eastern 
Europe.  These  events  are  not  to  be  regarded,  as 
some  have  regarded  them,  as  "  afterthoughts,''  or 
as  the  desperate  efforts  of  a  Power  thwarted  in  other 
directions  ;  on  the  contrary  they  are  incidents  in  the 
execution  of  a  plan  conceived  long  ago,  to  which  the 
crushing,  or — ^if  that  proved  impossible — ^the  maim- 
ing, of  France  and  Russia  was  but  the  necessary 
preUminary  step. 

I  desire  to  express  my  gratitude  to  Mr.  Lucien 
Wolf  for  valuable  assistance  given  me  in  regard  to 
the  last  three  chapters. 

G.  W.  P. 


March,  1916. 


X 


38420 


CONTENTS 


CHAP.  PAGE 

I.  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MILITARISM— 

Definition — State  and  Army — Philosophical  Basis 
— Kant  and  Goethe — Fichte,  Hegel,  Treitschke — 
Schopenhauer,  Gobineau,  Nietzsche — Summary         . .       x 

II.  CIRCUMSTANCES  AND  CONDITIONS,  AIMS  AND 

TENDENCIES,  OF  MODERN  GERMANY— 

Geographical  Position — Military  History — Economic 
Expansion — Self-confidence — Materialism — Delusions — 
Colonies  and  Colonization — Economic  Requirements — 
Colonial  Movement — Treaties  and  Customs-Unions — 
Central  European  Union — Socialism — Trade  Methods 
— The  Navy — The  Drang  nach  Osten — Austria-Hun- 
gary and  Turkey — Control  of  the  Near-East — Summary      1 6 

III.  FOREIGN  POLICY  OF  BISMARCK,  1871-1890— 

German  Anxieties — Germany  and  her  Allies — Peace 
of  Bismarck — Dreikaiserbtmd — Russo-Turkish  War — 
Austro-German  Alliance — Triple  Alliance — Success  of 
Bismarck     . .         . .         . .         .  •         . .         . .         •  •     44 

IV.  GERMAN  FOREIGN  POLICY,  1890-1905— 

William  II  and  the  Near-East — Franco-Russian 
Alliance — Anglo-French  Rivalry — South  African  War — 
The  Far-East — Russian  Advances — Russo-Japanese 
War — Eclipse  of  Russia — Summary        . .         . .         . .     54 

V.  GERMAN  FOREIGN  POLICY,  1905-1914— 

Effect  of  Japanese  Victories — Anglo-French  Agree- 
ment— Franco-German  Relations — Morocco — France, 
Italy  and  Spain — Germany,  France  and  Morocco — Fall 


viii  COT>iTE^TS— (continued) 

PAGB 

of     Delcass^ — Gonference     of     Algeciras — Casablanca 

Incident — Franco-German  Convention — Anglo-Russian 
Agreement — The  Near-East :  Crete — Greece  and 
Rumania — Bulgaria,  Serbia  and  Montenegro — Turkey 
and  Macedonia — Projects  of  Reform — Austrian  Policy 
— Aehrenthal  and  Isvolski — Reval  Interview —  Turkish 
Revolution — Annexation  of  Bosnia — Austria-Hungary 
and  Serbia — Set-back  for  the  Entente — Revolution 
in  Greece — ^Morocco  again — The  Panther  at  Agadir — 
Franco-German  Compromise — Tripolitan  War — The 
Balkan  League — Attempts  at  Intervention — First 
Balkan  War  :  Albania — Conference  of  London — Treaty 
of  London — Macedonia — Second  Balkan  War — Treaty 
of  Bucarest — Germany,  Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia 
— German  War  Party — Germany's  Great  Aim         . .     66 


German  Policy  before 
the  War 

CHAPTER  I 

THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF  MILITARISM 

Few  members  of  this  audience  will  be  unacquainted 
with  the  remark  of  Aristotle,  that  political  disturb- 
ances spring  from  small  occasions  but  from  great 
causes.  The  remark  is  essentially  true  with  regard  to 
the  struggle  in  which  this  country  is  now  engaged. 
My  object  to-day  is  not  to  discuss  the  immediate 
occasions  of  the  War,  or  the  course  of  the  diplomatic 
negotiations  which  preceded  the  outbreak  ;  nor  shall 
I  attempt  to  apportion  the  blame  for  the  failure 
of  those  negotiations.  These  questions  have  been 
adequately  discussed  by  many  capable  writers  in 
Great  Britain  and  abroad,  and  the  general  conclusion 
appears  to  most  people  no  longer  doubtful.  This 
ground,  therefore,  need  not  be  traversed  anew.  I 
wish  rather  to  direct  your  attention  to  the  deeper 
causes  of  the  conflict :  (i)  to  the  ideas  and  princi- 
ples, the  ambitions  and  motives,  which  have  pro- 
duced in  Germany  a  state  of  mind  favourable  to 
war ;  (2)  to  the  historical  events  and  the  economic 
and  political  conditions  which  have  contributed  to 


t  DEFINITION  OF  MILITARISM 

strengthen  the  warUke  tendency  thus  aroused  ;  and 
(3)  finally  to  the  course  of  international  politics, 
especially  during  the  last  ten  or  eleven  years,  which, 
I  will  not  say  rendered  an  armed  conflict  inevitable, 
but  made  it  very  difficult  to  avoid.  We  shall  see  that 
a  mass  of  hopes  and  fears,  of  resentments  and  sus- 
picions, and  of  incitements  to  a  warlike  solution  was 
gradually  accumulated,  which  only  required  a  spark 
to  be  kindled  into  flame. 

First,  then,  as  to  the  ideas  and  principles  which 
have  come  to  dominate  the  political  mind  of  Ger- 
many. We  are  apt  to  single  out,  as  the  most  notable 
characteristic  of  the  modern  German  Empire,  its 
militarism  ;  and  the  word  is  habitually,  if  vaguely, 
used — like  charity — to  cover  a  multitude  of  sins. 
Now,  what  do  we  mean  by  militarism  ?  The  T<lew 
English  Dictionary  defines  it  as  follows  : 

The  spirit  and  tendencies  characteristic  of  the  pro- 
fessional soldier ;  the  prevalence  of  military  sentiments 
or  ideals  among  a  people  ;  the  political  condition  charac- 
terized by  the  predominance  of  the  military  class  in 
government  or  administration  ;  the  tendency  to  regard 
military  efficiency  as  the  paramount  interest  of  the 
State. 

The  definition  is  accurate  enough,  but  it  hardly  brings 
out  the  fact  that  militarism  involves  two  distinct 
things.  It  is,  in  the  first  place,  a  certain  conception 
of  the  State ;  in  the  second  place,  it  is  a  politico- 
military  system  based  on  that  conception.  Under 
the  militarist  conception  the  State  is  regarded — one 
might  say,  worshipped — as  a  sort  of  superhuman 
entity,  quite  distinct  from  and  superior  to  the  human 


STATE  AND  ARMY  3 

beings  who  compose  it.  It  is  independent  and  sove- 
reign, absolved  from  all  rules  and  restrictions  which 
stand  in  the  way  of  its  welfare  or  its  aggrandize- 
ment. It  is  based  on  force — it  is  force ;  it  is  in 
constant  competition  with  other  States,  in  a  condi- 
tion of  latent  or  open  war  ;  it  is  justified  in  obtaining 
its  ends  by  force  of  arms  ;  and  the  paramount  nature 
of  its  aims  and  duties  sanctifies  all  methods.  Thus, 
in  the  case  of  the  State,  morality,  in  the  ordinary 
sense  of  the  word,  is  abjured ;  or  rather,  a  new 
ethical  code  of  political  morality  is  set  up — a 
Jesuitical  or  Machiavellian  system  of  ethics,  which, 
though  ostensibly  apphed  only  to  the  State,  must 
obviously  react  on  the  obligations  of  individuals. 

So  much  for  the  idea.  The  organization  of  the 
State  depends  upon  it  and  corresponds  to  it.  If  the 
State  is  based  on  force,  its  primary  organ,  its  chief 
visible  embodiment,  is  the  army.  The  primary  duty 
of  the  citizen  is  military  service,  and  every  able- 
bodied  citizen  is  primarily  or  potentially  a  soldier. 
Disciphne  being  indispensable  to  an  army,  all  citi- 
zens, whether  actually  civiUan  or  military,  must  be 
drilled  and  disciplined.  Since  an  army  must  be 
under  centralized  and  concentrated  command,  the 
State  also,  which  is  coterminous  with  the  army,  must 
be  autocratically  governed,  at  least  in  the  ultimate 
resort.  Political  despotism  follows  inevitably  from 
military  concentration.  Socially,  the  military  class 
— the  class,  that  is,  that  permanently  adopts  soldier- 
ing as  a  profession — ^takes  precedence  of  all  others. 
CentraUzed  organization  is  substituted  for  individual 
effort.  Science  and  education,  schoolmasters  and 
professors,   commercial   enterprise,   industrial   and 


4  PHILOSOPHICAL  BASIS 

colonial  expansion,  are  regarded  primarily  from  the 
same  point  of  view — that  of  contribution  to  the 
forces  of  the  State — and  are  more  or  less  subject  to 
the  influence  of  that  idea.  I  am  not  concerned  to 
criticize  this  system,  or  to  examine  its  ulterior  effects 
upon  a  nation.  All  I  wish  to  point  out  is  that,  when 
once  this  apotheosis  of  the  State,  and  the  conception 
of  it  as  force,  have  become  engrained  in  the  leaders 
of  a  people  and  the  bulk  of  their  followers,  the  rest 
follows  as  a  logical  consequence ;  and  you  get  a 
stupendous  military  machine,  not  only  capable  of 
vigorous  defence  but  irresistibly  tending  towards 
aggression. 

Such  being  the  outcome  of  these  ideas,  we  have 
next  to  ask  to  what  kind  of  teaching  this  peculiar 
mental  condition  is  due,  on  what  philosophical  basis 
it  is  built  up.  I  do  not  pretend  to  be  a  metaphysi- 
cian or  to  have  more  than  a  superficial  acquaintance 
with  German  philosophy  ;  but  this  is  perhaps  of  less 
importance  in  the  present  inquiry,  for  it  is  not  the 
truth  or  falsehood  of  the  philosophical  theories  con- 
cerned that  is  now  in  question,  but  the  effect  they 
had  upon  the  public  mind  when  filtered  through 
many  intermediaries,  and  largely  perverted  or  dis- 
torted in  the  process.  It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that 
the  average  educated  German,  still  less  the  mass  of 
the  people,  could  really  follow  the  arguments  of  a 
Kant  or  a  Hegel  in  regard  to  that  most  difficult  of 
sciences,  metaphysics ;  but  the  German  mind  has 
a  peculiar  aptitude  for  grasping  and  being  influenced 
by  general  ideas,  and  also  for  selecting  from  the 
whole  body  of  a  great  man*s  teaching,  e.g.,  from 
that  of  Darwin,  just  those  portions  which  appeal  to 


KANT  AND  GOETHE  5 

its  emotions  or  suit  its  circumstances,  and  neglect- 
ing the  reservations  or  modifications  which  are 
necessary  to  a  full  understanding  of  his  theory. 
And  it  is  only  this  national  effect,  this  popular 
assimilation  of  the  philosophical  theories,  with  which 
we  are  now  concerned. 

The  system  of  political  thought  and  organization 
which  may  be  summarized  as  Militarism  seems  to 
have  a  double  origin.  It  is  traceable  to  the  two 
greatest  names  in  German  literature — Kant  and 
Goethe.  The  trains  of  thought  started  by  these 
great  men  developed  separately  for  a  long  time, 
until  at  length,  metamorphosed  almost  out  of  recog- 
nition, and  taking  in  many  extraneous  elements 
by  the  way,  they  became  capable  of  fusion  in  the 
political  theory  that  now  holds  the  field.  The  two 
roots  from  which  this  theory  sprang  are  the  doctrine 
of  Duty  taught  by  Kant,  and  the  doctrine  of  Self- 
culture  not  only  taught  but  practised  by  Goethe. 
Strange  that  from  so  noble  an  origin  should  spring 
a  body  of  principles  which  are  a  danger  to  the  pro- 
gress of  man  and  the  civilization  of  the  world ! 

Kant  taught  the  transcendent  duty  of  submission 
to  the  moral  law ;  but  law  and  liberty  were  for  him 
brought  into  harmony  by  reason.  The  submission 
to  the  moral  law  must  be  a  willing  and  deliberate 
submission ;  that  is,  the  will  and  the  reason  must 
jointly  enter  into  it ;  the  free  will,  actuated  by 
reason,  must  consciously  submit.  The  act  of  sub- 
mission, to  be  of  any  value,  must  be  pure  of  selfish 
or  material  considerations  ;  it  must  freely  recognize 
the  absolute  validity  of  the  moral  law.  Once  recog- 
nized, the  duty  of  obeying  it  becomes  a  ''  categorical 


6  KANT  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  DUTY 

imperative  " ;  an  attitude  of  respect  and  awe  is 
alone  permissible  in  the  face  of  it.  Religion  is  the 
feeling  that  springs  from  the  recognition  of  moral 
duty  as  the  commandment  of  God.  Wordsworth*s 
"  Ode  to  Duty,"  whether  actually  influenced  by 
Kant  or  not,  puts  forward  a  similar  ideal.  Let  us 
recall  his  noble  hues : 

Stem  lawgiver  !  yet  thou  dost  wear 
The  Godhead's  most  benignant  grace  ; 
Nor  know  we  anything  so  fair 
As  is  the  smile  upon  thy  face  .  .  . 
Thou  dost  preserve  the  stars  from  wrong, 
And  the  most  ancient  heavens  through  thee  are 
fresh  and  strong. 

This  transcendent  idea  of  duty  is  the  one  domin- 
ant outcome  of  Kant's  ethical  teaching  in  the  Ger- 
man mind.  But  there  are  two  kinds  of  duty,  private 
and  pubhc  :  the  duty  of  man  to  man,  the  duty  of 
the  citizen  to  the  State.  It  was  a  great  national 
episode — ^the  Wars  of  Liberation — which  gave  a 
special  turn  to  the  general  idea,  and  laid  special 
emphasis  and  sanction  on,  the  duty  to  the  State. 
Between  1806  and  1815  the  State  took  up  a  more 
and  more  dominant  position  in  the  mental  horizon 
of  Germany,  and  especially  of  Prussia.  To  the  State 
the  Prussian  had  always  looked  for  aid  and  direc- 
tion ;  to  it  now  more  than  ever  he  owed  salvation 
and  protection.  In  such  times,  when  the  nation 
nerves  itself  to  throw  off  a  foreign  yoke,  and  triumphs, 
it  is  natural  that  civic  duty  should  take  on  a  peculiar 
sanctity. 

This  tendency  was  strongly  aided  by  the  teaching 
of  Fichte,  who  enforced  the  idea  of  civic  duty  and 


FICHTE  ON  THE  STATE  7 

self-sacrifice  in  his  Addresses  to  the  German  People. 
For  Fichte,  as  for  Hobbes  and  Locke,  the  State  is  the 
outcome  of  contract ;  but  Fichte  follows  Hobbes 
rather  than  Locke  in  his  deductions  from  the  theory. 
Here  you  have  the  dividing  line  between  the  abso- 
lutist doctrine  prevalent  in  Germany,  and  the  liberal 
tendencies  which  have  governed  our  political  de- 
velopment since  the  Revolution  of  1688.  Locke 
regarded  the  contract  as  one  equally  binding  on 
both  parties — sovereign  and  people — ^with  the  con- 
sequence that,  if  the  sovereign  fails  to  act  according 
to  it,  the  people  is  released  from  its  obligations. 
Hobbes  regarded  it  as  an  abdication,  on  the  part  of 
the  people,  of  powers  which  could  not  be  resumed. 
The  sovereign  becomes,  through  the  voluntary 
cession  of  unlimited  authority,  a  Leviathan,  thence- 
forward irremovable  and  irresistible.  So,  with 
Fichte,  the  State  embodies  the  popular  will ;  and 
the  commands  of  its  executive  must  be  obeyed.  The 
form  of  the  State  is  comparatively  a  matter  of  in- 
difference ;  *'  every  political  constitution,"  he  says, 
"  is  legitimate,  provided  it  does  not  bar  progress." 
As  the  definition  of  progress  must  be  left  to  the 
State,  the  proviso  is  no  bar  to  absolutism.  In  his 
Addresses  Fichte  insists  that  rights  and  duties  are 
combined  in  the  State ;  from  the  State  the  citizen 
derives  what  rights  he  enjoys ;  from  it  he  learns 
what  duties  he  has  to  perform.  Nay,  further,  the 
State  becomes  his  religion  ;  his  individuality  is  sunk 
in  it ;  its  future  is  his  future.  In  Fichte,  too,  the 
new  theory  of  Nationality  found  an  eloquent  and 
whole-hearted  supporter.  The  State  is  the  Nation 
in  its  active  shape ;   in  and  through  the  State  the 

B 


8     ARNDT,  KORNER,  AND  HEGEL 

Nation  is  preserved.  *'  The  individual/'  says 
Treitschke,  *'  sees  in  his  country  the  realization  of 
his  earthly  immortality/' 

To  this  theory  Arndt  and  Korner  gave  poetical 
expression  in  their  impassioned  prose  and  verse ; 
they  inflamed  the  moral  sense  of  patriotic  duty 
with  the  emotion  of  self-sacrifice  to  a  high  and  noble 
aim.  But  the  philosophical  basis  was  supplied  or 
at  least  largely  developed  by  Hegel,  the  real  founder 
of  the  German  theory  of  the  State.  In  his  Philosophy 
of  Law  the  State  appears  as  the  outcome  of  spirit, 
*'  the  world  which  the  spirit  has  made  for  itself," 
the  highest  embodiment  of  conscious  reason.  It 
is  not  only  the  unity  in  which  all  minor  forms  of 
social  organization — legal,  economic,  educational,  etc. 
— combine  and  are  perfected ;  it  is  also  that  in  which 
all  individual  aims  harmoniously  join.  Patriotism 
is  the  conviction  "  that  my  particular  interest 
is  contained  and  secured  in  the  interest  and  end  of 
the  State."  Thus  Hegel  went  beyond  Fichte  in  his 
elevation  of  the  State  to  something  almost  divine. 
He  differed  too  in  refusing  to  regard  the  form  of  the 
State  as  unimportant ;  for  him,  organic  civil  unity 
could  only  find  adequate  expression  in  a  monarchy; 
there  must  be  some  one  human  being  to  embody  and 
personate  the  State.  Hegel  had  lived  through  the 
French  Revolution ;  and  Kant's  RepubHc  of  the 
Nations  was  for  him  a  dangerous  dream.  The 
Kingdom  of  Prussia  under  Frederick  the  Great, 
with  his  high  notion  of  duty  and  his  conception  of 
personal  monarchy,  was  a  close  approximation  to 
Hegel's  ideal. 

Now  it  is  in  the  army  that  the  State  is  most 


CLAUSEWITZ  AND  TREITSCHKE  9 

visibly  embodied  for  the  multitude.  Universal 
military  service  makes  every  able-bodied  man  an 
active  participator  in  the  State  ;  it  brings  home  to 
everyone  the  notion  of  civic  duty  and  self-sacrifice 
in  the  most  concrete  and  tangible  form.  The  general 
theory  of  duty,  so  strongly  inculcated  by  Kant, 
at  once  gives  force  to,  and  becomes  concentrated  in, 
the  duty  of  soldierly  obedience  and  discipUne.  And 
here  it  is  that  the  great  work  of  Clausewitz  on  war 
becomes  important  from  the  civic  point  of  view. 
Clausewitz  not  only  insisted  on  the  duty  of  every 
citizen  to  serve  in  the  army,  and  on  war  as  the  ultima 
ratio  of  State  policy,  but  he  made  its  principles 
intelligible  to  all.  Intelligence  was  called  in  to  aid 
the  moral  sense,  to  show  how  the  paramount  duty 
of  service  to  the  State  could  best  be  discharged. 

From  these  forerunners  it  is  but  a  short  step  to 
Treitschke,  the  great  historian,  who  is  the  outcome 
of  Hegel  on  one  side,  and  on  the  other  of  the  historical 
facts,  the  victorious  wars,  which  he  had  witnessed. 
Hegel  repudiated  the  idea  that  the  State  rests  on 
force ;  Treitschke,  with  these  facts  before  him, 
embraced  it.  In  his  Politik  he  combines,  more 
clearly  and  completely  than  any  other,  the  theory 
of  the  State  as  a  semi-divine  entity,  with  the  theory 
that  it  is  based  on  Force ;  from  which  it  follows 
that  the  army  is  its  highest  manifestation,  and  war 
its  primary  business.  "  War,"  he  says,  "  is  state- 
craft par  excellence.  Only  in  war  does  a  people 
really  become  a  people.  War  is  a  radical  medicine 
for  the  ills  of  State. ''^  And  again  :  ''  The  living 
God  will  take  good  care  that  war,  as  a  stern  medicine 
1  Politik,  i,  60. 


10  GOETHE 

for  humanity,  shall  constantly  recur.  .  .  .  Wars 
cannot  cease  ;  they  cannot  and  should  not,  so  long 
as  the  State  is  sovereign  among  sovereign  States/'^ 
These  views,  finally,  are  embodied,  still  more  crudely, 
in  Bernhardi,  for  whom  war  is  the  climax  of  civiliza- 
tion, and  in  a  host  of  other  German  pamphleteers. 
Might  is  recognized  as  Right ;  and  Schiller's  famous 
line,  "  Die  Weltgeschichte  ist  das  Weltgericht,"  is 
taken  to  mean  that  the  verdict  of  History — in  other 
words,  success — determines  what  is  just.  Thus  has 
Kant's  ''  categorical  imperative "  been  perverted, 
by  passing  through  a  series  of  refracting  media, 
into  the  duty  of  serving  in  the  army  and  of  making 
war. 

This,  then,  is  one  of  the  main  lines  which  German 
thought  has  followed.  But  there  is  another.  The 
second  current  which  has  gone  to  form  the  present 
theory  of  politics  is  traceable,  I  think,  to  Goethe, 
with  his  idea  of  self-culture,  a  sort  of  sublimated 
selfishness,  elevated  also  to  the  sphere  of  duty.  It 
is,  however,  an  idea  of  duty  very  different  from  that 
of  Kant  or  Fichte — ^the  duty  of  the  individual  to 
himself.  For  Goethe  the  State  hardly  existed, 
except  as  a  convenient  machine  for  social  adminis- 
tration. He  had  little  patriotism ;  he  turned  a 
deaf  ear  to  the  call  of  the  State  in  the  hour  of 
danger.  He  cared  naught  for  Germany,  despised 
Prussia,  and  admired  Napoleon,  if  he  did  not,  like 
Heine,  go  so  far  as  to  adore  him.  Goethe's  ideal  is 
not  self-abnegation  or  surrender  to  the  moral  law 
as  with  Kant,  still  less  self-sacrifice  to,  or  fusion  in, 
the  State,  as  with  Fichte.     It  is  self-cultivation, 

1  lb,,  i,  76,  77. 


SCHOPENHAUER  AND  NIETZSCHE        ii 

self-elevation,  not  by  mere  enjoyment,  but  by  self- 
discipline  and  Entbehrung,  There  is  nobility  too 
in  this  aim — for  the  noble-minded  man,  the  great 
man ;  but  it  is  tainted,  for  the  ordinary  man,  by 
the  emphasis  laid  on  self. 

This  tendency  is  carried  still  further  by  Schopen- 
hauer, who  elevated  the  Will — in  which  self  and  self- 
consciousness  are  most  clearly  visible — to  the  rank 
of  a  fundamental  principle.  The  world,  for  him,  is 
"  Will  and  Idea  "  ;  the  Will  is  the  ultimate  fact, 
inseparable  from  self,  that  by  which  man  becomes 
self-conscious,  by  which  he  really  lives.  As  for  the 
State  and  all  that  according  to  Hegel  (his  bete  noire) 
it  involves,  he  would  not  hear  of  it.  We  are  a  long 
way,  it  appears,  from  the  line  of  thought  which 
culminates  in  Treitschke  and  Bemhardi.  Yet  we 
shall  presently  see  them  combine. 

It  was  from  the  idea  of  self -culture  and  the  domin- 
ance of  will-power,  combined  with  Darwin's  theory 
of  the  Struggle  for  Life  and  the  Survival  of  the 
Fittest — ^that  Nietzsche's  notion  of  the  Superman 
was  evolved.  Schopenhauer  cursed  the  Will  to  Live, 
as  uselessly  prolonging  our  misery ;  but  Schopen- 
hauer was  a  pessimist.  The  force  of  Will  might  be 
put  to  other  uses  then  self-annihilation ;  it  was 
reserved  for  Nietzsche  to  discover  them.  There  is 
much  else  in  Nietzsche  besides  the  Superman — for 
instance,  much  scorn  poured  on  Germany,  and 
especially  on  Prussia  ;  but,  after  all,  the  ideal  of  the 
Superman  is  the  fertilizing  germ  in  his  teaching.  The 
Superman  is  the  highly  endowed  individual,  the  bom 
superior  person,  who  by  diligent  self -culture  and  self- 
denial  in  minor  things  raises  himself  to  a  position 


12  NIETZSCHE  AND  WAR 

of  predominance  above  his  fellows.  The  hero- 
worship  practised  by  Heine  and  extolled  by  Carlyle 
finds  in  him  its  object.  By  virtue  of  this  superiority 
he  acquires  not  only  the  power  but  the  right  to 
govern.  He  is  in  a  constant  state  of  war — first,  with 
his  weaker  self,  then  with  his  weaker  neighbours. 
Nietzsche's  feeling  about  war  is  shown  by  such 
sayings  as  "  It  is  said  that  a  good  cause  justifies  war; 
but  I  say  unto  you  that  a  good  war  justifies  any 
cause."  So  Frederick  the  Great  had  said,  "  I  take 
first ;  it  is  for  the  professors  afterwards  to  find  the 
justification."  And  again  :  "  My  brethren  in  war, 
I  love  you  from  the  very  heart.  Your  enemy  shall 
ye  seek,  your  war  shall  ye  wage,  and  for  the  sake  of 
your  thoughts.  Ye  shall^  love  peace  as  a  means 
to  new  wars,  and  the  short  peace  more  than  the 
long.  To  the  good  warrior  soundeth  '  Thou  shalt ' 
pleasant er  than  'I  will.'  So  live  your  Ufe  of  obe- 
dience and  of  war.  What  mattereth  a  long  life  ?  " 
Obedience  and  War  I — it  is  Prussian  militarism  in 
three  words.  Darwin,  who  recognized  the  moral 
law  as  profoundly  modifying  the  original  struggle 
for  life  (Schopenhauer's  Will  to  Live),  is  accepted 
only  as  laying  down  the  law  of  nature  (Hobbes* 
homo  homini  lupus)  ^  still  universally  valid.  It  is  a 
return  to  nature,  or  rather  a  recognition  of  its 
eternal  law,  that  is  preached.  In  his  Antichrist 
Nietzsche  execrated  Christianity  as  opposing  this 
return.  Might  is  Right ;  the  strong  man  can,  and 
therefore  may  and  should,  rule  as  he  likes.  And 
his  method  is  not  persuasion,  or  of  what  use  is  his 
strength  ?  It  is  force  and  war. 
We  come  at  last  to  the  point  at  which  the  two 


GOBINEAU^S  RACE-THEORY  13 

currents  of  thought  which  we  have  traced  are  fused 
in  one.  If  the  strong  man  may  and  should  rule,  so 
may  a  strong  combination  of  individuals,  in  other 
words  the  strong  State.  Did  not  Nietzsche  himself 
make  the  step,  when  he  divided  the  world  into  ruling 
and  servile  races  ?  And  which  is  to  be  the  strong 
and  therefore  dominant  State?  To  the  German 
the  answer  is  obvious.  But  it  was  not  always  so. 
Fichte  indeed  had  told  his  hearers  that  it  was  "  they, 
among  all  modern  peoples,  to  whom  the  germ  of 
human  perfection  in  a  special  sense  is  entrusted,  and 
on  whom  the  lead  in  its  development  is  conferred." 
But  few  Germans,  before  the  days  of  Bismarck, 
were  convinced  of  this.  A  strong  impulse  was,  how- 
ever, given  by  the  fantastic  but  attractive  theories 
of  the  Frenchman,  Count  Gobineau,  who,  writing 
in  the  forties  of  last  century,  indicated,  in  his  essay 
on  '*  The  InequaUty  of  Races,"  the  Teutonic  race 
as  the  race  of  the  future.  By  the  Teutonic  race 
Gobineau  meant  a  good  deal  more  than  the  German 
people ;  but  it  was  easy  for  Germans  to  convince 
themselves,  however  wrong  the  view  may  be,  that 
they  alone  had  kept  pure  the  Teutonic  breed.  He 
hated  and  despised  democracy,  fatal,  in  his  view, 
to  the  retention  of  racial  superiority.  The  theory 
stimulated  national  pride,  and  was  admirably 
calculated  to  support  the  military-absolutist  system 
to  which,  for  more  practical  reasons,  the  Germans 
were  inclined. 

Gobineau's  book,  hardly  noticed  elsewhere,  ger- 
minated slowly  in  the  German  brain.  His  Rassen- 
theorie  was  studied ;  a  Gobineaugesellschafi  was 
founded ;    and   the   astonishing   successes   of   the 


14    WOLTMANN  AND  CHAMBERLAIN 

period  1864-71  brought  it  general  credence  in  Ger- 
many. It  was  developed  to  an  absurdity  by  such 
writers  as  Woltmann,  who  claimed  Dante,  Lionardo 
and  many  other  great  men  of  the  past  as  Germans  ; 
and  with  more  plausibility  and  a  great  show  of 
learning  by  H.  S.  Chamberlain.  The  theory  has 
now  obtained  universal  acceptance  across  the  Rhine. 
The  Kaiser  himself  has  declared  his  people  to  be 
"  the  salt  of  the  earth  "  ;  and  a  host  of  minor 
persons,  professors  and  pamphleteers,  have  preached 
it  consistently,  before  and  still  more  blatantly  since 
the  War.  In  Germany  the  Germans  are  honestly 
believed  to  be  the  chosen  people,  and  Germany  the 
Super-State,  destined  to  rule  the  world  and  deserving 
its  predominance. 

Here,  then,  the  two  currents  of  thought  flow  to- 
gether into  a  mighty  stream.  Obedience  to  the  moral 
law,  in  other  words  duty,  is  incumbent  on  all.  The 
primary  and  fundamental  duty  is  duty  to  the  State. 
The  State  is  force  ;  its  essential  embodiment  is  the 
army,  its  primary  business  war.  Self-culture  is  also 
a  duty  ;  the  Will  is  power  ;  like  the  Superman,  the 
State  which  has  Kultur  {i.e.,  organization)  and  Will 
becomes  the  Super-State.  This  is  what  the  German 
State  has  become.  It  is  within  its  power,  therefore 
it  is  its  right  and  its  duty,  to  rule  the  world.  But 
this  dominance  cannot  be  obtained  except  by  force 
of  arms.  It  is  therefore  incumbent  on  every  German 
to  support  it  in  this  attempt ;  and  the  end  is  so 
great  and  good  that  it  justifies  all  means. 

Such  is  the  theory  ;  and  we  must  remember  that 
in  Germany  theories  are  apt  to  be  put  into  practice. 
That  Schwdrmerei  which  is  so  characteristic  of  the 


SUMMARY  15 

German  mind  is  easily  transferred  to  politics ;  the 
dream  of  universal  dominion  has  seized  upon  a 
whole  nation.  ''Reflection/'  said  Mme.  de  Stael, 
"  calms  other  peoples ;  it  inflames  the  German." 
And  so  the  German  mind  has  been  prepared  for 
war. 


CHAPTER  II 


CIRCUMSTANCES     AND     CONDITIONS,     AIMS     AND 
TENDENCIES,     OF     MODERN     GERMANY 

We  have  next  to  consider  the  events,  the  circum- 
stances and  conditions,  which  contributed  to 
strengthen  this  pecuHar  state  of  mind,  and  led 
Prussia  first,  and  afterwards  the  rest  of  Germany, 
to  give  it  practical  expression. 

First,  look  at  the  geographical  position  of  Prussia 
and  of  Germany.  In  early  days,  under  the  Great 
Elector,  Prussia  was  a  little  State  in  a  vast  plain, 
with  no  natural  frontier  at  all,  except  where  parts 
of  her  dominions  touched  the  sea.  Expanded  as 
she  was  by  Frederick  the  Great,  the  Prussian  State 
was  a  straggling,  ill-compacted  domain,  its  western 
lands  cut  off  from  the  main  body,  exposed  to  attack 
all  round.  The  Government  was  forced  to  be,  as 
Frederick  expressed  it,  "  tou jours  en  vedette " 
— always  ready,  always  on  the  watch.  Moreover, 
as  I  need  hardly  remind  you,  Germany  was,  until 
the  latter  half  of  the  last  century,  little  more  than 
a  geographical  expression.  Tom  between  the  con- 
flicting claims  of  Prussia  and  Austria,  and  open  to 
the  intrigues  of  foreign  Powers,  Germany  was  dis- 
united within  and  indefensible  without.  It  was  not 
till  after  the  successful  wars  of  1864-71  that  Germany 

16 


GEOGRAPHICAL  POSITION  17 

could  consider  herself  in  these  respects — poHtical 
unity  and  military  defensibility — comparatively 
safe.  Since  then,  the  Vosges  have  formed  a  natural 
boundary  on  the  south-west ;  the  neutral  States  of 
Holland,  Belgium,  and  Switzerland  protect  her 
from  attack  on  the  west  and  south ;  the  alliance 
with  Austria  secures  her  on  the  south-east.  But  on 
the  east  she  still  has  no  natural  limit ;  and  the 
Russian  frontier  is  only  180  miles  from  Berlin. 
Moreover,  her  position  in  the  centre  of  Europe, 
though  it  has  great  strategical  advantages,  exposes 
her  to  simultaneous  attack  on  two  fronts.  Lastly, 
her  coast  was  till  recently  subject  to  the  disadvan- 
tage of  being  cut  in  two  by  Denmark — a  difficulty 
not  completely  obviated  by  the  Kiel  Canal ;  and, 
when  her  ships  pass  out  into  the  North  Sea,  there 
lies  England,  like  a  huge  breakwater,  right  across 
her  path  to  the  Atlantic — a  fact  which,  in  case  of 
British  hostility,  exposes  her  merchant  shipping  to 
peculiar  hazard.  In  such  conditions  it  is  not  sur- 
prising that  the  military  spirit  burnt  itself  into  the 
very  heart  of  the  Prussian  people,  from  whom  it  has 
spread  to  the  rest  of  Germany. 

Next,  what  is  the  teaching  of  history  for  the  Ger- 
man people  ?  The  history  of  Prussia  for  130  years, 
from  the  accession  of  Frederick  the  Great  to  the 
triumph  of  Bismarck,  is  on  the  one  hand  a  history 
of  successful  war,  on  the  other  a  tale  of  humiliation 
illustrating  the  danger  of  being  unprepared  for  war. 
Throughout  the  whole  period,  Prussia  depended  on 
her  army  to  a  degree  unparalleled  in  any  other 
State.  France,  it  is  true,  in  the  great  days  of 
Louis  XIV,  made  conquests  by  force  of  arms.    War 


i8         MILITARY  HISTORY  OF  PRUSSIA 

created  the  Empire  of  Napoleon ;  and,  for  a  time, 
successful  war  raised  the  prestige  of  the  Second 
Empire.  The  British  Empire  was  also  largely  the 
result  of  war,  naval  and  military,  in  all  parts  of  the 
world.  But  in  neither  country  was  war  brought 
home  to  the  people,  except  in  France  by  the  inva- 
sions of  1814  and  1815,  in  so  intimate  and  terrible 
a  form  as  it  constantly  was  to  the  inhabitants  of 
Prussia.  Modern  Prussia  was  made  by  Frederick 
the  Great  in  two  great  wars,  waged  largely,  it  must 
be  remembered,  on  Prussian  soil.  The  army  which 
his  father  founded,  and  which  he  developed  and  led 
to  victory,  kept  up  the  military  prestige  of  Prussia 
till  the  end  of  the  century,  and  was  so  dominant  a 
factor  in  its  greatness,  that  Mirabeau  could  say 
with  truth  '*  The  only  industry  of  Prussia  is  war.'' 
But  the  obsolescence  of  Frederick's  system  and 
the  want  of  leadership  in  Prussia  nearly  proved  the 
country's  ruin.  In  the  clash  with  Napoleon,  Prussia 
was  humiliated  and  reduced  to  an  almost  servile 
condition ;  it  was  the  revival  of  the  army  on  a 
national  basis,  and  the  introduction  of  universal 
military  service,  which  raised  her  from  the  dust  in 
the  Wars  of  Liberation.  But  again  neglect  of  mili- 
tary preparation  gave  a  set-back  to  Prussian 
ambitions  ;  and  in  the  surrender  at  Olmiitz  {1850) 
she  was  forced  to  yield  the  hegemony  to  Austria. 
Twelve  years  later  it  became  the  first  care  of  Bis- 
marck to  reform  and  strengthen  the  army  ;  for  this 
he  dared  to  violate  the  constitution  and  to  stake 
his  own  political  existence.  The  man  '*  of  blood  and 
iron  "  achieved  his  aim,  and  in  three  successful  wars 
he  created  the  German  Empire  under  Prussian  rule. 


GERMANY  PRUSSIANIZED  19 

This  achievement  fixed  an  indelible  mark  not  only 
on  the  soul  of  Prussia  but  on  that  of  Germany. 
Germany  became  Prussianized  ;  the  Prussian  view 
of  the  State,  the  Prussian  military  system,  were 
gratefully  adopted  throughout  the  land ;  and, 
whatever  relics  of  the  old  German  Partikularismus 
may  still  be  found,  they  are  wholly  ineffective.  It 
is  non-Prussians,  like  Treitschke  and  others,  who 
have  given  Prussianism  a  philosophical  basis  ;  and 
many  of  its  strongest  supporters  are  to  be  found  in 
the  South.  Moreover,  a  whole  school  of  historians, 
from  Dahlmann  and  Droysen  to  Sybel  and  Treit- 
schke, contributed  their  aid  to  the  Prussianizing 
process,  by  teaching  and  writing  German  history 
from  the  Prussian  point  of  view.  The  policy  of 
Prussia  was  praised  as  a  far-sighted  national  policy 
from  Frederick  the  Great  to  William  the  First. 
Even  Ranke  supported  the  political  theory  by  con- 
centrating attention  on  the  diplomatic  relations  of 
States ;  and  Mommsen  aided  absolutism  by  his 
impassioned  panegyric  of  Caesar. 

The  sudden  rise  of  Germany  was  due  to  the 
army  ;  an  overweening  belief  in  the  army,  an  exag- 
gerated conception  of  military  power,  was  the  in- 
evitable result.  Thenceforward  the  army,  which 
had  made  the  Empire,  was  kept  up  to  retain  it. 
Bismarck,  it  is  true,  stood  mainly  on  the  defensive 
for  the  rest  of  his  political  life ;  he  was  satisfied, 
and  he  thought  the  nation  should  be  satisfied,  with 
the  triumph  he  had  won.  It  was  now  the  time  for 
consolidation,  not  for  conquest.  In  diplomatic 
intercourse,  the  army,  kept  in  the  highest  state  of 
efficiency  and  readiness,  would  give  sufficient  weight 


20  ECONOMIC  EXPANSION 

to  German  demands  without  going  the  length  of 
war.  On  these  principles  he  acted ;  and,  though 
twice  at  least  he  was  on  the  brink  of  aggression,  it 
cannot  be  said  that,  during  the  last  twenty  years  of 
his  rule,  his  policy  was  aggressive.  But  during  the 
period  of  peace  the  nation  did  not  cease  to  believe 
in,  nor  did  it  neglect,  the  army  ;  quite  the  contrary. 
With  the  recollection  of  Jena  and  Olmiitz  in  their 
minds,  the  Germans  took  care  that  they  should  not 
be  found  defenceless  again.  Had  this  been  all,  the 
rest  of  the  world  would  have  had  no  cause  for  alarm. 
But  it  was  not  all.  The  German  leaders,  at  least, 
came  to  regard  the  weapon  of  defence  as  an  instru- 
ment of  aggression.  The  causes  which  have  led  to 
this  all-important  change  have  next  to  be  considered. 

The  economic  expansion  of  Germany  during  the 
last  half-century,  especially  during  the  last  quarter 
of  that  time,  has  been  nothing  short  of  marvellous. 
The  economic  progress  of  the  United  States  since  the 
Civil  War  has  perhaps  been  equally  rapid,  but  across 
the  Atlantic  the  growth  of  military  resources  has  not 
kept  level  with  it.  Military  tendencies  are  often  re- 
garded as  antagonistic  to  commercial  and  industrial 
growth,  but  this  is  not  necessarily  the  case.  It  was 
not  so  in  England  under  EUzabeth ;  it  was  not  so 
when  Walpole  was  driven  from  office  for  his  pacific 
policy  towards  a  commercial  rival,  or  when  Chatham 
received  the  thanks  of  the  City  for  having  made 
commerce  to  flourish  by  war.  It  has  certainly  not 
been  the  case  with  Germany  during  the  last  fifty 
years. 

The  enormous  industrial  and  commercial  growth 
of  Germany  since  1870  could  never  have  taken  place 


ECONOMIC  EXPANSION  21 

— ^in  spite  of  Mr.  Norman  Angell — ^without  the  suc- 
cessful war  which  united  the  nation,  finally  swept 
away  its  internal  barriers,  and  conferred  upon  it  that 
security  from  invasion,  that  self-confidence  within 
and  that  respect  from  without,  which  are  indis- 
pensable to  economic  expansion  on  a  large  scale. 
What  the  industrial  and  commercial  expansion  of 
Germany  has  been  you  may  read  in  Prince  Billow's 
book.  Imperial  Germany,  or  in  the  works  of  Mr. 
W.  H.  Dawson  and  others.  I  am  not  going  to 
burden  you  with  statistics,  but  I  may  remind  you 
that  since  1870  the  foreign  trade  of  Germany  has 
more  than  trebled,  rising  from  300  to  950  millions, 
while  her  mercantile  shipping  has  grown  in  like 
proportion.  In  the  iron  trade  Germany  has  long 
outstripped  Great  Britain ;  in  the  application  of 
science,  especially  chemistry,  to  manufactures  she 
is  far  ahead.  The  Industrial  Revolution  which  took 
place  in  England  in  the  eighteenth  century  has  been 
repeated  in  Germany  on  a  larger  scale ;  she  has 
passed  from  a  mainly  agricultural  to  a  mainly  in- 
dustrial country.  Her  population  has  risen  from 
41  to  67  millions  ;  the  yearly  addition  (though  the 
rate  of  increase  is  falling)  is  nearly  a  million.  Emi- 
gration has  sunk  from  about  200,000  a  year  to  a 
negligible  quantity.  The  change  has  been  enormous  ; 
the  social  character  of  the  whole  people,  and  with 
this  its  aims  and  ambitions,  have  been  revolution- 
ized. What,  from  our  particular  point  of  view,  are 
the  chief  results  ? 

In  the  first  place,  the  growth  of  wealth,  combined 
with  military  power,  has  inspired  great  and,  within 
limits,  justifiable  self-confidence.    A  hundred,  even 


22  GERMAN  SELF-CONFIDENCE 

sixty  years  ago,  Germany,  compared  with  France 
and  England,  was  a  poor  country  ;  now  she  is  very 
rich.  She  has  the  miUtary  force ;  she  has  also  the 
wealth  to  support  it,  the  sinews  of  war.  As  the 
Jingo  doggerel  put  it,  *'  She's  got  the  ships,  she's  got 
the  men,  she's  got  the  money  too."  She  is  fully 
conscious  of  her  power ;  her  national  pride  and 
national  ambitions  have  grown  with  it.  Her  eleva- 
tion, so  sudden  and  complete,  from  a  humble  posi- 
tion to  the  first  rank  among  the  nations,  could  not 
but  intoxicate  a  people,  especially  one  so  susceptible 
as  the  German.  It  has  come  to  confirm  the  ideas  of 
Gobineau  and  his  followers  with  the  logic  of  facts. 
A  nation  so  triumphant  in  war,  so  prominent  in  the 
arts  of  peace,  must  surely  be  the  select  people,  fated 
by  an  observant  Providence  to  rule  the  world.  Mili- 
tary success  alone  would  hardly  have  accomplished 
this  change  of  temper ;  it  needed  the  great  acces- 
sion of  wealth,  and  the  organization  of  the  national 
resources — financial,  industrial,  and  commercial — to 
establish  it.  The  phenomenon  of  the  "  swollen 
head,"  so  often  observed  in  parvenus,  especially  in 
that  class  known  as  nouveaux  riches — ^to  which 
Germany  belongs — ^has  been  repeated  on  a  gigantic 
scale  ;  and  the  temptation  to  use  the  new  resources 
in  the  acquisition  of  more  wealth  by  force  of  arms 
has  become  overpoweringly  strong.  Remember 
Bliicher's  observation,  ''What a  city  to  loot!"  as  he 
rode  down  Cheapside  with  the  Allied  Generals  in 
1815.  The  Prussian  soldier  has  always  been  inclined 
to  loot ;  it  was  now  to  be  the  turn  of  the  State. 
Accordingly  an  alliance  has  been  struck  between 
two  parties  hitherto  opposed — ^the  pure  militarists. 


WEAKNESS  OF  MATERIALISM  23 

the  Junkers  and  the  mihtary  chiefs,  the  Agrarians, 
on  the  one  side  ;  the  great  captains  of  industry  and 
finance,  the  Balhns  and  the  Gwinners,  on  the  other. 
Their  interests  appearing  to  converge,  they  have 
agreed  to  pursue  henceforward  a  poHcy  of  aggran- 
dizement in  common.  The  class  hitherto  dominant 
in  Prussia,  of  whom  it  was  hterally  true  that  their 
only  industry  was  war,  has  been  immensely  strength- 
ened by  the  adhesion  of  the  commercial  and  indus- 
trial leaders,  disposing  of  vast  wealth  and  controlling 
immense  material  resources. 

It  is  true  that  the  new  spirit  of  confidence  in  Ger- 
many has  its  weak  sides.  The  growth  of  industrial- 
ism and  commercialism  has  radically  altered,  or  at 
least  obscured,  those  qualities  for  which  Germany 
was  once  admired  and  even  loved — the  qualities 
of  simplicity  and  kindliness,  of  Gemilthlichkeit  and 
Biederkeit,  the  unselfish  pursuit  of  literature  and 
science  for  its  own  ends.  The  old  values  have  been 
/! upset;  Germany  has  become  materialized.  The 
^commercial  spirit,  the  taint  of  unscrupulous  com- 
petition, have  invaded  every  walk  of  life.  Force  and 
fraud  are  become  legitimate  means  in  the  race  to 
become  rich  ;  ''  rem.  Si  possis,  recte  ;  si  non,  quo- 
cunque  modo  rem.''  This,  no  doubt,  has  been  more 
or  less  the  case  in  every  nation,  our  own  included, 
but  in  none  so  obviously  as  in  the  German.  Their 
literature  has  become  hard  and  cruel,  their  fiction 
often  coarse  and  brutal.  History  is  distorted  by  a 
disingenuous  and  narrow  patriotism.  Science  is 
pursued,  not  for  itself,  but  for  its  applicability  to 
the  pursuit  of  wealth.  Forty  years  ago,  when  I  was 
a  student  at  Bonn,  the  Greek  professor  Bemays  told 
c 


24  GERMAN  DELUSIONS 

me  he  feared  that  the  growth  of  commerce  and  mih- 
tarism  which  would  result  from  the  victories  of  1870 
would  undermine  the  old  ideals  of  Culture  ;  and  the 
prophecy  has  come  true.  Nietzsche  himself  said 
that  *'  the  German  Empire  would  destroy  the 
German  mind." 

The  effects  of  these  new  tendencies  on  the  foreign 
policy  of  Germany  are  too  obvious  to  require  point- 
ing out.    But  it  may  be  worth  while  to  call  atten- 
tion to  another  outcome  of  this  overweening  pride. 
Nothing  obscures  the  judgment  so  much  as  vanity 
and  self-conceit.     A  false  appraisement  of  oneself 
is  certain  to  lead  to  a  false  opinion  of  one's  neigh- 
bours.    And  this  has  been  notably  the  case  with 
Germany.     Always  somewhat  unsympathetic  and 
therefore  uninteUigent  of  others,  the  Germans  have 
been  led  by  their  pride  on  the  one  hand,  by  their 
desires  on  the  other,  into  the  grossest  miscalcula- 
tions as  to  the  mind  of  foreign  nations,  and  even  as 
to  the  political  conditions  of  other  countries.   Never 
has  it  proved  more  true  that  the  wish  is  father  to 
the  thought.    The  Germans  have  been  led  to  believe 
that  France  was  utterly  decadent ;    that  Russia 
would  collapse  at  a  blow ;  that  England  would  never 
fight,  and  that,  if  she  did,  her  Colonies  would  desert 
her,  India  would  revolt,  and  the  British  Empire 
would  crumble  to  pieces.    There  is  no  end,  in  fact, 
to  the  delusions  and  false  hopes  which  have  been 
nourished  in  the  minds  of  Germans,  as  a  result  of 
this  habitual  glorification  of  themselves  and  depre- 
ciation   of    their   neighbours.      Their   vanity    has 
destroyed  their  judgment. 
So  much  for  the  moral  effects  of  commercial  and 


EARLY  GERMAN  COLONIZATION  25 

industrial  expansion  in  Germany.  Its  political 
results  have  been  even  more  important,  and  bear 
more  directly  on  our  subject — the  deeper  causes  of 
the  War.  Among  these  political  results  the  first  to 
be  noticed  is  the  demand  for  colonies.  Colonies,  of 
a  sort,  Germany  has  long  possessed,  but  not  such 
as  were  of  great  practical  value  to  the  country  of 
their  origin.  I  refer  to  the  numerous  scattered 
settlements  of  German-speaking  people  which  are 
to  be  found  in  neighbouring  and  even  more  distant 
countries — in  Hungary,  in  Poland,  in  Western  and 
Southern  Russia  as  far  as  the  Caucasus,  in  the 
Balkane  and  in  Syria.  More  than  seventy  years  ago, 
Friedrich  List  had  advocated  the  colonization  of 
Hungary  and  the  valley  of  the  lower  Danube,  and 
had  pointed  out  that  these  undeveloped  but  fertile 
lands  offered  excellent  prospects  to  German  settlers. 
But  his  ideas  had  to  wait  for  another  generation 
before  they  were  revived  in  connection  with  much 
vaster  schemes.  Little  is  known  of  these  outposts 
of  Deutschtum  outside  Germany ;  and  even  in  that 
country  sUght  attention  was  paid  to  them  till 
quite  recent  times.  The  later  German  settlements 
in  South  America,  especially  those  in  Brazil  and 
Argentina,  have  attracted  more  remark,  because 
they  seem  to  offer  greater  potentialities,  even  a  way 
of  evading  the  prohibitions  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
Of  late  the  tendency  has  been  to  regard  all  such 
settlements  as  possible  nuclei  from  which  German 
influences,  economical  and  political,  may  radiate ; 
and  the  remarkable  persistency  with  which,  in  some 
cases  after  many  generations,  these  settlers  have 
preserved  their  national  language,  habits,  and  ideas 


26       OVER-POPULATION  AND  COLONIES 

undoubtedly  lends  support  to  such  views.  More- 
over, these  settlements  now  fall  into  their  place  as 
parts  of  that  scheme  of  ''  peaceful  penetration  " 
which  has  of  late  been  pursued  with  such  success 
in  Holland  and  Belgium,  in  Italy,  in  Northern 
France,  and  even  in  some  parts  of  the  British 
Empire.  But,  whatever  value  these  colonies  might 
eventually  acquire,  they  were  of  no  great  immediate 
importance.  It  was  something  of  a  very  different 
kind  that  Germany  began,  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
last  century,  to  require. 

German  writers  on  this  subject  habitually  urge 
the  arguments  that  colonies  are  needed,  firstly,  in 
order  that  the  surplus  of  the  teeming  population  may 
not  be  lost  to  the  Empire  by  emigration  to  non- 
German  lands,  and,  secondly,  in  order  that  fresh 
reservoirs  of  the  raw  material  used  in  German 
factories  may  be  opened  up,  and  new  markets  for 
the  disposal  of  German  manufactures,  with  unre- 
stricted rights  of  entry,  may  be  provided.  This 
became  still  more  important  after  the  adoption  (in 
1879)  of  a  protectionist  policy,  with  its  consequent 
tendency  to  over-production.  It  is  true  that,  of 
late  years,  the  growth  of  population  has  ceased  to 
be  a  cause  of  immediate  alarm,  for  the  increase  of 
industrial  activity  has  almost  entirely  absorbed  it ; 
there  has,  indeed,  been  a  considerable  immigration. 
But  this,  it  is  argued,  can  only  be  a  temporary 
solution  ;  the  time  will  inevitably  come,  and  come 
soon,  when  Germany  will  be  over-populated,  and 
the  surplus  of  hands  and  brains  will  flow  out  to 
strengthen  and  enrich  Germany's  competitors,  and 
be  lost  for  ever  to  Deutschtum, 


ECONOMIC  REQUIREMENTS  2^ 

The  need  of  reservoirs  of  raw  products  and  of  new 
markets  for  German  manufactures,  under  German 
control,  is  even  more  immediate  and  insistent.  The 
suppHes  of  coal,  iron,  and  other  metals  in  Germany 
are  not  inexhaustible  ;  other  countries,  with  nascent 
industries,  will  more  and  more  desire  to  keep  their 
supplies  for  themselves ;  materials  for  textile  in- 
dustries (wool  and  cotton),  rubber  and  many  metals, 
are  only  to  be  got  on  a  large  scale  in  countries  more 
or  less  primitive,  agricultural  or  uncivilized.  More- 
over, many  markets  for  manufactured  goods  are 
already  protected  by  customs  barriers  which  it  taxes 
even  German  skill  and  persistency  to  surmount ; 
profits  are  diminished,  and  even  loss  incurred,  by 
such  processes  as  '*  dumping ''  in  order  to  force 
closed  doors.  The  prospect  that  these  barriers  may 
be  raised  still  higher  alarms  the  trading  community. 
The  McKinley  tariff  in  the  United  States,  the  denun- 
ciation of  the  commercial  treaty  in  Canada,  raised 
loud  outcries ;  while  the  chances  of  Tariff  Reform  in 
England  have  been  anxiously  canvassed  by  German 
economists.  These  dangers  and  their  consequences 
have  been  impressed  on  the  public  by  many  writers  ; 
and  the  necessity  of  evading  or  overcoming  them 
furnishes  convincing  material  for  the  Pan-German 
League.  To  these  material  incentives  must  be  added 
the  vague  yearning  after  world-power  which  fills  so 
many  ambitious  German  minds,  and  has  driven  so 
many  German  pens.  A  great  people  like  the  Ger- 
man could  not  be  content  with  Europe.  Germany 
must  become  a  Weltmacht  ;  and,  to  be  a  Weltmacht, 
you  must  have  a  colonial  empire.  Without  her 
oversea  dominions  and  dependencies,  Great  Britain, 


28  THE  COLONIAL  MOVEMENT 

the  World-power  par  excellence,  would  be  nothing 
at  all. 
r  Such  were  the  ideas  and  motives  that  animated 
the  Colonial  Movement  which  began  in  Germany 
about  1880.  Two  years  later  it  took  shape  in  the 
foundation  of  the  German  Colonial  Society.  It  was 
about  the  same  time  that  the  '*  scramble  for  Africa  " 
commenced.  In  1879  ^^e  Belgian  occupation  of  the 
Congo  began,  and  the  Dual  Control  was  estabUshed 
in  Egypt.  Next  year  France  resumed  her  activities 
in  West  Africa,  and  in  1881  occupied  Tunis.  In  1882 
Great  Britain  took  control  of  Egypt  and  about  the 
same  time  of  Basutoland,  while  Italy  occupied 
Eritrea.  In  1883  the  French,  who  had  been  pushing 
into  Upper  Nigeria,  began  to  occupy  Madagascar ; 
and  next  year  we  took  Bechuanaland  and  Nyasa- 
land.  Bismarck  had  hitherto  turned  a  deaf  ear  to 
all  the  prayers  and  warnings  of  the  colonial  party. 
His  policy  was  not  colonial  expansion,  but  consolida- 
tion ;  he  was  reluctant  to  add  the  danger  of  friction 
abroad  to  his  preoccupations  in  Europe  ;  Germany 
had  no  money  to  spare  for  colonial  enterprise,  and 
no  fleet  to  protect  her  colonies  if  founded.  Such 
were  his  reasons  for  abstention.  But  in  1884  the 
pressure  became  too  strong  for  him,  and  he  gave 
way.  After  much  negotiation  with  Great  Britain, 
in  which  it  must  be  said  we  played  a  sorry  part, 
Bismarck  proclaimed  a  German  protectorate  in 
South- West  Africa,  and  sanctioned  the  occupation 
of  Togoland  and  Cameroon.  In  the  same  year  the 
Colonial  Conference  at  Berlin  announced  to  the 
world  that  Germany  was  henceforth  to  take  her 
share    of   *'  the   white   man's   burden  ** — and   the 


COLONIAL  EXPANSION  2g 

white  man's  plunder.     German  colonial  expansion 
had  begun. 

The  era  of  great  colonial  companies  followed — ^the 
German  East  Africa  Company  in  1885,  the  British 
East  Africa  Company  in  1886,  the  British  South 
Africa  Company  in  1889,  and  many  others.  The 
islands  of  the  Southern  Pacific  attracted  German 
enterprise  ;  and  parts  of  New  Guinea,  Samoa,  and 
other  islands  were  occupied.  In  the  last  decade  of 
the  nineteenth  century  a  series  of  treaties  settled 
many  possible  causes  of  friction  and  determined  the 
boundaries  of  the  various  colonies  in  Africa — Anglo- 
French  conventions  in  1890,  1898,  and  1899 ;  an 
Anglo-German  convention  in  1890,  and  a  secret  one 
in  1898 ;  an  Anglo-Portuguese  treaty  in  1891,  and 
many  other  minor  arrangements.  Never  before 
was  a  whole  continent  parcelled  out  with  so  little 
trouble.  Germany  had  got  her  "  place  in  the  sun,*' 
though  it  must  be  allowed  that  her  acquisitions  were 
small  in  area  and  sometimes  poor  in  quality  compared 
with  those  made  in  the  same  period  by  other  Powers, 
especially  France  and  England.  Nor  can  it  be  said 
that  her  colonial  possessions  have,  so  far,  added  to 
her  strength,  or  attained  the  object  for  which  they 
were  acquired  ;  almost  all  of  them  have  cost  more, 
some  very  much  more,  than  they  have  brought  in. 
But  there  they  are — or  rather  were — a  nucleus,  at 
least,  which  Germany  hoped  to  enlarge  in  due  time, 
by  diplomacy  or  arms.  And  the  desire  for  such 
enlargement  has  been — as  we  saw  in  the  negotia- 
tions immediately  preceding  the  War — an  important 
element  in  German  policy.  Colonies  are  regarded 
as  essential  to  a  Weltmacht;  and,  if  all  the  most 


30        TREATIES  AND  CUSTOMS-UNIONS 

eligible  parts  of  the  earth  are  already  occupied — 
well,  they  must  be  taken  from  a  country  with  a 
stationary  population,  like  France,  or  from  a  small 
State,  like  Belgium,  which,  being  neutraUzed  in 
Europe,  has  no  right  to  any  foreign  possessions  at  all. 

German  colonies  have  proved  rather  disappoint- 
ing, but,  even  if  they  had  been  more  successful,  they 
would  hardly  have  satisfied  German  ambitions,  or 
been  regarded  as  sufficient  outlets  for  or  feeders  of 
German  trade.  Commercial  and  industrial  exigencies 
have  prompted  other  schemes  and  methods.  Com- 
mercial treaties,  advantageous  to  Germany,  form 
one  of  these  methods.  A  notable  example  is  the 
treaty  forced  upon  Russia  during  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  which  gave  valuable  rights  to  Ger- 
man products  while  laying  a  heavy  duty  on  Russian 
com.  The  certainty  that  Russia  would  not  renew 
this  treaty  on  its  expiration  in  1916  has  been  re- 
garded as  a  minor  cause  of  the  War  ;  and  the  making 
of  similar  or  much  more  one-sided  treaties  with  the 
States  to  be  defeated  by  Germany  is  frequently  held 
up  by  German  writers  as  one  of  the  advantages  to 
be  derived  from  a  miUtary  triumph. 

But  commercial  treaties  are  only  a  minor  item  in 
the  German  programme.  The  idea  of  an  immense 
expansion  of  the  existing  Customs  Union  hovers 
before  the  eyes  of  many  German  writers.  We  find 
it  at  least  as  far  back  as  the  year  1892,  in  a  work  by 
Julius  von  Eckhardt,  entitled  Berlin-Wien-Rom, 
A  great  Mitteleuropdischer  Zollverein  is  to  be  formed, 
embracing  Austria,  Italy,  Switzerland  and  other 
small  States,  which  will  be  either  forced  to  join  or 
economically  starved  into  adhesion.     The  number 


CENTRAL-EUROPEAN  CUSTOMS-UNION    3^ 

of  States  so  brought  under  the  aegis  of  Germany 
varies  in  other  proposals,  according  to  the  ambition 
of  the  writer  ;  but  it  is  always  so  large  as  to  be  com- 
pletely self-supporting,  while  the  economic  pressure 
which  it  will  be  able  to  exert  on  other  States  or 
Leagues  will  be  irresistible.  In  a  remarkable  pam- 
phlet published  in  1895,  Germania  Triumphans,  the 
ultimate  triumph  of  Germany  is  foretold  as  being 
accomplished  in  1915,  after  a  series  of  gigantic  wars  ; 
and  these  wars  are  due  originally  to  commercial 
rivalry  alone,  and  to  the  attempts  of  other  Powers, 
to  stifle  German  trade  by  means  of  tariff  leagues. 
That  commercial  unity  paves  the  way  for  political, 
the  history  of  the  Zollverein  is  there  to  prove  ;  and 
these  writers  make  it  clear  that  what  they  contem- 
plate is  a  vast  combination  of  States  under  German 
hegemony,  in  other  words  under  Prussian  rule,  which 
shall  ensure  world-wide  domination.  Whether  com- 
mercial or  poHtical  control  is  the  ultimate  aim 
matters  little ;  the  point  is  that  politics  and  trade 
are  regarded  as  inseparable,  and  that  successful  war 
is  the  means  by  which  the  double  end  is  to  be  achieved. 
When  this  is  accomplished,  universal  peace  will 
reign,  and  triumphant  Deutschtum  will  regenerate 
the  world.  Such  are  the  dreams  and  such  the 
projects  which  have  occupied  many  active  German 
brains  during  the  last  twenty  years  or  more.  But 
commercial  and  colonial  expansion,  going  hand  in 
hand,  have  had  other  notable  results. 

One  of  these  is  the  rapid  and  menacing  growth  of 
Socialism.  It  is  true  that  the  Social-Democratic 
party  is  by  no  means  wholly  Sociahst ;  the  majority 
of  its  members  are  rather  what  we  should    call 


32       SOCIALISM  AND  TRADE  METHODS 

Democrats  or  Radicals ;  its  immediate  aim  is  not 
Socialism,  but  political  reform — a  radical  change 
in  the  constitution.  This  is,  however,  of  no  importance 
in  the  present  connection ;  the  point  is  that  a  large 
and  growing  section  of  the  artisan  population,  and 
not  the  artisan  only,  demands  political  reforms  which 
would  cut  at  the  root  of  the  existing  bureaucratic 
autocracy.  The  danger  has  long  been  obvious ; 
divergence  of  opinion  on  the  question  how  to  meet 
it  is  said,  on  good  authority,  to  have  been  the 
immediate  cause  of  Bismarck's  dismissal  in  1890. 
But  of  late  years  it  has  grown  alarmingly  ;  in  1912 
the  Social-Democrats  numbered  no  in  a  Reichstag 
of  357  members.  The  prospect  of  domestic  revolu- 
tion has  driven  rulers  into  foreign  war  before  now ; 
and  it  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  the  spectre  of 
Socialism  and  the  menace  of  a  revolutionary  prole- 
tariat have  contributed  to  make  the  great  capitaUsts, 
the  dominant  military  party,  and  the  Emperor  him- 
self, already  inclined  on  other  grounds  to  war,  more 
ready  to  adopt  this  solution  as  an  alternative. 

Another  danger  appears  also  to  have  arisen  from 
the  peculiar  methods  by  which  German  industry 
and  commerce  have  been  expanded,  and  from  the 
necessities  which  these  methods  impose.  These 
methods  and  necessities  do  not  seem  to  have 
attracted  much  attention  in  this  country,  but  have 
been  ably  expounded  by  foreign  writers,  notably  by 
Prof.  Denis  and  M.  Baillod  in  France,  by  Prof. 
Millioud  (of  Lausanne)  in  his  book  La  Caste  domin- 
ante  allemande,  and  by  others.  According  to  these 
writers,  German  industrial  and  financial  expansion 
has  been  built  up  on  a  vast  system  of  credit.    The 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMAN  TRADE   33 

result  is  a  huge  and  growing  accumulation  of  debt. 
The  necessity  of  securing  the  capital  already  in- 
volved, and  the  payment  of  interest,  necessitate  a 
larger  output  and  therefore  an  increased  outlay,  the 
capital  for  which  can  only  be  obtained  by  an  increase 
of  indebtedness.  The  manufacturers  and  the  finan- 
ciers who  support  them  are  therefore  involved  in  a 
vicious  circle.  The  magnificent  edifice  is  hollow  at 
the  base.  Meanwhile  they  spend  profusely ;  the 
whole  standard  of  living  has  risen  ;  the  thrift  which 
is  so  conspicuous  in  France,  and  to  which  the  financial 
soundness  of  the  French  nation  owes  so  much,  is 
wanting  in  Germany.  A  comparison  of  German 
exports  and  imports  tells  a  similar  tale.  M.  Baillod 
shows  that  while,  down  to  about  thirty  years  ago, 
exports  and  imports  were  fairly  balanced,  since  1887 
the  excess  of  imports  has  gone  on  growing,  till  it  has 
reached  in  thirty  years  the  sum  of  over  240  millions 
steriing.  In  this  country,  as  we  know,  imports 
habitually  exceed  exports ;  but  the  difference  is 
covered  by  the  large  profits  on  our  carrying  trade 
and  the  interest  on  our  foreign  loans.  Neither 
source  of  supply  exists  to  any  appreciable  extent  in 
Germany.  In  spite,  therefore,  of  the  enormous 
growth  of  trade,  especially  overseas  trade,  Germany 
is  in  reality  poorer  by  240  miUions.  Thus,  in  order 
to  secure  the  progress  made  and  to  avoid  collapse, 
the  pace  has  ever  to  become  faster,  the  output 
larger — and  this  in  the  face  of  gorged  markets,  and 
markets  which  show  a  tendency  to  be  more  and  more 
closed  to  foreign  goods. 

In  the  presence  of  these  conditions,  imagine  the 
difficulties  that  would  arise  from  the  establishment 


34  ECONOMIC  MOTIVES  OF  WAR 

of  a  Customs  Union  between  France  and  Russia,  or 
a  Tariff  League  embracing  the  British  Empire,  or  a 
great  rise  of  tariffs  in  the  United  States,  involving 
such  restrictions  as  would  practically  stop  the  sale 
of  foreign  products  in  those  countries.  All  manu- 
facturing communities  would  be  hard  hit,  but  it  is 
obvious  that  a  community  which  is  already  deep  in 
debt  would  suffer  most.  Wages  would  fall ;  unem- 
ployment would  increase ;  the  grievances  of  the 
Social-Democrats  would  become  more  acute ;  a 
political  revolution  might  even  be  the  result.  This 
danger  has  been — ^if  we  are  to  believe  the  writers 
referred  to — an  ever-growing  preoccupation  of  the 
German  authorities.  The  necessity  of  fresh  and  un- 
restricted markets  is  vital  to  their  trade,  and  there- 
fore to  the  whole  political  and  military  system 
depending  thereon.  But  there  is  no  apparent  way 
of  obtaining  fresh  colonial  or  other  reservoirs  and 
markets,  or  even  making  sure  of  those  that  exist, 
except  by  war  or  by  diplomatic  efforts  backed  by 
military  force,  which  may  easily  lead  to  war.  This, 
it  is  suggested,  is  the  main  argument  which  has  been 
employed  to  convince  the  leading  Socialists  that 
war  was  inevitable.  Some  explanation  is  certainly 
required  to  account  for  the  readiness  with  which 
that  party  abandoned  their  former  attitude  and 
placed  themselves  at  the  disposal  of  the  Govern- 
ment ;  and  the  suggestion  that  they  have  been 
influenced  by  the  arguments  referred  to  is  at  least 
worth  consideration.  If  the  facts  stated  about  the 
condition  of  German  trade  and  industry  are  true,  or 
even  approximately  true,  it  is  impossible  not  to  see 
in  them  a  powerful  contributory  incentive  to  war. 


NAVAL   REQUIREMENTS  35 

Two  other  results  of  colonial  and  commercial  ex- 
pansion have  still  to  be  noticed — the  German  fleet 
and  the  Drang  nach  Osten,  The  two  obj  ects  for  which 
the  German  fleet  was  originally  formed,  or  at  least 
those  which  were  adopted  to  justify  its  formation, 
were  the  defence  and  extension  of  oversea  colonies, 
and  the  protection  of  oversea  commerce.  Such 
colonies  were  for  the  most  part  obtained,  as  we  have 
seen,  in  the  eighties  and  nineties  of  last  century; 
and  it  was  during  the  same  period  that  foreign  trade 
began  to  take  on  such  enormous  proportions.  To 
both  developments  the  estabUshment  and  strength- 
ening of  the  German  fleet  were  primarily  due.  With- 
out a  fleet,  neither  colonies  nor  commerce  could  be 
regarded  as  secure  ;  both  would  be  at  the  mercy  of 
a  stronger  naval  power.  Such  were  the  reasons 
alleged  in  the  preamble  to  the  first  Navy  Law.  The 
reasons  were  good ;  the  need  was  obvious ;  the 
growing  wealth  of  Germany  supplied  the  means  to 
meet  it.  The  ulterior  aims  that  were  subsequently 
disclosed,  or  not  obscurely  implied,  were  not  likely 
to  discredit  the  enterprise  in  the  eyes  of  a  people 
prepared,  as  we  have  seen,  for  war,  and  glad  to  find 
a  new  weapon  ready  to  its  hand. 

The  German  Navy  has  been  the  special  creation 
of  the  present  Emperor.  Bismarck  had  frowned 
upon  such  efforts,  as  he  had  upon  colonization,  and 
for  the  same  reasons.  But  the  Emperor  had  no 
sooner  got  rid  of  this  check  on  his  proclivities  than 
he  began  (about  1890)  to  reorganize  the  Admiralty. 
In  1897  Admiral  Tirpitz  was  appointed  as  its  head. 
In  1898  the  first  Navy  Law  was  promulgated,  with 
a  comparatively  modest  programme.     Two  years 


36  THE  GERMAN  NAVY 

later,  while  Great  Britain  was  in  the  thick  of  the 
South  African  War,  the  second  Navy  Law  was  passed. 
It  doubled  the  strength  of  the  fleet;  but  what  was 
even  more  notable  than  this  increase  was  the  chal- 
lenge thrown  out  in  the  accompanying  memoran- 
dum, which  contained  the  following  passage  :  "  To 
protect  Germany's  sea-trade  and  colonies,  in  existing 
circumstances,  there  is  only  one  means.  Germany 
must  have  a  battle-fleet  so  strong  that,  even  for  the 
adversary  possessing  the  greatest  sea-power,  a  war 
against  it  would  involve  such  dangers  as  to  imperil 
his  position  in  the  world/'  After  this  it  was  im- 
possible to  mistake  the  ulterior  object  of  the  German 
Navy.  Other  Navy  Laws  followed,  increasing  both 
strength  and  efficiency,  in  1908  and  1912 ;  and  in 
the  latter  year  the  German  Government  refused 
(when  Lord  Haldane  went  to  Berlin)  to  retard  its 
rate  of  building  except  on  terms  which  would  have 
left  Germany  free  to  pursue  a  policy  of  aggression 
in  Europe  without  fear  of  British  intervention. 

The  creation  of  a  great  navy  was  welcomed 
throughout  Germany.  The  Emperor  himself  led  the 
agitation  in  its  behalf ;  and  phrases  like  '*  Our 
future  is  on  the  water  "  and  ''  Bitter  is  our  need  of 
a  strong  fleet  *'  rang  through  the  whole  Empire. 
Austria,  the  ally,  was  urged  to  follow  suit,  and 
obeyed  the  call.  A  host  of  pamphleteers  supported 
the  Imperial  efforts ;  the  Navy  League  {Flotten- 
verein),  founded  in  1898,  now  embraces  over  a  million 
of  members  and  associates ;  books  (like  that  of 
Troeltsch)  were  written  to  show  that  the  German 
Navy,  though  smaller  than  the  British,  would  pro- 
bably prove  superior  in  fighting  qualities — a  view 


THE  DRANG  NACH   OSTEN  37 

also  adopted  by  Bernhardi ;  and  it  was  universally 
expected  to  do  great  things  in  the  coming  war.  It 
is  easy  to  see  how  the  Navy,  originating  in  colonial 
and  commercial  needs,  due  therefore  primarily  to 
economic  growth,  must  have  increased  the  con- 
fidence of  the  German  people,  relieved  them  from 
certain  fears,  and  thus  proved  a  direct  incentive 
to  war. 

I  come  finally  to  the  last  outcome  of  the  combina- 
tion of  philosophical  ideas  with  political  and  econo- 
mic aims  and  motives  which  I  have  to  mention — the 
Drang  nach  Osten,  the  pressure  to  the  East.  It  is 
also,  in  some  ways,  the  most  important  outcome, 
because  most  directly  and  immediately  connected 
with  the  present  war.  So  far  as  I  am  able  to  judge, 
it  supplies  the  master-key  to  German  foreign  policy. 
The  conquest  of  the  Orient  can,  I  believe,  be  shown 
by  reference  to  a  long  series  of  German  publications 
and  to  recent  events  to  be  its  principal  objective, 
the  great  aim  to  which  all  other  aims  are  more  or  less 
subsidiary.  It  explains  much  that  would  otherwise 
be  difficult  to  understand,  more  especially  the  intense 
interest  which  Germany  takes  in  the  maintenance  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire.  It  is  also  the  most 
idealistic  (if  I  may  use  the  word)  of  German  aims ; 
it  opens  up  the  widest  possibilities  to  the  imagina- 
tion ;  and  idealistic  conceptions  have  a  peculiar 
fascination  for  the  German  mind. 

A  modern  poet  has  remarked  : 

If  you've  'eard  the  East  a-calling, 
You  won't  never  'eed  naught  else. 

It  would  be  an  exaggeration  to  attribute  to  the 


38  MOLTKE,  LIST  AND  LAGARDE 

Germans  so  exclusive  a  devotion,  but  there  is  no 
doubt  that  upon  them,  and  especially  on  their 
romanticist  Emperor,  the  East  has  exercised  a  great 
and  growing  attraction.  Realpolitik  scorns  the 
guidance  of  sentiment ;  but  this  is  no  reason  why  it 
should  not  turn  it  to  use.  The  German  sentiment 
for  the  East  is  of  considerable  antiquity.  The 
practical  eye  of  Moltke  discerned,  in  the  'forties  of  the 
last  century,  its  potentialities  for  his  nation  ;  he  even 
conceived  a  German  Principality  of  Palestine.  I 
have  already  referred  to  the  views  of  List,  in  con- 
nection with  German  colonization  of  the  lands  to 
the  east  of  Germany.  In  the  next  generation  after 
the  Franco-German  War,  explorers  like  Sachau 
travelled  in  Asia  Minor  and  Mesopotamia,  and 
pressed  upon  their  countrymen  the  notion  that  those 
regions,  once  so  prosperous  and  fertile,  might  be 
reclaimed  for  civilization  by  German  labour  and 
German  capital.  One  of  the  most  influential  of 
German  publicists,  Paul  Botticher,  better  known 
under  his  pen-name,  Paul  de  Lagarde,  revived  and 
developed,  about  1880,  the  ideas  of  List.  Writing  in 
the  National" Zeitung,  he  says  :  *'  How  often  are  we  to 
repeat  to  our  countrymen  who  emigrate  to  America, 
that  they  can  find  at  their  very  doors  magnificent 
countries  only  waiting  to  be  exploited  ?  "  And  again: 
'*  We  must  create  a  Central  Europe  by  conquering 
for  German  colonization  large  spaces  to  the  east  of 
our  frontiers. ' '  He  foresaw  that  a  great  war  would  be 
necessary  for  this  purpose,  and  urged  his  countrymen 
to  prepare  for  it.  A  year  or  two  later,  Constantin 
Frantz  suggested  the  establishment  of  a  great 
Central-European    Confederation,    extending   from 


GERMANY  AND  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY       39 

Holland  to  the  Balkan  States,  and  involving  the 
retirement  of  Russia  beyond  the  Dniester.  For  this 
end,  he  said,  "  Prussia  must  be  able  to  wage  an 
offensive  war  in  the  grand  style/'  Later  writers 
carried  their  views  still  further,  so  as  to  include  not 
only  Turkey  in  Europe  but  the  whole  Ottoman 
Empire.  Able  officials  like  Dernburg  (afterwards 
Colonial  Minister  and  lately  propagandist-in-chief 
in  the  United  States),  clever  and  learned  publicists 
like  Paul  Rohrbach,  professors  like  Anton  Sprenger 
and  Ernst  Hasse,  and  enthusiasts  like  Friedrich 
Naumann,  pointed  to  the  Nearer  East  as  the  goal  of 
German  hopes,  the  most  promising  object  of  German 
efforts.  The  Pan-German  League  adopted  the 
policy  with  ardour. 

The  attitude  of  these  writers  towards  Turkey  and 
Austria  deserves  a  moment's  attention.  Both  these 
States  are  regarded  as  of  the  first  importance  for  the 
realization  of  German  ambitions ;  but,  whereas  it 
was  at  first  supposed  that  they  were  too  far  gone  in 
the  process  of  disruption  to  be  saved,  and  that  all 
that  Germany  could  expect  was  to  obtain  a  large 
portion  of  their  disjecta  membra,  it  is  now  generally 
maintained  that  they  can  be  brought  in  their 
entirety  within  the  sphere  of  German  influence. 
For  this  purpose  the  German  element  in  Austria- 
Hungary  must  not  only  be  maintained  but  placed 
in  a  position  of  unquestioned  superiority;  the 
''  slavizing  "  of  that  empire  must,  at  all  costs,  be 
prevented.  Ardent  patriots  protested  against  the 
Magyarisirung  of  the  Germans  in  Hungary,  and 
deplored  the  progress  of  the  Czechs  in  Bohemia. 
It  was  proposed  that  the  non-German  elements 

D 


40  GERMANY  AND  TURKEY 

under  Austrian  rule  should  be  expropriated,  as  has 
recently  been  attempted  in  Prussian  Poland,  and 
that  alien  nationalities  should  be  confined,  like  the 
Red  Indians  in  North  America,  to  *'  reserves." 
''  Pure  Deutschtum/*  urged  Friedrich  Lange,  must 
be  substituted  for  Slaventum.  Austria,  in  short, 
must  be  thoroughly  germanized.  We  recall  the 
old  dispute  between  the  Grossdeutsche  and  Klein- 
deiitsche  parties  which  raged  in  the  fifties  of  the 
last  century.  The  question  was  then  solved  by 
the  exclusion  of  Austria  from  the  new  German 
Empire ;  Prussia  was  not  yet  strong  enough  to 
impress  itself  on  the  rest  of  Germany,  and  on  Austria 
into  the  bargain.  But,  now  that  Germany  has  been 
satisfactorily  prussianized,  the  old  idea  of  a  Gross- 
deutschlandy  to  include  Austria-Hungary,  has  been 
revived  in  another  form.  So  too  with  Turkey.  In 
1896  the  Pan-German  League,  in  an  official  pubUca- 
tion,  spoke  of  the  dissolution  of  the  Ottoman  Empire 
as  imminent,  and  anticipated  no  objection,  on  the 
part  of  other  Powers,  to  Germany  "  claiming  a 
portion ''  of  its  territories.  Now  it  claims  the  whole ; 
and  the  means  to  this  end  is  a  close  alliance,  with 
all  the  advantages  which  an  alliance  with  Ger- 
many implies.  Rohrbach  [Der  deutsche  Gedanke) 
discovers,  between  the  nature  of  the  German  and 
that  of  the  Turk,  if  not  a  profound  relationship  of 
character,  certain  traces  of  affinity — a  conclusion 
in  which  we  may  readily  acquiesce.  The  Turk, 
says  this  writer,  is  the  chief  material  and  moral 
force  of  the  East.  There  is,  therefore,  in  his  Empire, 
"  a  sphere  in  which  the  German  Gedanke  may  have 
a  great  future,  not  only  by  way  of  material  coloniza- 


CONTROL  OF  THE  NEAR-EAST     41 

tion,  but  also  with  a  view  to  political  domination 
and  moral  influence." 

Thus  the  ground  was  prepared,  the  favourable 
mental  attitude  produced.  The  craze  for  coloniza- 
tion was  at  its  height,  as  we  have  seen,  in  the  eighties 
of  last  century.  A  certain  disillusionment  followed. 
Colonies  in  fruitful  and  habitable  portions  of  the 
earth  were  no  longer  to  be  had — at  least  without 
fighting  for  them.  Here  was  a  wide  area,  unoccupied 
or  occupied  only  by  wandering  tribes  or  semi- 
civilized  peoples,  under  the  nominal  sway  of  a 
decadent  Power.  Here  the  superfluous  population  of 
Germany  might  be  disposed  in  promising  settlements ; 
German  capital  could  be  profitably  employed  in 
railways  and  irrigation  works,  in  mining  and  agri- 
culture ;  increasing  prosperity  would  provide  grow- 
ing markets  for  German  produce  ;  a  country  rendered 
fit  for  husbandry  and  possessing  untold  mineral 
wealth  would  supply  raw  materials  for  manufacture 
and  food  for  the  toiling  millions  at  home. 

To  these  economical  incentives  were  added  the 
political  and  other  advantages  to  be  drawn  from  a 
close  connection  with  Turkey.  Financial  and  eco- 
nomic control  over  Turkey,  European  and  Asiatic, 
meant  not  only  the  chance  of  utilizing  excellent 
military  material  which,  under  German  tuition, 
could  be  formed  into  a  first-rate  army  ;  it  meant  also 
the  control  of  South-Eastem  Europe  and  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean,  the  command  of  the  Danube  from 
source  to  mouth,  the  severance  of  Russia  from  the 
open  sea,  and  an  end  to  the  Russian  dream  of  cele- 
brating an  Orthodox  Mass  in  Santa  Sophia.  More 
than  that,  the  submission  of  Turkey  to  German 


42     IMPORTANCE  OF  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 

guidance  would  mean  the  practical  possession  of 
Bagdad,  and  a  road  to  the  Persian  Gulf  ;  whence  it 
would  be  easy  to  bring  pressure  to  bear  not  only  on 
Persia  but  on  Russian  territory  east  of  the  Caspian, 
and  even  on  India.  Rohrbach,  in  his  essay  on  the 
Bagdad  Railway,  dwells  complacently  on  the 
prospect  of  using  the  Turkish  army  as  a  ''  spear- 
head ''  against  the  English  in  Egypt,  in  case  we 
should  oppose  German  designs  elsewhere. 

The  possibilities,  in  short,  both  economic  and 
politit^al,  were  practically  boundless.  But,  to  secure 
so  great  a  prize,  it  was  indispensable  that  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Empire  should  not  only  be  maintained, 
but  should  dominate  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  The 
disadvantage  of  a  close  aUiance  with  a  State  so 
divided  in  itself,  and  in  so  precarious  a  political 
condition,  as  Austria-Hungary,  has  induced  some 
German  publicists  to  advocate  a  rupture  of  the 
connection  ;  but  this  view  appears  to  be  very  rare. 
The  vast  majority  of  writers  regard  the  connection 
as  essential ;  and  it  is  clear  that  the  great  scheme 
could  in  no  other  way  be  carried  out.  The  road  from 
Berlin  to  Byzantium  and  thence  to  Bagdad — "  the 
three  B's  '' — runs  through  Vienna.  Hence  the  policy 
which  has  led  to  the  present  war. 

Recent  incidents  will  establish  more  clearly  the 
thesis  that  the  attempt  to  dominate  the  East  forms 
the  keystone  of  German  Weltpolitik  ;  but  it  will  be 
more  convenient  to  take  these  in  chronological  order 
and  as  connected  with  other  matters,  in  a  survey  of 
the  events  immediately  leading  up  to  the  present 
war,  to  which  I  next  invite  your  attention.  We  have 
seen  how  the  German  mind  was  prepared  by  philoso- 


SUMMARY  43 

phical  theory,  by  the  experience  of  the  past,  and  by 
the  teaching  of  historians,  to  embrace  certain  views 
of  the  State  and  of  war,  which  produced  a  wariike 
tendency  ;  we  have  also  seen  how  this  tendency  was 
confirmed  and  strengthened  by  confidence  arising 
from  a  great  accession  of  financial  and  economic 
resources ;  how  from  economic  progress  a  colonial 
empire  and  a  great  fleet  arose ;  how,  finally,  econ- 
nomic  necessities  and  political  ambitions,  combined 
with  the  teaching  of  many  eloquent  writers,  familiar- 
ized the  people  with  the  idea  of  war  as  a  legitimate 
means  of  solving  their  difficulties  and  realizing  the 
national  aims.  We  have  now  to  see  how  the  events 
of  the  last  few  years  have  led  up  to  the  actual  out- 
break, by  gradually  convincing  the  German  people 
that  their  interests  demanded  the  adoption  of  a 
method  to  which  they  were  already,  by  theory, 
training,  and  experience,  predisposed. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE    FOREIGN    POLICY    OF    BISMARCK,    187I-189O 

Looking  broadly  at  the  events  of  the  last  twenty- 
five  years,  we  perceive  certain  main  lines  of  German 
expansionist  policy  gradually  unfolding  themselves 
— a  colonial  policy,  manifested  in  various  parts  of 
the  globe,  in  Africa,  Asia,  South  America,  but 
especially  in  regard  to  the  question  of  Morocco  ;  a 
Near-Eastern  policy,  which  may  also  be  called,  in  a 
sense,  colonial,  displaying  itself  in  the  Balkans,  in 
relations  with  Turkey,  and  in  far-reaching  schemes 
like  the  Bagdad  railway  ;  a  military  policy,  visible 
in  the  rapid  and  continuous  growi;h,  after  1898,  of 
the  war-fleet,  and  in  frequent  additions  to  the 
strength  of  the  army,  designed  to  support  those 
schemes.  Less  obviously,  in  some  departments 
indeed  almost  invisibly,  a  policy  of  economic  ex- 
pansion is  pushed  on,  by  great  steamship  lines 
depending  largely  on  Government  support,  by  lavish 
expenditure  on  colonial  progress,  by  the  peaceful 
penetration — financial,  commercial,  and  industrial 
— of  neighbouring  States,  and  by  many  thoughtful 
measures  calculated  to  improve  economic  conditions 
at  home,  and  to  allay  socialistic  discontent.  On  the 
other  hand,  we  see  signs  of  growing  anxiety  on  the 
part  of  other  States,  and  increasing  suspicion  of  Get- 


GERMAN  ANXIETIES  45 

many's  intentions.  A  new  grouping  of  the  Great 
Powers  is  gradually  formed,  in  which  the  so-called 
Triple  Entente — England,  France,  and  Russia — faces 
the  Triple  Alliance  of  Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  and 
Italy.  Thus  it  was  hoped  that  a ' '  Balance  of  Power ' ' 
would  be  maintained,  and  European  peace  pre- 
served. But  by  Germans  the  formation  of  the 
Entente  was  stigmatized  as  Einkreisungspolitik — a 
policy  of  encirclement,  designed  to  hem  in  Germany 
and  to  prevent  her  further  expansion. 

On  the  side  of  the  Entente  Powers — apart  from 
the  views  of  certain  chauvinistic  sections,  which  no 
doubt  have  existed,  more  or  less,  in  all  three  countries 
— the  combination  was  genuinely  defensive  ;  but  it 
is  easy  to  see  how  it  might  appear  to  anxious  German 
minds  to  be,  at  least  potentially,  aggressive.  It  must 
be  remembered  that  Germany  had  causes  of  friction 
with  each  of  the  three  Entente  Powers — ^with  France, 
the  incurable  sore  of  Alsace-Lorraine  and  (latterly) 
Morocco ;  with  Russia,  the  question  of  Deutschtum 
against  Slaventum  and  (latterly)  the  Balkan  question ; 
with  Great  Britain,  naval  supremacy  and  commercial 
rivalry.  Should  all  these  questions  become  acute  at 
the  same  time,  a  hostile  combination  of  a  very 
dangerous  kind  was  obviously  possible.  Moreover, 
the  Triple  Alliance  had  one  weak  spot,  in  the  craving 
of  Italy  for  a  better  strategic  frontier  and  for  Italia 
irredenta,  and  in  her  rivalry  with  Austria  in  the 
Adriatic.  Hence  the  German  fears  ;  and  fear  is  one 
of  the  most  potent  causes  of  war.  If  a  combined 
attack  were  probable  or  even  possible,  would  it  not 
be  better  to  anticipate  it  while  there  was  a  Ukelihood 
of  victory  ?    The  belief  in  the  existence  of  a  wide- 


46  GERMANY  AND  HER  ALLIES 

spread  plot  against  the  life  of  Germany,  and  the  idea 
of  a  preventive  war  to  thwart  it,  took  hold  of  the 
German  mind  ;  and  a  war  which  anticipates  attack 
may  be  regarded  as  a  defensive  war.  Such  is  the 
reasoning  which  has  been  consistently  presented  to, 
and  universally  accepted  by,  the  German  people. 
Such  is  their  defence  and  justification. 

These  being  the  broad  facts,  apparent  on  a  super- 
ficial investigation,  let  us  endeavour  to  see  them  in 
somewhat  larger  detail,  and  to  trace  out,  in  their 
chronological  development,  the  phases  through 
which  German  policy  passed  during  a  period  of  forty 
years,  and  the  events  connected  with  that  policy 
which  led,  by  a  sort  of  logical  sequence,  to  the 
present  colUsion. 

In  concentrating  attention  on  the  policy  and  aims 
of  Germany,  I  am  not  unmindful  of  the  fact  that 
Austria-Hungary  is  an  important  member  of  the 
Germanic  firm.  The  exact  share  which  the  states- 
men of  Vienna  and  of  Pesth  have  had  in  determining 
the  poUcy  of  the  Triple  AlHance  cannot  now,  and 
possibly  never  will,  be  defined.  But  it  is  clear  that 
the  dominant  partner  throughout,  and  to  an  ever- 
increasing  degree  in  recent  years,  has  been  Germany. 
However  prominent  Austria-Hungary  may  have 
seemed  occasionally  to  be,  e.g,,  in  October,  1908,  and 
in  July,  1914,  no  one  will  deny  that  the  originating 
mind,  the  motive  force,  and  (at  times)  the  curbing 
hand,  have  all  along  been  in  BerHn.  Italy,  again, 
though  her  ambitions  and  her  needs  have  often  been 
subjects  of  grave  and  doubtless  anxious  considera- 
tion for  German  statesmen,  has  been  still  less  of  a 
determining  element  in  the  Central  League ;    and, 


THE  PEACE  OF  BISMARCK  47 

at  all  events  since  the  close  of  the  last  century,  she 
has  tended  more  and  more  to  go  her  own  way.  It  is 
with  Germany  then  that  we  have,  first  and  last,  to 
reckon ;  it  is  with  her  policy  and  her  aims  that  we 
are  really  concerned. 

Although  Bismarck,  in  respect  of  colonial  expan- 
sion and  of  contact  with  Turkey,  yielded  to  some 
extent,  as  I  have  already  said,  to  modern  aims  and 
ideas,  the  character  of  his  government  during  its 
later  years  (1870-1890)  is  quite  different  from  that 
of  William  II  which  followed.  Further,  in  the  reign 
of  the  present  Emperor,  a  remarkable  change  took 
place  about  the  year  1905,  mainly  in  consequence  of 
the  Russo-Japanese  War.  A  policy  hitherto  cautious 
and  not  obtrusively  aggressive  gave  way  in  that  year 
to  one  of  ominous  activity  ;  serious  crises  in  inter- 
national affairs  rapidly  succeeded  one  another  ;  and 
the  menace  of  war  became  more  and  more  acute. 
The  dates  1890  and  1905  are  thus  of  primary  im- 
portance in  our  survey.  I  shall  deal  shortly  with  the 
first  two  periods,  and  at  greater  length  with  the  last, 
as  having  the  most  direct  bearing  on  our  subject. 

In  order  to  realize  the  change  which  took  place  in 
1890,  let  me  endeavour  to  indicate  the  principles  of 
Bismarck's  policy,  and  the  international  position  in 
which  he  left  Germany  and  Europe  at  the  time  of  his 
fall.  Aggressive  and  enterprising,  even  hazardous, 
as  was  Bismarck's  conduct  of  affairs  during  his  first 
nine  years  of  power,  his  actions  during  the  last  nine- 
teen years,  from  the  Peace  of  Frankfort  onward,  may 
be  summed  up  in  the  words  caution  and  consolida^ 
tion.    The  very  greatness  of  his  triumph  made  him 


\ 


48  THE  DREIKAISERBUND 

anxious  lest  a  combination  of  States  should  seek  to 
deprive  him  of  it.  He  suffered,  as  Schouvaloff  said, 
and  as  he  himself  confessed,  from  a  perpetual 
cauchemar  des  coalitions,  Russia  was  already  his 
friend  ;  her  support  had  been  invaluable  ever  since 
he  had  won  it  by  his  Polish  policy  in  1863  ;  it  was 
further  secured  when,  in  1871,  his  assistance  enabled 
her  to  erase  the  Black  Sea  clauses  from  the  Treaty 
of  Paris.  But  from  the  two  other  great  Continental 
Powers — Austria  and  France — he  had  to  fear  a  war 
of  revenge.  In  the  case  of  Austria,  which  would  gladly 
have  aided  France  in  1870,  had  she  been  prepared, 
the  wisdom  of  his  moderation  in  1866  was  soon  made 
plain.  Austria  now  accepted  the  fait  accompli,  and 
recognized  her  exclusion  from  Germany ;  and  in 
1872  the  Dreikaiserbund  was  formed.  This  league 
was,  in  fact,  a  revival  of  the  old  Holy  Alliance — a 
compact,  but  without  any  formal  document,  for  the 
maintenance  of  peace  on  the  basis  of  the  status  quo, 
the  suppression  of  revolutionary  efforts,  and  joint 
action  in  Eastern  affairs.  In  1873  Italy  was  admitted, 
by  a  similar  verbal  agreement,  to  partnership  with 
the  three  Empires  in  the  task  of  maintaining  Euro- 
pean peace.  France  was  thus  isolated,  as  after  1815  ; 
a  war  of  revanche,  even  had  her  internal  condition 
allowed  it,  was  made  impossible ;  and  Austria  was 
directed  to  look  for  compensation  for  her  German 
and  Italian  losses  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  But  the 
understanding  with  Russia  was  not  absolutely 
secure ;  and  the  first  rift  was  made  when  the  Tsar 
intervened  in  1875  to  save  France  from  a  war  of 
annihilation,  threatened  by  Bismarck  on  account  of 
the  French  Army  Law  and  his  fears  of  a  royaUst 


THE  RUSSO-TURKISH  WAR  49 

Restoration  which  would  cross  his  aims  in  the 
Kulturkampf.  Bismarck,  it  is  true,  strenuously 
denied  that  he  had  cherished  any  such  intention. 
But  it  was  universally  believed  to  have  existed  ;  and 
in  any  case  he  was  deeply  offended  with  the  Russian 
Chancellor.    Three  years  later  he  had  his  revenge. 

The  Eastern  Question,  dormant  for  twenty  years, 
was  revived  by  the  insurrection  in  Herzegovina 
(1875),  due  in  some  measure  to  a  scheme  of  reform 
which  the  three  Eastern  Powers  had  presented  to 
the  Porte.  Serbia  subsequently  attacked  Turkey  ; 
the  "  Bulgarian  atrocities  "  followed  ;  and  the  Tsar 
was  hurried,  by  an  outbreak  of  national  emotion, 
into  a  Turkish  war.  Before  he  entered  upon  it,  he 
sought  an  understanding  with  Germany  as  to  the 
probable  outcome.  Bismarck  declining  to  pledge 
himself,  the  Tsar  turned  to  Austria,  and,  in  the  secret 
treaty  of  Reichstadt  (1876),  purchased  her  benevo- 
lent neutrality  by  the  promise  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina. It  was  hoped  that  Austrian  aggrandizement 
in  the  western  part  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula  would 
be  more  than  balanced  by  Russian  gains,  direct  or 
indirect,  on  the  eastern  side.  But  the  Tsar  was 
doomed  to  disappointment.  The  Peace  of  San 
Stefano,  which  brought  the  Russo-Turkish  War  to 
a  close,  seemed  indeed  not  only  to  promise  a  settle- 
ment of  the  Eastern  Question,  at  least  for  a  long  time, 
but  also  to  secure  a  dominant  influence  for  Russia 
in  the  greater  part  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula,^  But 
the  Congress  of  Berlin  altered  all  this.  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  were  occupied  by  Austria ;  but 
the  "  big  Bulgaria  "  to  which  Russia  looked  for  com- 
pensation was  reduced  to  small  dimensions,  and 


50  AUSTRO-GERMAN  ALLIANCE 

what  was  left  was  divided  into  two  separate  States. 
Russia  not  only  lost  prestige,  but  by  her  unwise  and 
ungrateful  policy  towards  Rumania  alienated  the 
affections  of  that  country  for  thirty  years.  Turkey 
recovered  a  great  part  of  what  she  had  abandoned  ; 
and  the  seeds  of  future  trouble  were  sown  in  the 
restoration  of  her  sovereignty  over  Macedonia. 

At  the  Congress  of  Berlin  Bismarck  claimed  to 
have  played  the  part  of  an  "  honest  broker  '' ;  but 
strict  impartiality  was  not  what  Russia  had  expected, 
and  her  relations  with  Germany  could  not  remain  on 
the  same  friendly  footing  as  before.  So  deeply  was 
the  Tsar  annoyed  that  he  even  threatened  war  ;  and 
for  a  short  time  relations  between  Petrograd  and 
Berlin  were  seriously  strained.  Bismarck  was  quick 
to  perceive  his  chance;  and  the  Austro-German 
alliance  of  1879  '^^^  ^^^  result.  This  treaty,  not 
officially  divulged  till  1888,1  pledged  each  Power  to 
active  assistance  in  case  of  an  attack  by  Russia  on 
either,  and  to  benevolent  neutrality  in  case  of  attack 
by  another  Power.  It  has  lasted  to  this  day. 
Bismarck,  it  is  true,  did  not  regard  it  as  a  sufficient 
safeguard ;  he  had  no  intention  of  falling  out  with 
his  great  neighbour,  and  still  longed  for  security  on 
his  eastern  front.  In  1881  the  Tsar,  Alexander  II, 
died  ;  two  years  later  Gortschakoff  followed  him  to 
the  grave.  His  old  rival  removed,  Bismarck  set  him- 
self to  renew  the  former  connection,  and  in  1884,  at 
Skiernewice,  he  entered  into  a  secret  agreement — 
the  so-called  '*  reinsurance  "  treaty — with  Russia. 
It  was  at  a  time  when  his  colonial  policy,  involving 

1  Its  purport  was,  however,  known ;  and  it  was  immediately 
welcomed  by  Lord  Salisbury  as  a  guarantee  of  European  peace. 


END  OF  RUSSO-GERMAN  ENTENTE       51 

possibilities  of  friction  with  England,  was  maturing, 
and  when  Russia  was  not  only  intent  upon  ousting 
Prince  Alexander  of  Battenberg  from  Bulgaria,  but 
was  also  contemplating  an  advance  in  Central  Asia, 
which  two  years  later  nearly  brought  her  into  conflict 
with  England  over  the  Penjdeh  affair.  Both  parties 
had  therefore  an  interest  in  coming  to  terms.  The 
treaty,  in  what  are  probably  Bismarck's  own  words,^ 
arranged  '*  that  if  either  of  them  [Germany  or  Russia] 
were  attacked,  the  other  would  remain  benevolently 
neutral.''  Russia,  thus  protected,  was  emboldened 
to  go  forward  in  Asia,  where,  in  1885,  she  seized 
Penjdeh,  and  in  the  Balkans,  where  she  kidnapped 
Prince  Alexander,  and  presently  made  herself 
mistress  of  Bulgaria.  Germany,  on  her  side,  was 
able  to  act  with  more  decision  in  colonial  matters. 
Bismarck  now  laid  hands  on  South-West  Africa,  and 
proclaimed  Germany's  appearance  as  a  Colonial 
Power  by  the  Congo  Conference  at  Berlin.  Never- 
theless, a  certain  coolness  recurred  when,  in  1887, 
the  Tsar  again  intervened,  on  the  occasion  of  the 
Schnabele  incident,  to  hinder  Bismarck  from  attack- 
ing France  ;  and  in  1890,  after  the  Chancellor's  fall, 
his  successor,  Caprivi,  declined  to  renew  the  treaty. 
It  was,  however,  kept  a  secret  till  1896,  when 
Bismarck,  taunted  with  having  done  nothing  to 
prevent  the  Franco-Russian  alliance,  disclosed  it. 
Its  non-renewal  was  then  defended  on  the  ground 
that  it  was  incompatible  with  the  Austrian  alliance. 
Whatever  the  cause,  the  fact  that  the  alliance  with 
Austria-Hungary  was  retained,  while  the  arrange- 
ment   with     Russia     was    dropped,    indicated    a 

1  Hamburger  Nachrichten,  October  24th,  1896. 


52    FORMATION  OF  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE 

momentous  deflection  in  the  policy  of  Germany,  and 
a  departure  from  Bismarckian  lines.  It  was,  indeed, 
the  parting  of  the  ways. 

Meanwhile,  however,  Bismarck  had  secured  another 
ally.  In  1881,  France,  acting  on  a  suggestion  made 
by  Lord  SaHsbury  to  M.  Waddington  during  the 
Congress  of  Berlin,  and  on  significant  hints  from  the 
Chancellor,  occupied  Tunis.  This  was  naturally  a 
cause  of  deep  annoyance  to  Italy  ;  Rome  was  again 
threatened  by  a  new  and  more  dangerous  Carthage. 
Isolated  as  Italy  was,  she  could  expect  no  compensa- 
tion ;  and  the  menace  to  her  security  drove  her  to 
join  the  Austro-German  League  in  the  following  year. 
Thus  was  formed  the  Triple  Alliance,  which,  renewed 
on  several  occasions,  remained  a  governing  factor  in 
European  politics  for  over  thirty  years.  Rumania, 
after  1879 — ^^  is  still  uncertain  whether  the  treaty 
of  1883  was  a  formal  alliance  or  not — ^was  virtually 
another  member  of  the  league. 

Thus  entrenched  and  fortified  by  compacts  with 
all  his  important  neighbours,  save  France,  Bismarck 
could  feel  safe.  Anglo-German  relations  were 
friendly ;  Lord  Salisbury  was  well-inclined ;  and 
Bismarck  declared  in  1885  that  the  friendship  of 
England  was  more  important  to  Germany  than  the 
future  of  Egypt.  France  was  on  bad  terms  with 
Italy,  which  was  still  resenting  the  occupation  of 
Tunis  and  smarting  under  the  failure  of  her  colonial 
enterprises.  The  Egyptian  Question,  not  to  mention 
boundary  difficulties  in  West  Africa  and  other 
colonial  troubles,  separated  France  from  Great 
Britain.  The  progress  of  Russia  in  Central  Asia 
aroused  anxieties  in  England  which  Lord  Salisbury 


THE  SUCCESS  OF  BISMARCK  53 

vainly  strove  to  allay  by  the  advice  to  study  large 
maps  and  not  to  be  *'mervous/'  The  policy  of 
combination  on  the  one  side  and  separation  on  the 
other  had  admirably  succeeded.  Germany  was 
growing  richer  every  day ;  and  there  appeared  no 
probability  of  that  '*  nightmare  *'  coalition  which 
subsequently  took  place.  Such  was  the  condition  of 
prosperity  and  security  in  which  Bismarck  left  the 
German  Empire,  when  in  1890  he  resigned  the  reins 
of  power  into  the  hands  of  the  young  and  impetuous 
Emperor.  With  his  departure  from  the  scene  the 
character  of  the  drama  changed. 


CHAPTER  IV 

GERMAN   FOREIGN   POLICY,    189O-I905 

The  amazing  activity  of  the  new  ruler,  and  the  war- 
like utterances  with  which  WilUam  II  began  his 
reign,  caused  no  little  fluttering  of  the  dovecotes ; 
but,  as  years  passed  by  and  Germany  did  not  adopt 
a  menacing  attitude,  international  anxiety  was  some- 
what allayed.  The  Emperor  had,  however,  already 
shown  his  hand,  if  Europe  in  general  failed  to  per- 
ceive his  game.  The  views  of  Oriental  policy  which 
I  have  already  described  had  begun  to  sink  into  the 
German  mind  soon  after  the  Franco-German  War, 
but  they  remained  vague  and  visionary  till  a  much 
later  date.  Bismarck,  with  his  caution  and  strong 
common  sense,  would  have  nothing  to  say  to  them. 
His  remark,  made  so  late  as  1888,  that  German  in- 
terests in  the  Balkans  were  not  worth  the  bones  of 
a  single  Pomeranian  grenadier,  was  typical  of  his 
state  of  mind.  As  in  the  matter  of  the  colonies  and 
the  fleet,  he  was  reluctant  to  embark  on  a  policy  of 
adventure  ;  and,  no  doubt,  increasing  age  strength- 
ened his  objections.  Nevertheless  he  was  ready  to 
take  advantage  of  opportunities,  especially  such  as 
enabled  him  to  further  the  economic  progress  of  Ger- 
many, on  which  his  heart  was  set.    For  many  years 

54 


WILLIAM  II  AND  THE  NEAR-EAST       55 

British  influence  had  been  predominant  in  Constanti- 
nople. But,  when  Gladstone  came  into  power  in  1880, 
pledged  as  he  was  by  his  utterances  in  and  before 
1878,  a  different  tone  was  adopted  by  our  Foreign 
Office,  and  British  influence  at  the  Porte  began  to 
wane.  Another  blow  was  dealt  to  it  by  our  occupa- 
tion of  Egypt  in  1882.  Bismarck  seized  the  opening 
thus  given.  He  was  able  to  persuade  the  Sultan  that 
Germany  was  the  true  friend  of  Turkey,  and  he  used 
the  goodwill  of  the  Turkish  Government  to  promote 
German  financial  and  commercial  interests  in  the 
Ottoman  Empire.  Further  than  this,  however,  he 
would  not  go. 

The  young  Emperor,  immediately  on  his  accession, 
manifested  his  inclination  towards  a  more  active 
policy.  The  Drang  nach  Osten  began  to  pass  from 
the  visionary  phase  into  the  area  of  practical  politics. 
In  1889  the  Emperor  paid  his  first  visit  to  Constan- 
tinople, and  knit  up  a  personal  friendship  with  the 
Sultan,  Abdul  Hamid.  German  pubUcists  at  once 
grasped  the  importance  of  this  visit,  and  extolled 
their  ruler's  activity  and  foresight.  Bismarck  did 
not  like  the  journey,  still  less  the  views  which 
the  Emperor  announced  on  his  return ;  and  this 
divergence  was  probably  one  of  the  reasons  which 
led  to  the  Chancellor's  dismissal  in  1890.  In  1898 
the  Emperor  again  visited  the  Golden  Horn,  went 
on  to  Jerusalem,  figured  in  Eastern  costume,  and  at 
Damascus  proclaimed  himself  the  protector  of  Turkey 
and  the  friend  of  Mohammedanism  throughout  the 
world.  We  may  remember  that  this  announcement 
closely  synchronized  with  the  first  German  Navy 
Bill,  the  Battle  of  Omdurman,  and  the  episode  of 


56  FRANCE  AND  RUSSIA 

Fashoda,  which  nearly  brought  about  a  war  between 
England  and  France.  Still  larger  concessions  were 
soon  afterwards  obtained  from  the  Porte ;  and  the 
project  of  the  Bagdad  Railway,  which  was  to  link  up 
Berlin  with  the  Middle  East,  was  launched.  The 
''  peaceful  penetration  "  of  the  Ottoman  Empire — 
the  preliminary  to  its  political  subjugation — had 
begun. 

Meanwhile  important  events  had  happened  else- 
where ;  and  of  these  the  gravest,  in  its  effect  on  the 
position  of  Germany,  was  the  formation  of  the  Franco- 
Russian  aUiance.  The  first  indication  of  such  a 
possibility  was  given,  as  we  have  seen,  in  1875  ; 
twelve  years  later  another  warning  note  was  heard. 
The  Tsar's  intervention  naturally  won  the  gratitude 
of  France ;  fear  of  Germany  and  acute  colonial 
rivalry  with  England  prompted  her  to  approach  the 
Power  which  alone  could  check  Berlin,  and  whose 
progress  in  the  East  was  a  cause  of  alarm  to  this 
country.  The  rapid  recovery  of  France  from  the 
sufferings  of  1870  and  her  great  wealth  enabled  her 
to  offer  the  financial  assistance  of  which  Russia  has 
always  been  in  need.  Hitherto  Petrograd  had  drawn 
chiefly  on  Berlin  ;  but,  after  the  alienation  of  1887, 
the  supply  showed  a  tendency  to  dry  up,  just  at  the 
time  when  money  was  badly  wanted  for  the  Trans- 
Siberian  Railway  and  other  expensive  schemes.  The 
Paris  bankers  came  to  Russia's  aid,  and  by  the  year 
1894  had  advanced  no  less  than  160  millions  sterling  ^ 

1  The  whole  amount  advanced  by  France  to  Russia,  from 
public  and  private  sources,  was  estimated  in  191 4  by  Paul 
Rohrbach  {Der  Krieg  und  die  deutsche  Politih),  on  the  basis 
of  French  statements,  at  ;£8oo,ooo,ooo. 


THE  FRANCO-RUSSIAN  ALLIANCE         57 

to  that  country.  The  ground  for  an  understanding 
was  thus  firmly  laid ;  and  certain  obstacles  to  a 
closer  union  were  gradually  removed.  The  death  of 
the  old  Emperor  William  I  and  his  son  in  1888  broke 
the  personal  tie  which  had  hitherto  united  the  Courts 
of  Berlin  and  Petrograd.  The  instability  of  French 
governments  naturally  repelled  the  Russian  auto- 
cracy ;  but  in  1889  the  Boulanger  incident  showed 
that  the  Republic  was  more  firmly  seated  than  had 
hitherto  been  supposed.  When  the  compact  of  1884 
was  dropped,  Russia  required  support  in  Europe  if 
she  were  to  prosecute  her  Far-Eastern  policy  with 
good  hope  of  success.  France  was  her  natural  ally, 
for  both  countries  were  still  at  odds  with  Great 
Britain  ;  and  friction  in  Siam  brought  England  and 
France  to  the  verge  of  war  in  1893.  The  result  of 
all  these  circumstances  was  the  Franco-Russian 
alliance.  A  military  convention  was  signed  in  1891 
and  confirmed  in  1894 ;  and  a  year  later  M.  Ribot 
could  pubHcly  speak  of  Russia  as  the  "  ally ''  of 
France. 

The  terms  of  the  alliance  have  never  been  divulged, 
but  it  appears  certain  that  it  was  merely  a  defensive 
compact.  Security  in  Europe  was  the  primary 
object  in  view  ;  but  this  security  could  be,  and  indeed 
was,  utilized  for  enterprises  far  afield.  France  was 
encouraged  to  push  forward  still  more  adventurously 
in  Africa.  In  1896  the  Marchand  Mission  started 
from  the  French  Congo  for  the  Upper  Nile.  Arriving 
at  Fashoda,  just  before  the  Battle  of  Omdurman, 
Colonel  Marchand  found  himself  face  to  face  with  a 
victorious  British  force.  Some  little  time  before, 
the  French  Government  had  sounded  the  Russian 


58  ANGLO-FRENCH  RIVALRY 

as  to  its  attitude  in  case  of  the  collision  which  was 
clearly  possible,  and  had  received  an  assurance  from 
Petrograd  that  Russia  would  support  France.^  But, 
when  the  crisis  came,  President  Faure  and  M. 
Delcass6  decided,  for  whatever  reason,  that  Fashoda 
was  not  worth  a  war.  They  accordingly  gave  way, 
and  recalled  Colonel  Marchand.  A  convention,  in 
which  France  abandoned  her  claims  on  the  Egyptian 
Sudan,  was  the  result ;  but  a  natural  feeUng  of  sore- 
ness for  some  time  prevailed  across  the  Channel.  In 
West  Africa,  also,  there  was  for  some  time  serious 
friction ;  but  the  difficulty  was  overcome  by  a 
judicious  compromise,  and  in  1899  the  respective 
boundaries  were  defined.  Still  there  remained 
Egypt ;  the  fisheries  question  in  Newfoundland  was 
troublesome ;  sore  spots  enough  existed  in  various 
parts  of  the  globe  to  relieve  Germany  of  anxiety  lest 
the  two  ancient  rivals  should  put  aside  their  quarrels 
and  combine  to  check  her  ambitions. 

Apart  from  these  difficulties  with  France,  Great 
Britain  was  occupied,  during  a  large  portion  of  this 
period,  with  the  troubles  in  South  Africa  which 
culminated  in  the  Boer  War.  The  origin  of  these 
troubles,  dating  from  the  annexation  of  the  Trans- 
vaal in  1877,  and  intensified  by  the  unfortunate  war 
of  1881,  cannot  be  attributed  to  German  influence. 
It  is  none  the  less  true  that  the  future  of  the  Boer 
RepubUcs  began,  from  that  time,  to  interest  German 
expansionists ;  and  the  possibiUty  of  knitting  up 
relations  with  the  farmers  of  the  Transvaal  cannot 
but  have  occurred  to  Bismarck  when  he  resolved  to 

1  See  articles  and  documents  in  the  Figaro,  February  i8th 
and  22nd,  1904. 


THE  SOUTH-AFRICAN  WAR  59 

annex  South-West  Africa.^  The  encouragement 
which  President  Kriiger  received  from  BerHn  had 
much  to  do  with  his  resistance  to  British  claims ; 
and  the  Emperor's  telegram,  sent  on  the  morrow  of 
the  Jameson  ''  raid/'  was  loudly  applauded  in  Ger- 
many. It  was  the  first  incident  which  roused  the 
British  public  to  a  sense  of  German  hostility.  When 
the  South  African  War  broke  out,  there  is  no  doubt 
that  the  Boers  expected  active  assistance  from  Ger- 
many ;  and,  if  what  they  had  taken  to  be  promises 
were  not  redeemed  by  the  formation  of  a  Euro- 
pean Coalition  in  their  favour,  in  the  winter  of  1899-  ^ 
1900,  the  reason  is  perhaps  to  be  found  in  the  secretv^ 
Anglo-German  convention  of  1898.  This  arrange- 
ment settled  the  respective  claims  of  the  two 
countries  in  case  of  a  liquidation  of  the  Portuguese 
colonial  empire,  which  was  then  regarded  as  immi- 
nent, and  left  everything  south  of  the  Zambesi  within 
the  sphere  of  British  influence.*  In  view  of  this 
understanding,  the  German  Government  could  hardly 
have  intervened  in  the  struggle — at  least,  so  long  as 
its  issue  remained  doubtful.  It  is  also  not  improbable 
that  the  self-restraint  exercised  in  Berlin  is  partly 
traceable  to  Mr.  Rhodes'  visit  in  March  1899,^  at 
which  some  sort  of  understanding  is  said  to  have 
been  reached  by  the  Emperor  and  his  visitor  respect- 

^  It  was  doubtless  in  view  of  possible  trouble  with  the  Boers 
that  a  secret  clause  was  added  to  the  Anglo-Portuguese  Boundary 
Treaty  of  1891,  enabling  Great  Britain  to  send  troops.  Jhr^ugh 
Portuguese  territory — a  stipulation  afterwards  utilized  m  the 
relief  of  Maf eking.  ^  >    , 

"  See  "The  Anglo-German  Agreement,"  Fortnightly  Review, 
October,!  898. 
^^  See  The  Life  0]  Cecil  Rhodes,  by  Sir  L.  Michel. 


6o  AFFAIRS  IN  THE  FAR-EASt 

ing  Imperial  plans  in  Mesopotamia  and  those  of 
Rhodes  in  South  Africa.  Be  this  as  it  may,  the  pro- 
posal for  a  coahtion  against  Great  Britain,  which 
was  certainly  made,  and  is  said,  on  good  authority, 
to  have  emanated  from  Russia,  but  is  attributed  by 
others  to  Germany,  came  to  nothing.^  The  attitude 
of  the  German  Government  during  the  Boer  War 
appears — though  details  are  still  obscure — to  have 
been  *'  correct  "  ;  and  the  danger  passed  when  our 
ultimate  victory  seemed  secure.  But  the  perils  of 
*'  splendid  isolation  "  impressed  themselves  forcibly 
on  the  British  Government,  and  had  much  to  do 
with  the  changes  in  foreign  policy  which  followed. 
Another  outcome  of  the  struggle  was  that  the  im- 
portance of  sea-power,  which  alone  enabled  us  to 
bring  the  war  to  a  successful  close,  afforded  an 
object-lesson  not  lost  upon  the  German  people.  Its 
teaching  was  utilized  in  the  famous  Navy  Law  of 
1900. 

Meanwhile,  in  the  Far  East,  a  conflict  was  pre- 
paring, which  bade  fair  to  employ  the  energies  of 
Russia  for  some  time  to  come.  The  firstfruits  of  her 
alliance  with  France  were  seen  in  the  combination 
of  those  Powers,  in  concert  with  Germany,  to  upset 
the  Treaty  of  Simonoseki  (1895),  which  had  ended 
the  Chino- Japanese  War,  and  to  deprive  Japan  of 
the  most  important  results  of  her  victory.  The  out- 
come of  this  somewhat  nefarious  transaction  was 
mainly  to  the  advantage  of  Russia.  Japan  was 
forced  to  retrocede  Port  Arthur  to  China ;  but 
Russia  had  no  intention  of  leaving  that  great  fortress 

^See  " Count MuraviefE's  Indiscretion"  {ForU  Rev.,  Dec,  1899), 
the  author  of  which  lays  the  blame  on  Russia. 


RUSSIAN  ADVANCES  IN  CHINA  6i 

in  Chinese  hands.  Early  in  1896  she  made  a  secret 
treaty  with  China,  securing  an  optional  lease  of  Port 
Arthur  or  of  Kiaochau,  together  with  important 
concessions  in  Manchuria,  including  the  right  to 
make  a  railway  to  the  Liaotung  Peninsula.  She 
strengthened  this  advantage  by  advancing  money 
to  enable  China  to  pay  the  Japanese  indemnity ; 
and,  in  the  autumn  of  1896,  the  Cassini  Convention 
made  her  influence  paramount  in  Pekin.  In  1897 
Germany,  taking  advantage  of  the  murder  of  two 
German  missionaries,  seized  the  valuable  port  of 
Kiaochau,  and  extorted  from  China  important  rights 
over  the  province  of  Shantung.  The  acquisition  was 
one  on  which  the  Emperor  seems  to  have  set  a  special 
value ;  and  enormous  sums  of  money  have  been 
spent  in  the  development  of  the  latest  German 
colony.  Early  in  the  following  year  Russia  occupied 
Port  Arthur,  upon  which  England,  by  arrangement 
with  Japan,  occupied  Wei-Hai-Wei ;  and  early  in 
1899  ^  convention  between  England  and  Russia 
recognized  British  rights  in  the  Yangtse  Valley,  as 
a  set-off  to  the  recognition  of  Russian  influence  in 
Manchuria. 

These  encroachments  on  the  integrity  of  China 
led  to  a  great  outburst  of  national  feeling  in  that 
country  ;  and  the  "  Boxer  "  troubles  were  the  result. 
The  siege  of  the  Legations  at  Pekin  (1900)  forced  the 
Powers  to  intervene,  and  furnished  Russia  with  a 
pretext  for  occupying  Manchuria.  When  the  troubles 
came  to  an  end,  she  found  other  reasons  for  retaining 
the  ground  she  had  gained.  About  the  same  time 
Russian  speculators  obtained  concessions  on  the 
Yalu  river;    and  it  became  increasingly  probable 


62  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR 

that  Russia  would  soon  attain  at  Seoul  the  same 
dominant  position  which  she  had  already  won  at 
Pekin.  Now,  Korea  is  for  Japan  very  much  what 
Belgium  is  to  Great  Britain ;  and  the  Russians  at 
Seoul  and  Masampho  would  have  been  as  menacing 
to  Japanese  security  as  a  German  occupation  of 
Brussels  and  Antwerp  would  be  to  this  country. 
Japan  made  up  her  mind  to  fight  rather  than  incur 
this  danger,  and  found  in  England  the  support  she 
required.  Hence  the  Anglo- Japanese  alUance  of 
1902,  and  the  Russo-Japanese  War  which  began 
two  years  later. 

How  far  it  is  true  that  Germany  prompted  Russia 
to  the  enterprise  must  remain  for  the  present  doubt- 
ful ;  certain  it  is  that,  in  consideration  of  a  highly 
advantageous  commercial  treaty,  the  German 
Government  gave  the  Tsar  certain  pledges  which 
enabled  Russia  to  denude  her  western  front  of  troops, 
in  order  to  transport  them  to  the  scene  of  war  in 
Manchuria.  German  shipowners  were  allowed  to 
sell  ships  to  Russia,  to  be  converted  into  cruisers ; 
and  German  financiers  provided  a  loan.  If  the  war 
was  not  due  to  German  advice — ^which  indeed  would 
have  been  superfluous — ^it  was  favourable  to  German 
interests,  and  was  therefore  facihtated  by  Germany. 

This  is  not  the  place  to  discuss  the  Anglo- Japanese 
alliance  or  the  war  that  followed.  What  I  am  con- 
cerned to  point  out  is  the  enormous  effect  which  the 
issue  of  that  war  produced  in  international  and 
especially  European  politics.  No  one  acquainted 
with  the  history  of  Europe  in  the  nineteenth  century 
can  fail  to  be  struck  by  the  dominant  position  which 
Russia  occupied  during  almost  all  that  time.  Courted 


THE  ECLIPSE  OF  RUSSIA  63 

by  Napoleon  I,  and  dividing  the  Continent  with  him, 
it  was  she  who  gave  his  Empire  its  first  deadly  blow. 
After  1815  she  led  the  forces  of  reaction ;  and  her 
policy  in  the  Near  East  kept  the  Western  Powers  in 
constant  alarm.  The  Crimean  War  exposed  her  real 
weakness  ;  nevertheless,  a  few  years  later  she  weighed 
as  heavily  as  ever  in  the  scale  of  European  politics. 
It  was  her  goodwill  that  enabled  Napoleon  III  to 
vanquish  Austria  and  emancipate  Italy.  Courted 
by  Bismarck,  her  benevolent  neutrality  allowed  him 
to  overthrow  Austria  and  France,  and  to  create  the 
German  Empire  ;  and,  except  for  one  brief  interlude, 
a  good  understanding  with  Russia  was  the  keynote 
of  his  foreign  policy.  Even  the  comparatively  un- 
successful war  of  1878  only  temporarily  dimmed  her 
prestige.  It  recovered  more  than  it  had  lost  through 
the  alliance  with  France ;  and  it  can  hardly  be 
doubted  that  the  fear  of  a  collision  with  Russia  kept 
the  projects  of  William  II,  especially  his  designs  in 
the  Near  East,  within  bounds  for  fifteen  years. 

But  now  all  this  was  to  be  altered.  Russia  chal- 
lenged the  young  Asiatic  Power,  and  was  grievously 
defeated.  Nor  was  this  all.  The  result  of  the  war, 
combined  with  lamentable  social  and  poUtical  con- 
ditions at  home,  produced  internal  disorders  which, 
added  to  the  immense  losses  of  men  and  maUriel  in 
the  Far  East,  rendered  a  vigorous  foreign  policy  im- 
possible for  a  long  time  to  come.  In  short,  Russia 
was  eUminated  from  international  calculations ;  it 
was  as  if,  in  the  solar  system,  Saturn  had  suddenly 
fallen  from  heaven.  A  balancing  force  had  been 
removed  ;  the  relations  of  all  the  other  planets  were 
changed.     More  especially,   a  constant  source  of 


ni 


64  SUMMARY  OF  THE  PERIOD 

anxiety  for  Germany  disappeared — at  least  for  a 
time.    The  Kaiser's  hands  were  freed. 

The  most  notable  features  of  the  period  (1890- 
1904)  which  we  have  now  passed  in  brief  review  ar( 
these.  For  the  poUcy  of  consoHdation  at  home  ani 
restraint  abroad,  which  marked  the  later  years  ol 
Bismarck's  sway,  was  substituted  a  more  active  an( 
adventurous  policy,  a  policy  of  expansion,  not  ye 
indeed  obviously  a^^ressive,  but  rather  preparato:^ 
for  aggression.  JnciJents  but  httle  noticed  at  the 
time,  such  as  the  Emperor's  visits  to  the  East,  the 
launching  of  the  Bagdad  railway,  the  acquisition  of 
Heligoland,  are  now  seen  to  mark  stages  in  the 
execution  of  a  consistent  and  considered  plan.  Other 
events,  such  as  the  Kriiger  telegram  and  the  seizure 
of  Kiaochau,  which  made  more  noise,  fall  into  their 
place  in  the  same  scheme.  Above  all,  the  creation  of 
a  great  navy,  starting  from  the  Navy  Bills  of  1898 
and  1900,  began  to  attract  attention  in  this  country, 
and  roused  apprehensions  which  the  events  of  the 
subsequent  period  did  nothing  to  allay.  Meanwhile 
the  internal  prosperity  of  Germany  advanced  by 
leaps  and  bounds  ;  and  the  confidence  of  the  country 
grew  with  the  increase  of  its  wealth.  New  ideas, 
new  hopes  and  ambitions,  began  to  permeate  poli- 
tical circles,  and  inflamed  the  utterances  of  a  host 
of  writers.  The  Bismarckian  system  began  to  be 
regarded  as  obsolete.  The  great  scheme  of  a  Central 
European  Customs  Union  was  launched.  The  idea^ 
of  a  vast  semi-colonial  empire  or  protectorate,  ex- 
tending from  the  Balkans  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  took 
shape.  The  Pan-German  League,  with  its  all- . 
embracing  notions  of  nationality,  its  far-reaching  \ 


SUMMARY  OF  THE  PERIOD  65 

schemes  of  conquest,  appealed  to  the  visionary  side  of 
the  German  mind.  The  Navy  League  and  other 
similar  associations  supplied  a  practical  and  im- 
mediate aim,  and  strengthened  the  idea  of  combined 
national  effort  for  a  great  end.  It  was  a  period  of 
rapid  internal  development,  both  of  forces  and  ideas, 
during  which  the  foundations  were  laid  for  expansion 
and  ultimately  for  aggression  abroad.  The  nature 
of  this  growth  was  little  understood  or  even  observed 
outside  Germany.  England,  France,  Italy,  and 
Russia  were  all  occupied  beyond  the  frontiers  of 
Europe ;  what  was  going  on  in  Germany  escaped 
their  attention.  Nevertheless,  especially  towards 
the  end  of  the  period,  a  vague  feeling  of  suspicion 
and  apprehension  began  to  spread.  The  Bismarckian 
grouping  of  the  Powers  gave  way ;  or  rather  the 
Powers  outside  the  central  bloc  tended  to  substitute 
coalition  for  their  previous  isolation.  The  Triple 
AUiance  still  held  firm,  but  France  and  Russia  drew 
together,  and  England  and  France  began  to  search 
for  a  way  of  composing  their  mutual  jealousies.  The 
Triple  Entente  was  already  visible  on  the  horizon. 
Such  was  the  position  when  the  Russo-Japanese  War 
took  place. 


CHAPTER  V 

GERMAN   FOREIGN   POLICY,   I905-I914 

We  now  enter  upon  another  period,  one  full  of 
"  alarums  and  excursions "  which  have  led  on, 
almost  inevitably,  to  the  present  war.  I  am  far 
from  asserting  that  Germany,  ten  years  ago,  had 
conceived  the  deliberate  intention  of  provoking  a 
European  conflict.  What  I  maintain  is  that  the 
course  of  action  initiated  by  the  German  Govern- 
ment in  1905  was  one  of  an  increasingly  self-assertive, 
if  not  actively  aggressive,  character,  calculated  to 
encourage  ambitions  in  the  German  people  and  fears 
in  other  nations  which  divided  Europe  into  two 
armed  camps ;  and  that  a  policy  of  demands  and 
threats,  of  diplomacy  backed  by  a  constant  *'  rattling 
of  the  sabre,"  was  bound  eventually  to  lead  Germany 
into  an  international  position  in  which  diplomatic 
pressure  could  no  longer  ensure  a  triumph,  and  war 
became,  for  a  fully  armed  and  self-confident  people, 
the  only  alternative.  Clausewitz  regarded  war  as 
the  *' continuation  of  policy."  That  depends  on  the 
policy.  A  policy  was  now  pursued  by  Germany  which 
was  bound,  sooner  or  later,  to  result  in  war. 

Let  us  note,  at  the  outset,  the  dates  of  certain 
events  in  the  Far  East.    The  war  between  Russia 

66 


EFFECT  OF  JAPANESE  VICTORIES        67 

and  Japan  began  in  February,  1904.  After  a  long 
series  of  sanguinary  engagements,  Port  Arthur  fell 
at  the  end  of  the  year  ;  and  the  remains  of  the  first 
Russian  fleet  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  victors. 
In  February  and  March,  1905,  was  fought  the  last 
great  land-battle,  that  of  Mukden  ;  and  in  May  the 
second  Russian  fleet  was  destroyed  in  the  Battle  of 
Tsushima.  President  Roosevelt  intervened,  and  the 
Peace  of  Portsmouth  was  signed  in  September. 

I  pass  over  the  more  remote  effects  of  the  Japan- 
ese victory,  which  re-echoed  throughout  Asia — the 
annexation  of  Korea,  the  revolution  in  China,  the 
growth  of  nationalist  feeling  and  the  stimulation  of 
"  unrest ''  in  India,  the  revolution  and  the  grant  of 
a  constitution  in  Persia.  In  the  Near  East  also  the 
triumph  of  an  Asiatic  over  a  European  Power  had 
a  perceptible  influence,  in  the  growth  of  the  Young 
Turk  movement,  which  issued  in  the  revolution  of 
1908,  and  in  the  nationaUst  agitation  in  Egypt. 
Even  in  the  Far  West,  the  fear  of  Japanese  aggres- 
sion began  to  occupy  the  mind  and  to  affect  the 
policy  of  the  United  States.  In  short,  the  victories 
of  Japan,  like  the  ocean-waves  engendered  by  the 
earthquake  of  Krakatoa,  were  felt  all  round  the 
world.  What  we  are  here  concerned  with  is  their 
immediate  effect  on  the  European  position. 

For  some  time  past  the  Governments  of  France 
and  Great  Britain  had  felt  that  the  existence  of  a 
number  of  causes  of  friction  between  them  was 
detrimental  to  both  countries ;  and  efforts  had  been 
made  by  well-disposed  persons  on  both  sides  of  the 
Channel  to  bring  about  a  better  understanding. 
These  efforts,  however,  had  not  made  much  way 


68        THE  ANGLO-FRENCH  AGREEMENT 

before  the  Russo-Japanese  War.  At  an  early  stage 
in  the  hostiUties  it  became  evident  that  a  Russian 
victory  was  improbable,  and  that,  at  all  events,  a 
long  and  exhausting  struggle  was  in  prospect.  With 
Russia  fully  occupied  in  the  Far  East,  France 
practically  fell  back  again  into  the  isolation  from 
which  she  had  escaped  in  1891.  So  long  as  England 
was  unfriendly,  or  even  indifferent,  she  was  exposed 
unaided  to  dangers  from  across  the  Rhine  such  as 
had  threatened  her  in  1875  and  1887.  The  situation 
was  too  hazardous  to  be  endured.  There  was  only 
one  possible  supporter — Great  Britain,  with  whom 
France  had  nearly  gone  to  war  six  years  before. 
But  in  the  interval  some  causes  of  trouble  had  been 
removed  ;  and  a  King  was  on  the  English  throne  who 
undoubtedly  laboured — even  if  his  influence  in  this 
respect  has  been  sometimes  exaggerated — ^in  the 
cause  of  peace.  Above  all,  it  was  felt  in  England 
that,  if  the  situation  was  to  be  saved,  and  the  peace 
of  Europe  preserved,  it  could  only  be  by  common 
action  on  the  part  of  the  two  western  Powers.  The 
result  was  the  Anglo-French  agreement  of  April 
1904,  which  set  at  rest  all  outstanding  questions 
between  the  two  countries.  France  recognized  the 
position  of  England  in  Egypt ;  England,  somewhat 
vaguely,  acknowledged  French  claims  in  Morocco ; 
Madagascar  was  registered  as  French  ;  French  and 
English  possessions  in  Nigeria  were  finally  delimited, 
rival  interests  in  Siam  reconciled,  and  the  ancient 
disputes  about  the  Newfoundland  fisheries  brought 
to  a  close.  There  was  no  further  obstacle  to  concerted 
action  in  European  affairs. 

The  stability  and  value  of  the  agreement  were  soon 


FRANCO-GERMAN  RELATIONS  69 

to  be  tested.  In  the  following  year  (1905)  Germany 
made  the  first  of  several  attempts  to  destroy  it.  The 
ground  she  chose  for  this  effort  was  the  question  of 
Morocco.  To  understand  her  action  and  the  events 
that  followed,  it  will  be  necessary  to  go  back  a  few 
years,  and  trace  briefly  the  circumstances  which 
brought  Moroccan  affairs  into  such  prominence. 
Since  the  retirement  of  Bismarck,  Franco-German 
relations  had  been,  if  not  precisely  friendly,  on  a 
tolerable  footing.  Germany  had  shown  dissatisfac- 
tion at  the  Franco-Russian  alliance  ;  and  Bismarck 
had,  as  we  have  seen,  been  blamed  for  not  guarding 
against  it.  But  the  Government  made  no  attempt 
to  undo  what  had  been  done,  for  it  had  no  desire  to 
pick  a  quarrel  with  either  of  the  contracting  parties 
at  the  time.  The  Allies,  moreover,  were  busily 
engaged  outside  Europe — France  in  Africa  and  Indo- 
China,  Russia  in  preparing  for  advances  in  the  Far 
East ;  and  for  some  years  the  Bismarckian  policy 
of  encouraging  such  occupations  was  pursued.  Dur- 
ing the  first  decade  of  his  reign,  the  German  Emperor 
showed  an  inclination  to  remain  on  good  terms  with 
France ;  and  overtures  for  an  understanding  were 
made,  on  several  occasions,  by  the  German  Foreign 
Office.  M.  Hanotaux,  French  Foreign  Secretary  from 
1894  to  1898,  was  strongly  in  favour  of  a  Franco- 
German  entente ;  but  his  successor,  M.  Delcasse, 
was  of  a  different  mind,  and  declared,  on  the  morrow 
of  Fashoda,  that  he  would  never  be  satisfied  until 
he  had  reconciled  England  and  France.  Neverthe- 
less, German  attempts  to  win  over  the  French  were 
repeated  in  1900  and  1901 ;  they  failed  principally 
because  the  acceptance  of  overtures  from  Berlin 


70  THE  CONDITION  OF  MOROCCO 

would  have  implied  acquiescence  in  the  Treaty  of 
Frankfort  and  the  final  abandonment  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine. 

It  was  about  this  time  that  Morocco  began  to  take 
a  leading  place  in  French  colonial  policy.  So  far 
back  as  1880  the  condition  of  that  country  had  been 
the  subject  of  international  discussion  ;  and  at  the 
Conference  of  Madrid,  held  in  that  year,  the  German 
delegate — ^it  was  before  the  days  when  Germany  had 
a  colonial  policy  at  all — was  instructed  to  support 
France.  For  some  twenty  years  after  this  date,  the 
French  Government  had  been  content  with  a  slowly 
advancing  trade,  furthered  by  private  effort ;  and  at 
the  end  of  the  century  France  held  unquestionably 
the  first  place  in  Moroccan  commerce.  Great  Britain 
came  next,  and  Germany  third,  but  a  long  way 
behind.  Until  the  death  of  the  Sultan  Mulai  Hassan, 
in  1894,  England  held  a  predominant  political  posi- 
tion at  Fez ;  but  under  his  successor  her  influence 
declined,  and  an  anarchical  condition  began  to 
supervene.  The  idea  of  a  British  protectorate  was 
more  than  once  suggested,  as  was  also  that  of  an 
Italian  protectorate ;  but  neither  suggestion  led  to 
any  practical  results.  When  Lord  Lansdowne  took 
office  as  Foreign  Secretary,  England — largely  owing 
to  the  experience  of  the  Boer  War — ^was  definitely 
abandoning  the  "  splendid  isolation  *'  on  which  she 
had  hitherto  prided  herself  ;  and  in  M.  Delcasse  she 
found  a  statesman  ready  to  meet  her  half-way. 

Advances  towards  an  understanding  with  Italy 
had  already  been  made  by  the  French  Government  ; 
and  a  commercial  treaty  (1898)  paved  the  way  for  a 
more  thorough  understanding.    This  was  achieved 


FRANCE,   ITALY  AND  SPAIN  71 

in  the  Franco-Italian  convention  of  1900,  confirmed 
two  years  later,  under  which  France  gave  Italy  a 
free  hand  in  Tripoli,  while  Italy  promised  to  raise 
no  objection  to  a  French  advance  in  Morocco. 
This  new  orientation  showed  itself  on  the  occasion 
of  the  renewal  of  the  Triple  AUiance  in  1902,  when 
the  clauses  of  the  treaty  aimed  especially  at  France, 
and  adopted  by  Crispi  at  a  time  when  Italy  was  very 
sore  over  Tunis,  were  left  out,  and  the  treaty  became, 
so  far  at  least  as  Italy  was  concerned,  one  of  a  mere- 
ly defensive  kind.  Certain  commercial  agreements 
were  made  about  the  same  time  (1901-2)  with  the 
Sultan  of  Morocco,  faciUtating  the  *'  peaceful  pen- 
tration  "  of  the  country  by  French  trade.  With 
Spain  also  a  settlement  was  attempted  in  1902.  The 
French  proposals  were  then  decHned  in  Madrid  ;  and 
it  was  not  till  after  the  Anglo-French  agreement  had 
been  signed  (April,  1904)  that  a  secret  convention 
was  made  with  Spain,  delimiting  the  respective 
spheres  of  action  of  the  twa  countries  in  Morocco 
(October,  1904). 

I  have  dwelt  at  some  length  on  these  preliminaries 
because  the  change  of  policy  implied  by  the  con- 
ventions with  England  and  Spain,  taken  together 
with  the  omission  to  offer  Germany  a  share  in  the 
settlement  of  Morocco — as  to  which  she  had  on 
previous  occasions  been  consulted — was  a  very 
momentous  one.  I  will  not  discuss  the  wisdom  of 
this  policy,  beyond  remarking  that  it  was  evidently 
hazardous.  It  was  in  no  sense  hostile  to  Germany, 
either  in  purport  or  in  intention ;  but  its  exclusive 
character  afforded  some  excuse  for  irritation. 

Intimation  of  the  Anglo-French  agreement,  so  far 

F 


72       GERMANY,  FRANCE  AND  MOROCCO 

as  Egypt  was  concerned,  was  at  once  given  by  the 
British  Government  to  that  of  Germany  ;  the  French 
Government  informed  the  German  Ambassador  in 
Paris  of  the  arrangement  about  Morocco.  The 
German  Government  raised  no  objections.  Prince 
RadoHn  told  M.  Delcasse  that  he  found  the  French 
declarations  about  Morocco  natural  and  reasonable  ; 
and  Count  von  Biilow  made  a  similar  statement  in 
the  Reichstag.  Although  the  Emperor,  in  a  pubUc 
speech  made  shortly  afterwards,  gave  somewhat 
cryptic  utterance  to  his  resentment,  his  Government 
took  no  overt  action  so  long  as  the  issue  of  the  strug- 
gle in  the  East  remained  uncertain.  But  the  Pan- 
German  League  was  active  ;  and  the  Russian  defeats, 
especially  the  fall  of  Port  Arthur,  produced  a  change 
in  the  attitude  of  Germany.  In  January,  1905, 
M.  Rouvier,  a  politician  opposed  to  Delcasse,  suc- 
ceeded M.  Combes  as  Premier  ;  and  intrigues  against 
the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  at  once  began.  The 
German  Government,  being  questioned  by  the  French 
Ambassador,  declared  that,  not  having  been  formally 
consulted  with  regard  to  Morocco,  it  did  not  consider 
itself  bound  to  observe  the  Anglo-French  agreement. 
On  March  31st,  shortly  after  the  Battle  of  Mukden, 
the  German  Emperor  landed  at  Tangier  and  made  a 
speech  in  which  he  proclaimed  himself  the  champion 
of  Moroccan  integrity.  This  was  followed  by  the 
demand  for  an  international  conference  to  consider 
the  question  anew ;  and  Count  Henckel  von  Don- 
nersmarck  was  sent  to  Paris  to  require  the  dismissal 
of  Delcasse.  Active  negotiations  followed  ;  Europe 
became  anxious ;  the  French  Government,  unpre- 
pared for  war,  was  alarmed.    Towards  the  end  of 


THE  FALL  OF  DELCASS^  73 

May  the  Battle  of  Tsushima  finally  destroyed  all 
hope  of  Russian  intervention  ;  and  on  June  6th  the 
Council  of  Ministers  in  Paris,  in  spite  of  Delcasse's 
opposition,  resolved  to  accept  the  German  demand. 
Thereupon  the  Foreign  Minister  resigned. 

This  first  success  was  not  likely  to  satisfy  Ger- 
many ;  on  the  contrary,  it  could  only  encourage  her 
to  further  activity  and  greater  truculence.  More- 
over, it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  Conservative 
Government  in  England  was,  at  the  time,  in  a  state 
of  rapid  dissolution ;  and  the  Germans  may  well 
have  fancied  that  a  Liberal  Ministry,  already  pledged 
to  a  change  of  policy  in  South  Africa,  would  adopt 
a  different  attitude  nearer  home.  The  Government 
of  Mr.  Balfour,  however,  at  an  early  stage  of  the 
proceedings,  intimated  to  BerHn  that,  '*  in  the  event 
of  an  unprovoked  attack  upon  the  Republic,  popular 
feeling  in  England  would  not  suffer  the  French  to 
be  left  unsupported  "  ;  and  this  timely  warning 
doubtless  contributed  to  the  maintenance  of  peace. 

The  principle  of  a  conference  once  accepted,  the 
bases  of  discussion  had  still  to  be  arranged ;  and  it 
was  not  till  September — ^ten  days  after  the  conclusion 
of  the  Peace  of  Portsmouth — ^that  the  agreement  was 
signed.  Even  with  the  reservations  that  were  made, 
the  enforced  recognition  that  Germany  and  her  allies 
had  a  right  to  share  in  the  settlement  of  Morocco  was 
a  diplomatic  triumph  of  great  importance  for  Berlin. 
Nor  can  it  be  denied  that,  although  German  interests 
in  Morocco  were  small  in  comparison  with  those  of 
England  and  France,  Germany  had  some  ground  for 
asserting  that  so  large  and  valuable  a  territory,  and 
one  so  near  to  Europe,  should  not  be  disposed  of  by 


74        THE  CONFERENCE  OF  ALGECIRAS 

three  Powers  without  attention  to  the  wishes  of  the 
rest.  When  we  consider  the  importance  of  colonial 
expansion  to  Germany,  and  remember  that  Morocco 
was  one  of  the  few  remaining  portions  of  the  earth's 
surface  available  for  European  colonization  of  a 
residential  kind,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  German 
Government  should  have  asserted  its  claim  for  con- 
sideration. It  was  the  high-handed  manner  in  which 
that  claim  was  pressed,  and  the  use  which  was  made 
of  the  comparative  isolation  in  which  France  found 
herself  at  the  time,  that  gave  genuine  cause  for  alarm 
and  irritation. 

The  Conference  met  at  Algeciras  in  January,  1906, 
and  sat  for  three  months.  To  describe  the  discussion 
in  detail  would  occupy  too  much  space.  It  must 
suffice  to  say  that  Germany  strove  hard  to  isolate 
France ;  and  that  the  conditions  which  she  sought 
to  impose  were  such  that  the  chances  of  peace  and 
war  seemed  for  some  time  to  be  evenly  balanced. 
But  the  British  Government,  maintaining  herein  the 
poHcy  of  its  predecessor,  held  firm  to  the  Entente ; 
and  Germany,  receiving  satisfaction  on  minor  points, 
and  finding  all  Europe,  with  the  exception  of  her 
"  brilliant  second,''  Austria,  arrayed  against  the 
concession  of  further  demands,  at  length  gave  way. 
In  the  end,  while  the  ''  integrity  of  Morocco  '*  was 
formally  recognized  and  the  principle  of  the  "  open 
door  "  maintained — at  least  for  a  specified  time — 
predominant  political  influence  in  that  country  was 
conceded  to  France.  The  first  attempt  to  break  up 
the  Anglo-French  Entente  had  failed ;  and  our 
friends  emerged  from  the  conflict  with  more  advan- 
tage than  they  could  have  expected  a  year  before. 


THE  CASABLANCA  INCIDENT  75 

This  was  not,  however,  to  be  the  end  of  the 
Moroccan  question ;  and  it  will  be  convenient  to 
carry  the  story  a  stage  further  before  passing  to 
other  matters.  Early  in  1908  civil  war  broke  out 
in  Morocco.  The  reigning  Sultan,  Abdul  Aziz,  was 
forced  to  fly  from  the  capital  and  took  refuge  in 
French  territory.  Germany  promptly  recognized 
the  pretender,  Mulai  Hafid,  and  sent  a  consul  to  Fez, 
thus  infringing  the  compact  which  attributed  politi- 
cal predominance  in  Morocco  to  France.  Eventually 
Mulai  Hafid  was  recognized  by  the  other  Powers 
concerned. 

This  difficulty  was  hardly  settled,  when  the  so- 
called  Casablanca  incident  (September,  1908) — a 
trivial  dispute  between  French  and  German  officials 
respecting  some  deserters  of  the  Foreign  Legion  in 
a  Moroccan  port — raised  another  storm.  The  inci- 
dent, which  might  have  been  easily  settled  by  a 
Power  peaceably  disposed,  was  converted  by  Ger- 
many into  an  international  question  of  the  first 
magnitude ;  and  the  attitude  she  assumed  was  as 
menacing  and  peremptory  as  it  had  been  three  years 
before.  But  things  in  France  had  improved  in  the 
interval ;  the  French  army  was  in  better  trim  ;  and 
confidence  in  the  Entente  (recently  strengthened  by 
the  adhesion  of  Russia)  was  more  strongly  estab- 
lished. Clemenceau  and  Pichon  held  firm ;  and 
Germany,  whose  attention  was  largely  occupied  by 
the  Balkan  crisis,  eventually  agreed  to  submit  the 
question  to  the  Hague  Tribunal.  Even  then  the 
matter  was  not  settled.  The  pubHcation  in  the  Daily 
Telegraph  (October,  1908)  of  the  famous  interview 
with  the  Emperor  caused  so  much  excitement  and 


76     FRANCO-GERMAN  CONVENTION 

annoyance  in  Germany  that  the  Government  thought 
it  advisable  to  divert  pubUc  attention  by  another 
attempt  to  bully  France.  They  suddenly  demanded 
that  France  should  make  a  public  apology  for  the 
action  of  her  officials,  before  the  question  was  sub- 
mitted to  the  Tribunal.  But  France,  supported  by 
England  and  Russia,  again  refused  to  humiliate 
herself  ;  and  the  incident,  which  threatened  to  end 
in  tragedy,  was  closed  by  an  almost  comic  com- 
promise. 

Finally,  in  February,  1909,  almost  simultaneously 
with  the  settlement  of  the  Bosnian  question,  a  con- 
vention was  signed  between  France  and  Germany. 
The  object  aimed  at  was  to  facilitate  the  execution 
of  the  Act  of  Algeciras.  It  was  agreed  that  Germany 
should  enjoy  perfect  equality  of  commercial  rights 
in  Morocco,  and  that  France  should  have  the  political 
control  necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  order,  with 
a  view  to  the  enjoyment  of  those  rights.  This  con- 
vention, combined  with  the  decision  of  the  Hague 
Tribunal  on  the  Casablanca  incident,  given  in  May, 
1909,  seemed  to  promise  quiet  for  some  time  to  come. 

We  must  now  turn  to  another  storm-centre,  the 
Near  East.  But  before  entering  on  it,  we  have  to 
take  note  of  an  event  of  first-rate  importance  in 
regard  to  international  relations — ^the  Anglo-Russian 
agreement  of  1907.  This  convention  was  the  natural 
though  not  immediate  consequence  of  the  Anglo- 
French  agreement  of  1904.  For  many  years  there 
had  been  difficulties  between  the  two  Powers  with 
regard  to  their  respective  interests  or  spheres  of 
activity  in  the  East.    In  1878  they  had  been  on  the 


THE  ANGLO-RUSSIAN  AGREEMENT       77 

verge  of  war  about  Turkey.  Russia  then  retaliated 
by  intrigues  at  Cabul,  which  led  to  the  Afghan  War 
of  1878-9.  In  1886  the  Penjdeh  incident  nearly 
brought  about  an  armed  collision.  The  Anglo- 
Japanese  aUiance  (1902)  aimed  at  giving  mutual 
security  against  Russian  aggression,  and,  by  localiz- 
ing the  war,  enabled  Japan  to  defeat  her  mighty  an- 
tagonist. The  growth  of  Russian  influence  at  Lhassa 
provoked  the  Tibetan  expedition  of  1903-4 ;  while 
in  Persia  conflicting  interests  produced  a  situation 
constantly  tending  to  become  more  serious.  In 
short,  with  Russia,  as  with  France,  before  1904, 
Great  Britain  had  many  points  of  friction,  rendering 
impossible  that  harmonious  co-operation  which  the 
aggressive  spirit  displayed  by  Germany  in  the 
Moroccan  crisis  had  proved  to  be  eminently  desirable. 
Chastened  in  spirit  by  her  defeats  in  the  Far  East 
and  by  the  domestic  disturbances  which  added  to 
her  weakness,  Russia  was  now  in  a  condition  to 
welcome  the  overtures  made  by  the  Conservative 
Government  in  England  and  continued  by  their 
successors.  The  negotiation  was  long  and  difficult, 
but  an  end  was  reached  in  the  Anglo-Russian  agree- 
ment of  August,  1907,  which  established  a  working 
compromise  with  regard  to  Persia,  Afghanistan,  and 
Tibet.  The  arrangement  was  not  in  all  respects 
satisfactory,  especially  with  regard  to  Persia ;  but 
it  at  least  enabled  the  two  Powers  to  work  together 
harmoniously  in  Europe.  The  Dual  Entente  thus 
became  a  Triple  Entente  ;  and  it  was  hoped,  at  least 
in  this  country — where  pacific  ideas  prevailed  and 
the  Entente  was  regarded  as  purely  defensive — that 
it  would  prove  a  bulwark  of  European  peace.     In 


78  THE  NEAR-EAST  :  CRETAN  TROUBLES 

Germany,  however,  it  was  resented  as  Einkreisungs- 
politiky  a  policy  deliberately  adopted  by  the  enemies 
of  Germany  with  the  malign  intention  of  forcing  on 
the  country  a  strait  waistcoat,  which  it  was  the 
duty,  as  well  as  the  interest,  of  a  powerful  and  self- 
respecting  State  at  all  costs  to  destroy. 

We  may  now  briefly  consider  the  previous  course 
of  affairs  in  South-Eastern  Europe,  in  order  to  under- 
stand the  conditions  under  which  the  Balkan  Ques- 
tion again  forced  its  way  in  1908  to  the  forefront  of 
European  politics.  After  1885,  when  Bulgaria  and 
Eastern  Rumelia  coalesced  into  one  State,  the  his- 
tory of  the  Near  East  for  the  next  twenty  years 
cannot  be  said  to  have  been  uneventful.  But  such 
disturbances  as  occurred  were  localized ;  and  the 
European  Concert  was,  generally  speaking,  effica- 
cious, not  indeed  in  removing  the  deep-seated  origins 
of  trouble,  but  in  preventing  them  from  causing  a 
European  conflagration.  The  Serbo-Bulgarian  War, 
which  followed  (1886)  the  amalgamation  of  Bulgaria, 
ended  quickly  in  a  Serbian  defeat,  and  was  prevented 
by  Austrian  intervention  from  producing  any  other 
results.  In  the  same  year  Greece,  desirous  of  making 
war  on  Turkey,  was  hindered  by  a  naval  blockade 
from  carrying  out  her  intention. 

Revolutionary  movements  in  Crete,  aiming  at  a 
union  with  the  Greek  kingdom,  were  for  many  years 
the  chief  source  of  trouble.  An  insurrection  broke 
out  in  1889 ;  and  religious  differences  between  the 
Christians  and  Mohammedans  in  the  island  embit- 
tered the  racial  conflict  thence  arising.  In  1895  the 
Sultan  succeeded  in  allaying  the  quarrel,  but  it  broke 
out  afresh  in  the  following  year  ;  and  the  desire  for 


GREECE  AND  RUMANIA  79 

annexation  found  a  growing  response  in  Greece.  In 
1897  Colonel  Vassos,  accompanied  by  Greek  sup- 
porters, landed  in  Crete ;  but  the  Powers,  while 
promising  autonomy,  ordered  him  to  leave.  National 
feeling  in  Greece  had,  however,  risen  by  this  time  to 
bursting-point ;  and  the  *'  Thirty  Days'  War  "  with 
Turkey  followed.  The  Greeks  were  badly  beaten ; 
the  Powers  again  intervened ;  and  the  status  quo  was 
restored.  A  temporary  settlement  of  the  Cretan 
question  was  achieved  in  the  following  year  (1898). 
The  Turkish  officials  left  the  island ;  and  Prince 
George  of  Greece  was  installed  as  High  Commissioner, 
under  the  nominal  suzerainty  of  the  Porte.  In  1906 
the  Prince  resigned,  and  his  place  was  taken  by 
M.  Ziamis ;  but  the  compromise  was  maintained, 
with  the  support  of  international  troops,  till  1909. 
It  should  be  observed  that  from  these  transactions, 
so  far  as  they  were  to  the  disadvantage  of  Turkey, 
the  German  Government,  so  far  as  possible,  held 
aloof.  A  German  contingent  was,  however,  sent  to 
join,  for  a  time,  the  contingents  of  the  other  Powers 
in  Crete. 

Meanwhile  Rumania,  which  had  become  a  king- 
dom in  1881,  pursued  the  even  tenour  of  her  way. 
Her  intimate  connection  with  the  Central  Powers, 
established  after  the  Russo-Turkish  War,  was  main- 
tained under  her  Hohenzollern  ruler.  King  Charles, 
and  was  strengthened  by  a  military  convention  in 
1896.  This  convention  appears  to  have  been  re- 
newed, with  more  specific  objects,  in  1900.^  Remote 
from  the  chief  areas  of  disturbance,  politically  within 
the  German  group,  but  from  the  cultural  point  of 

1  Gu^choff,  U Alliance  Balkanique,  pp.  61,  62. 


8o  BULGARIA  AND  SERBIA 

view  dependent  rather  on  Latin  civilization,  Rumania 
made  great  social  and  economic  progress  during  a 
period  of  thirty-five  years. 

Bulgaria,  on  the  other  hand,  fell  gradually  into 
the  orbit  of  Russian  influence.  Two  years  after  her 
junction  with  Eastern  Rumelia,  the  Prince,  Alex- 
ander of  Battenberg,  was  forced  to  abdicate ;  and 
Ferdinand  of  Coburg,  a  grandson  of  Louis  Philippe, 
was  chosen  Prince  in  his  stead.  His  great  minister, 
Stambuloff,  resisted  Russian  influence  until  his 
dismissal  in  1894.  Ferdinand  made  his  peace  with 
the  Tsar ;  and  thenceforward  the  foreign  poHcy  of 
Bulgaria  was  distinctly  Russophil.  By  a  convention 
between  Russia  and  Bulgaria  signed  in  1902,  as  a 
counterpoise  to  Austrian  influence  in  Serbia,  Russia 
undertook  to  uphold  the  integrity  of  Bulgaria. 

Meanwhile  Serbia  had  passed  through  stormy 
times.  Under  the  last  two  kings  of  the  Obrenovitch 
dynasty,  Milan  and  Alexander — Milan  assumed  the 
royal  title  in  1882 — Serbia  was  dominated  by 
Austrian  influence,  which  found  expression  in  the 
Austro-Serbian  convention  of  1900.  But  Milan, 
constantly  tampering  with  the  constitution,  became 
so  unpopular  that  in  1889  he  abdicated  in  favour  of 
his  son  Alexander,  who,  after  his  coming  of  age  in 
1893,  proved  as  incapable  and  ill-advised  a  ruler  as 
his  father.  His  unfortunate  marriage,  his  proscrip- 
tion of  the  Radical  party,  and  his  obstinate  adherence 
to  the  Austrian  connection,  combined  to  fan  the  fire 
of  national  discontent  to  a  white  heat ;  and  in  1903 
he  and  his  Queen  were  murdered  by  a  group  of  officers 
in  circumstances  of  great  brutality.  Peter  Kara- 
georgevitch  succeeded ;    and  the  foreign  relations 


SERBIA  AND  MONTENEGRO  8i 

of  Serbia  at  once  took  on  a  different  colour.  The 
new  direction  was  indicated  by  a  secret  treaty 
between  Serbia  and  Bulgaria  signed  in  1904/  and 
by  a  Serbo-Bulgarian  convention  in  1906,  which  was 
regarded  as  a  step  towards  a  customs-union  between 
the  two  countries.  Austria  showed  her  resentment 
by  imposing  a  prohibitive  tariff  on  the  chief  article 
of  Serbian  export — pigs ;  and  her  relations  with 
Serbia  have  been  unfriendly  ever  since. 

Of  Serbia's  neighbour,  Montenegro — separated 
from  her,  however,  by  the  Sanjak  of  Novi-Bazar,  for 
thirty  years  in  the  occupation  of  Austria-Hungary — 
nothing  need  be  said  except  that,  to  the  extent  of  her 
capacity,  she  followed  in  the  wake  of  wealthier  States, 
and,  largely  by  the  aid  of  Italian  capital,  gradually 
put  on  some  at  least  of  the  externals  of  civilization. 
It  was  not  till  1910  that  her  Prince  followed  the 
example  of  other  Balkan  rulers,  and  adopted  the 
title  of  King.  As  a  Slav  State,  Montenegro  looked  to 
Russia  for  support  against  aggression  on  the  part  of 
her  great  neighbour  to  the  north.  To  sum  up,  the 
rivalry  between  Austria  and  Russia  in  the  Balkan 
peninsula  was  fairly  evenly  balanced  till  1903,  Serbia 
and  Rumania  going  with  the  former,  Montenegro 
and  Bulgaria  with  the  latter.  But  in  that  year  the 
balance  was  upset  by  Serbia  going  over  to  the  Russian 
side — a  change  in  which  Austria- Hungary  was  not 
likely  to  acquiesce. 

During  this  period,  especially  after  the  German 
Emperor's  second  visit  in  1898,  Turkey  was  falling 
more  and  more  under  German  influence.  AHenated 
from  Russia,  Germany  looked  to  Turkey  to  balance 

1  Guechoff,  L* Alliance  Balkanique,  p.  14. 


82  TURKEY:    MACEDONIA 

the  loss.  While  continuing  to  strengthen  her  com- 
mercial connection  and  her  financial  control  at 
Constantinople,  she  was  careful  not  to  annoy  the 
Sultan  by  inconvenient  suggestions  on  behalf  of 
the  oppressed  communities  subject  to  his  control, 
or  still  more  disagreeable  interventions  such  as 
those  on  which  the  other  Powers  occasionally 
ventured.  Germany  could  not  altogether  abstain 
from  taking  a  part  in  the  European  Concert, 
but  the  "  flute "  on  which  she  performed  was 
seldom  heard;  and,  when  it  produced  any  sound 
at  all,  it  played  a  tune  more  pleasing  to  the 
Turk  than  was  that  given  out  by  the  rest  of  the 
band. 

This  attitude  was  especially  manifested  in  regard 
to  the  troubles  in  Macedonia — the  real  storm-centre 
of  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  In  that  extraordinary 
melange  of  nationalities  and  rehgions,  Serbs,  Greeks, 
and  Bulgarians  lived  together  in  inextricable  con- 
fusion ;  even  Rumania  had,  in  the  wandering 
shepherds  known  as  Kutzo-Wlachs,  an  excuse  for 
putting  a  finger  in  the  pie.  National  animosities 
were  accentuated  by  the  religious  differences  between 
the  Orthodox,  the  Hexarchists,  and  the  Patriarchists. 
Oppression,  anarchy,  and  internecine  strife  were 
chronic ;  and,  as  the  hour  of  Ottoman  dissolution 
seemed  approaching,  each  of  the  interested  States 
sought,  by  violent  but  covert  action  on  behalf  of  its 
own  nationals,  to  advance  its  claim  to  the  disputed 
territory  at  the  expense  of  its  rivals.  It  was  obvious 
that  any  serious  disturbance  in  this  region  affected 
the  interests  of  the  neighbouring  Balkan  States,  and 
consequently  those  of  the  Great   Powers  which, 


PROJECTS  OF  REFORM  83 

through  the  minor  States,  sought  to  extend  their 
influence  over  the  whole  peninsula. 

Such  a  disturbance  was  threatened  by  the  Greco- 
Turkish  War  of  1897.  In  view  of  this  event,  Turkey 
had  for  some  time  cultivated  good  relations  with 
Bulgaria ;  and  it  was  feared  that  the  Bulgarians 
might  join  the  Turks  against  Greece  with  a  view  to 
obtaining  concessions  in  Macedonia.  Austria  and 
Russia  therefore  came  to  an  understanding  (April, 
1897),  by  which  they  agreed  that  the  status  quo 
should  be  maintained,  while  recognizing  each  other's 
respective  spheres  of  influence  in  the  west  and  east 
of  the  Peninsula.  For  a  time  the  danger  was  evaded  ; 
but  it  recurred  in  1903,  when  the  state  of  things  in 
Macedonia  was  passing  from  bad  to  worse.  Some 
sort  of  intervention  appeared  inevitable  ;  and  Great 
Britain  put  forward  a  proposal  for  the  internationali- 
zation of  the  disturbed  districts.  At  this  moment 
Russia  was  preparing  for  the  confliict  in  Manchuria, 
and  had  no  wish  to  see  other  Powers  settling  Balkan 
affairs  while  her  energies  were  occupied  elsewhere. 
The  Tsar  therefore  approached  the  Emperor  of 
Austria,  whose  foreign  policy  was  then  directed  by 
the  pacific  Goluchowski ;  and  a  meeting  between 
the  two  sovereigns  took  place  at  Miirzsteg  (Septem- 
ber, 1903),  at  which  a  programme  of  reforms  for 
Macedonia  was  drawn  up.  This  was  pressed  upon 
the  Sultan,  and  theoretically  accepted ;  but,  as  the 
requisite  supervision  was  not  provided,  the  reforms 
produced  little  or  no  result. 

The  policy  of  co-operation  with  Russia  was 
naturally  unpopular  with  the  forward  party  in 
Vienna,  and  detested  by  the  Magyar  element  in  the 


84  BALKAN  POLICY  OF  AUSTRIA 

Dual  Monarchy.  The  feeling  grew  that  a  chance  of 
pushing  Austrian  interests  in  the  Balkans  had  been 
lost  in  1903,  and  that  something  must  be  done  to 
balance  the  disadvantageous  change  in  Serbian 
policy.  The  Russian  defeats  in  the  Far  East 
appeared  to  afford  an  opportunity  which  it  would 
be  absurd  to  neglect.  These  views  produced  a 
change  in  the  Austrian  ministry.  The  German 
Emperor  made  no  secret  of  his  dissatisfaction  at  the 
inadequacy  of  the  assistance  which  the  Austrian 
representative  had  given  him  at  Algeciras — ^his 
remark  about  the  ''  brilliant  second "  was  inter- 
preted as  conveying  a  reproof  under  the  guise  of 
praise  ;  and  in  1906  Goluchowski  retired.  His  place 
was  taken  by  a  Hungarian,  Count  Aehrenthal ;  and 
Austrian  policy  entered  upon  an  active  phase.  Its 
chief  object  was  to  incorporate  the  provinces  of 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  placed  under  Austrian 
protection  in  1878,  in  the  Austro-Hungarian  Em- 
pire. Once  fully  in  possession  of  these  districts,  and 
occupying  the  Sanjak  of  Novi-Bazar,  Austria  might 
push  her  way  to  Salonika,  and  thus  gain  direct  access 
to  the  ^gean.  This  project,  as  we  shall  see,  had  the 
full  support  of  Germany. 

It  is  said  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister, 
soon  after  he  took  office,  proposed  to  the  Russian 
Minister,  Isvolski,  in  the  spring  of  1907,  to  renew 
the  Miirzsteg  agreement  of  four  years  earlier,  but 
with  a  very  important  difference.  Germany  and 
France  were  now  to  be  brought  into  the  entente, 
with  certain  advantages  all  round.  Austria  was  to 
annex  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  ;  Russia  was  to  gain 
the  opening  of  the  Dardanelles  ;  France  was  to  help 


AEHRENTHAL  AND  ISVOLSKI  85 

Germany,  financially  and  otherwise,  in  the  promo- 
tion of  the  Bagdad  railway,  and  was  to  receive,  in 
return,  full  German  recognition  in  Morocco.  The 
ultimate  object — to  break  up  the  Anglo-French  and 
Anglo-Russian  ententes,  and  to  isolate  Great  Britain 
— must  have  been  apparent.  Incidentally  the  pro- 
posal throws  light  on  the  relative  importance  attached 
by  statesmen  in  Berlin  to  the  question  of  Morocco 
and  that  of  the  Near  East.  If  Austrian  control  over 
the  Balkans,  with  all  that  this  implied  for  both  the 
German  Powers,  could  be  secured,  Morocco  might 
be  neglected.  The  proposal  had  its  attractions  for 
Russia,  but  the  negotiations  with  England  were  on 
the  point  of  completion,  and  Isvolski  declined.  In 
the  following  August  (1907)  the  Anglo-Russian 
agreement  was  signed. 

As  a  counter-blow  to  that  convention,  Aehrenthal 
now  brought  forward  (February,  1908)  a  proposal 
for  a  railway  through  the  Sanjak,  which  should  link 
up  with  that  already  running  by  way  of  Uskub  to 
Mitrovitza.  Thereupon  Russia,  acting  in  concert 
with  Serbia,  proposed  another  railway  which  should 
run  direct  from  the  Danube  to  the  Adriatic — a  pro- 
ject which  received  the  support  of  Italy.  Both  these 
railways,  as  crossing  Turkish  territory,  would  have 
required  the  consent  of  the  Porte.  While  these 
projects  were  in  the  air,  England  and  Russia  issued 
a  joint  proposal  for  reforms  in  Macedonia,  which, 
like  the  British  suggestion  of  1903,  would  have 
tended  to  establish  international  control.  A  con- 
ference of  ambassadors  on  the  subject  of  Macedonian 
reforms  was  held  at  Constantinople ;  but  its  pro- 
ceedings were  rendered  abortive  by  the  opposition 


86  REVAL  INTERVIEW:  TURKISH  DISCONTENT 

of  Germany  and  Austria.  Aehrenthal  had  secretly 
bought  the  consent  of  the  Porte  to  the  Novi-Bazar 
railway  by  promising  to  resist  reforms — conduct 
which  Sir  E.  Grey  with  justice  stigmatized  as  dis- 
loyal. In  June,  1908,  King  Edward  VII  had  an 
interview  with  the  Tsar  at  Reval,  which  was  taken 
to  indicate  the  probability  of  joint  action  in  the 
Balkans,  and  has  been  supposed  by  German  writers, 
on  very  inadequate  evidence,  to  have  involved 
Asiatic  schemes  of  far  wider  scope.  Whatever 
may  have  been  the  truth  about  the  interview, 
it  is  clear  that  the  prospect  of  Anglo-Russian 
intervention  in  the  Balkans  was  very  distasteful 
to  the  statesmen  of  Vienna  and  Berlin,  and  stimu- 
lated them  to  action  which  nearly  precipitated  a 
European  war. 

The  Reval  interview  had  just  occurred  when  a 
revolution  in  Turkey  took  Europe  by  surprise  and 
gave  Austria  the  opportunity  she  desired.  So  far 
back  as  1891,  discontent  with  the  despotic  and  cor- 
rupt government  of  Abdul  Hamid  had  led  to  the 
formation  of  the  so-called  '*  Committee  of  Union 
and  Progress "  at  Geneva.  It  was  subsequently 
transferred  to  Paris,  whence  for  some  years  it  carried 
on  a  subterranean  propaganda  in  the  Turkish  Empire, 
which  appeared  to  have  Uttle  result.  In  1906,  how- 
ever, the  Committee  felt  itself  strong  enough  to 
move  to  Salonika ;  and  its  tenets  gained  ground 
rapidly  in  the  Turkish  army.  The  imminence  of 
European  intervention  in  Macedonia  stimulated  its 
activity  ;  and  suppressive  action  on  the  part  of  the 
Sultan  brought  the  revolt  to  a  head.  In  July,  1908, 
certain  regiments  stationed  at  Salonika  marched  on 


THE  TURKISH  REVOLUTION  87 

Constantinople,  overthrew  the  Sultan's  Government, 
and  installed  the  Committee  in  power. 

The  *'  Young  Turkish  ''  revolution  was  welcomed 
in  the  greater  part  of  Europe  as  an  event  fraught 
with  the  promise  of  better  days  for  Turkey  and  the 
subject  races  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  and  as  in- 
augurating an  era  of  reform  which  would  solve  the 
Eastern  Question  by  removing  the  causes  of  perennial 
disturbance.  So  convinced  were  the  Powers  that 
reforms  would  now  be  voluntarily  introduced,  that 
they  removed  their  officials  from  Macedonia  and 
handed  back  to  the  Turks  the  control  they  had 
assumed.  From  the  political  point  of  view  the 
revolution  was  hailed  by  the  Entente  Powers  as  a 
set-back  for  Austria  and  Germany,  whose  influence 
at  Constantinople  was  supposed  to  depend  on  the 
domination  of  Abdul  Hamid.  All  these  expecta- 
tions were  doomed  to  be  disappointed. 

Meanwhile  Isvolski  had  become  aware  of  the 
Austrian  intention  to  annex  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina 
at  all  costs — an  intention  which,  however,  was  kept 
so  secret  that  when  in  August  King  Edward  visited 
the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  at  Ischl  nothing  what- 
ever was  disclosed  to  him.  Isvolski  now  took  up 
again  the  project  of  opening  the  Dardanelles,  which 
had  been  dropped  for  a  time  when  he  declined 
AehrenthaFs  proposals  a  year  before.  This  project 
he  now  hoped  to  carry  through  by  direct  arrange- 
ment with  Austria-Hungary.  Two  months  after  the 
revolution  in  Constantinople  (September,  1908)  he 
had  an  interview  with  Aehrenthal  at  Buchlau,  in 
which  he  is  said  to  have  consented  to  the  annexation 
of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  on  the  condition  that 

G 


88  ANNEXATION  OF  BOSNIA 

Austria  should  assist  in  the  opening  of  the  Dardanelles. 
Armed  with  this  (at  least  conditional)  undertaking, 
he  went  on  to  Paris  and  London,  where,  however,  his 
project  of  a  deal  with  Austria  appears  to  have  been 
coldly  received.  Before  he  could  readjust  himself 
to  the  situation,  the  statesmen  in  Vienna  had  taken 
the  step  to  which  he  had  conditionally  assented. 

Their  intention  was  not  concealed  from  Prince 
Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria,  who  was  anxious  to  extract 
his  own  profit  from  the  state  of  affairs  in  Turkey. 
At  an  interview  which  he  had  with  the  Emperor 
Francis  Joseph  at  Pesth,  in  September,  1908,  an 
understanding  as  to  simultaneous  action  seems  to 
have  been  reached.  Whether  Ferdinand  subse- 
quently carried  out  his  share  of  the  bargain,  or  forced 
his  partner's  hand,  we  do  not  know.  At  all  events, 
it  was  agreed  that  advantage  should  be  taken  of  the 
confusion  that  still  reigned  in  Constantinople,  and 
of  the  precarious  position  of  the  Young  Turk  Govern- 
ment, already  threatened  by  the  forces  of  reaction. 
Accordingly,  on  October  5th,  Ferdinand  proclaimed 
the  independence  of  his  State  and  was  crowned 
Tsar  of  Bulgaria ;  and  two  days  later  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina  were  formally  annexed  by  Austria- 
Hungary.  To  appease  Turkish  feeling,  the  right  to 
occupy  the  Sanjak  of  Novi-Bazar  was  simultaneously 
given  up.  The  consent  of  the  signatory  Powers  was 
not  asked  for  these  infractions  of  the  Treaty  of 
Berlin. 

These  events  raised  a  great  outcry  throughout 
Europe.  The  acts  themselves  might  perhaps  have 
been  ratified  by  consent,  if  done  in  a  less  arbitrary 
and  illegitimate  fashion,  for  the  formal  annexation 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  AND  SERBIA  89 

made  little  real  change  in  the  condition  of  the  two 
provinces  concerned,  and  the  independence  of  Bul- 
garia would  hardly  have  provoked  remonstrance 
except  from  Turkey.  But  the  cynical  disregard  of 
treaties,  and  the  insolent  contempt  for  European 
opinion,  w^hich  the  manner  of  the  action  showed, 
were  of  evil  omen,  and  naturally  caused  widespread 
indignation.  Anxious  that,  at  least,  these  things 
should  not  form  a  precedent,  the  Entente  Powers 
proposed  that  a  conference  should  be  held  to  discuss 
the  matter ;  but  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany 
refused. 

The  strongest  opposition  to  their  action  was 
aroused  in  Serbia,  where  for  some  time  past  the  feel- 
ing of  common  nationality  and  of  brotherhood  with 
the  Serbs  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  had  been  grow- 
ing stronger.  The  dream  of  a  South  (Yougo)  Slav 
union,  of  which  these  provinces,  along  with  Montene- 
gro, would  have  formed  the  central  part,  had  stirred 
the  imagination  of  the  Serbian  people  to  its  depths. 
The  realization  of  such  a  dream  involved,  it  must  be 
recognized,  serious  dangers  for  the  Austrian  Empire  ; 
for  a  strong  Slav  State  on  its  southern  border  would 
have  exercised  a  powerful  attraction  on  the  Slav 
populations  already  embraced  in  the  Dual  Mon- 
archy. It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  Austria 
felt  bound  to  oppose  the  Serbian  ambition;  and  this 
hostility  was  even  stronger  in  the  Hungarian  portion 
of  the  monarchy,  where  the  ruUng  Magyar  race  were 
convinced  that  their  dominant  position  would  be 
fatally  imperilled  by  an  advance  of  Slav  nationality. 
Nor  was  this  all,  for  behind  Austria  stood  Germany, 
firmly  resolved  that  neither  a  Greater  Serbia  nor  any 


90  DANGER  OF  WAR 

other  obstacle  should  bar  her  from  realizing  her 
dream  of  preponderance  in  the  Near  East.  It  was 
now  for  the  first  time  that  the  teachings  of  those 
thinkers  and  idealists  to  whom  I  have  referred  above 
(pp.  38-40)  bore  manifest  fruit ;  now  for  the  first 
time  we  clearly  see,  at  least  in  outline,  the  funda- 
mental cause  of  the  present  war. 

During  the  autumn  of  the  year  1908  and  the  follow- 
ing winter  months,  negotiations  between  the  Powers 
were  continued  ;  and  the  tempers  of  the  disputants, 
especially  of  Serbia,  became  more  and  more  em- 
bittered. The  Serbs  claimed  that  at  any  rate  they 
should  receive  some  compensation,  in  the  cession  of 
a  corner  of  Herzegovina  which  would  have  given 
them  continuity  with  Montenegro ;  but  this  was 
just  what  Austria  was  determined  to  avoid.  The 
British  Government  protested,  but  without  any 
intention  of  taking  up  arms.  Between  the  Eastern 
Powers,  however,  the  quarrel  came  to  the  verge  of 
open  hostility.  Austria  mobilized  part  of  her  army 
on  the  Danube,  whereupon  Russia,  in  support  of 
Serbia,  repUed  by  a  partial  mobiUzation  on  her  side. 
War  seemed  on  the  point  of  breaking  out,  when 
Germany  intervened  with  what  was  practically  an 
ultimatum  to  the  Tsar — an  intimation  that,  if  Russia 
attacked  Austria,  she  would  find  the  German  legions 
marching  with  their  alUes.  This  was,  of  course,  a 
justifiable  warning,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  an  attack 
upon  Austria  would  have  formed  a  casus  belli  under 
the  aUiance  of  1879  >  ^"^^  ^^  shows  the  difficulty  of 
determining  what  is  an  "  aggressive  "  war.  Eng- 
land and  France  were  disinclined  to  go  the  length 
of  supporting  Russia  in  extreme  measures.    They 


A  SET-BACK  FOR  THE  ENTENTE         91 

counselled  peace  ;  and  Russia,  whose  strength  had 
not  yet  recovered  from  the  wounds  inflicted  in  the 
Japanese  War,  was  obliged  to  give  way.  The  fait 
accompli  was  sullenly  recognized ;  but  Russia  did 
not  forget  the  humiliation  she  underwent  in  pocket- 
ing the  German  affront.  Serbia  had  naturally  to 
follow  suit.  A  money  payment,  together  with  the 
retrocession  of  the  Sanjak  (already  mentioned), 
sufficed  to  indemnify  Turkey  for  the  abandon- 
ment of  her  rights  over  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina 
(February,  1909).  Similar  means  were  found,  with 
the  aid  of  Russia,  to  compensate  the  Porte,  in 
April  of  the  same  year,  for  the  loss  of  its  nominal 
sovereignty  over  Bulgaria. 

The  net  result  was  a  severe  diplomatic  defeat  for 
the  Entente  Powers — a  defeat  to  which  they  need 
never  have  exposed  themselves  had  they  regulated 
their  policy  in  accordance  with  their  forces  and  their 
strength  of  will,  and  acted  together  in  well-considered 
harmony.  The  prestige  of  Germany  was  much 
enhanced  in  the  eyes  of  Turkey  and  the  Balkan 
States,  and  that  of  the  Entente  correspondingly 
lowered ;  while  Prince  von  Biilow  could  congratu- 
late his  country  on  the  decisive  failure  of  the 
Einkreisungspolitik.  This  was  a  little  premature, 
but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  episode  was  highly 
detrimental  to  the  cause  of  the  Entente  in  that  area 
which  Germany  and  Austria  regarded  as  of  para- 
mount importance. 

Meanwhile  the  Young  Turks,  whose  seizure  of 
power  had  been  the  immediate  occasion  of  the  inci- 
dents I  have  narrated,  had  not  had  it  all  their  own 
way  in  Constantinople.     The  constitution  which 


92  REVOLUTION  IN  GREECE 

Midhat  Pasha  had  introduced  thirty-two  years 
before,  and  which  Abdul  Hamid  had  *'  suspended  '* 
in  1877,  was  revived  ;  and  a  pariiament  of  the  Em- 
pire was  summoned  in  accordance  with  it.  But  a 
reaction  began  ;  the  Committee  was  opposed  by  the 
"Liberal  Union";  and  in  April,  1909,  a  counter- 
revolution took  place,  which  restored  the  Sultan  to 
power.  His  recovery  was,  however,  of  very  brief 
duration ;  the  army,  under  Mahmud  Shefket,  again 
marched  on  Constantinople;  and  Abdul  Hamid 
was  finally  deposed.  His  brother  was  set  up  as  a 
"  constitutional "  Sultan  in  his  place,  but  the 
Committee  governed  in  the  Sultan's  name. 

The  example  of  Bulgaria  naturally  affected  another 
outlying  province — the  island  of  Crete.  The  demand 
for  union  with  Greece  was  revived  ;  but  the  Powers, 
unwiUing  to  inflict  another  blow  on  the  Young  Turk 
Government,  refused.  A  settlement  was  difficult, 
but  eventually  the  Greek  flag  was  hauled  down,  the 
foreign  troops  were  withdrawn  (July,  1909),  and  the 
status  quo  was  restored.  The  Greek  Government 
was  obliged  to  acquiesce,  but  the  rebuff  acted  un- 
favourably on  its  position  at  home ;  and  a  sort  of 
revolution  took  place,  in  which  the  army,  acting 
under  the  direction  of  the  ''  Military  League,"  seized 
control.  But  a  ''  saviour  of  society  "  was  found  in 
the  person  of  M.  Venizelos,  who  had  led,  with  wisdom 
and  moderation,  the  nationaHst  party  in  Crete.  This 
statesman  was  called  in  ;  a  National  Assembly  met 
(September,  1910) ;  the  Military  League  was  volun- 
tarily dissolved ;  and  Venizelos  became  Prime 
Minister.  Under  him  the  constitution  was  revised 
(January,  1911) ;  and  at  a  general  election  (March, 


FRANCE  AND  GERMANY  IN  MOROCCO  93 

1912)  he  was  returned  to  power  by  an  immense 
majority. 

We  must  now  return  to  the  other  end  of  the 
Mediterranean,  and  take  up  again  the  story  of 
Moroccan  affairs,  which  we  left  at  the  point  reached 
by  the  settlement  of  the  Casablanca  incident  and  the 
Franco-German  convention  of  1909.  Subsequently 
to  that  agreement,  several  well-intentioned  efforts 
were  made  with  a  view  to  the  co-operation  of  French 
and  German  capitalists  in  opening  up  the  country 
and  exploiting  its  mineral  wealth.  Such  were  the 
proposed  "  Union  des  Mines,"  the  attempted  com- 
bination between  the  French  Ngoko-Sangha  Com- 
pany and  a  German  company  in  Kamerun,  the  joint 
Congo-Kamerun  railway,  and  other  projects.  For 
one  reason  or  another,  all  these  schemes  broke  down  ; 
and  this  failure  produced  the  impression  in  Germany 
that  the  French  were  unwilling  to  carry  out  their 
portion  of  the  agreement.  The  Pan-Germans,  on 
their  side,  were  dissatisfied  with  the  concession  of 
political  control  to  France,  and  endeavoured  to  use 
their  commercial  position  in  order  to  bring  about  a 
condominium  with  that  country.  Against  these 
efforts  Sir  E.  Grey  found  it  necessary  to  protest  in 
March,  191 1.  As  a  condominium  was  put  out  of 
court  by  the  convention  of  1909,  the  Germans  fell 
back  on  other  objects ;  but  they  were  divided  be- 
tween the  demand  for  *'  compensation,''  which  they 
hoped  to  get  in  French  Congo,  and  an  "  exchange  " 
which  would  have  given  them  a  footing  on  the  west 
coast  of  Morocco. 

The  breakdown  of  the  Congo-Kamerun  railway 


94  THE  ''PANTHER"  AT  AGADIR 

proposal  unfortunately  coincided  with  a  French 
expedition  to  Fez,  undertaken  because  of  the  in- 
creasing anarchy  in  Morocco,  and  the  danger  to 
which  European  residents  in  Fez  appeared  to  be 
exposed.  The  French  justified  the  expedition  on 
the  ground  that  their  agreement  with  Germany  gave 
them  the  right  of  political  control,  and  laid  on  them 
the  duty  of  maintaining  order.  The  Germans  in- 
sisted that  they  had  never  intended  to  allow  France 
to  convert  Morocco  into  a  French  province ;  Morocco, 
in  short,  was  not  to  be  "  Tunisified.''  Encouraged 
by  their  success  in  the  Eastern  crisis,  by  the  political 
disturbances  which  divided  England,  and  by  the 
instability  of  French  governments,  they  conceived 
that  the  time  had  come  for  improving  the  position 
which  they  had  been  obliged  to  accept  in  the  Pact 
of  Algeciras.  Following  the  precedent  of  Tangier, 
they  resolved  on  another  theatrical  stroke  ;  and  on 
July  1st,  1911,  the  Panther  cast  anchor  off  Agadir. 
This  incident  plainly  meant  a  demand  for  a  port 
on  the  Atlantic,  with  claims  over  an  indefinite 
hinterland.  An  acrimonious  negotiation  followed. 
The  demand  for  a  portion  of  West  Morocco  could 
not  be  accepted  by  France,  for,  apart  from  the 
intrinsic  value  of  the  district  and  the  unjustifiable 
nature  of  the  claim,  the  French  position  in  Morocco 
would  have  been  exposed  to  constant  danger  from 
German  intrigues,  and  the  footing  gained  would 
have  been  made  a  basis  for  further  demands.  Nor 
could  it  be  accepted  by  England,  for,  apart  from  our 
pledges  to  France,  a  German  naval  station  at  Agadir 
or  Mogador  would  have  endangered  our  communica- 
tions with  the  Cape  and  our  trade  with  South 


FRANCO-GERMAN  COMPROMISE  95 

America.  England  therefore  intimated  that  on  this 
point  she  could  not  give  way  ;  and  Germany  shifted 
her  ground. 

For  some  months  the  situation  was  critical.  The 
Germans,  asserting  that  the  French  advance  had 
destroyed  the  Pact  of  Algeciras  and  relieved  them  of 
all  obligation  to  observe  their  pledges,  declared  that 
the  new  situation  thus  created  justified  them  in 
demanding  a  quid  pro  quo.  It  should  be  added  that 
the  vaUdity  of  the  Pact  had  been  limited  to  five 
years,  and  that  that  period  had  now  elapsed.  The 
attitude  of  the  Caillaux  ministry  was  not  devoid  of 
suspicious  elements ;  and  the  British  Government 
had  to  make  it  plain  that  they  must  have  a  voice  in 
the  decision.  In  August  war  seemed  imminent ; 
but  the  French  Government  gave  up  the  principle 
of  "  exchange ''  and  accepted  the  German  demand 
for  ''  compensation.''  The  fact  was  that  France  had, 
in  the  course  of  the  last  ten  years,  gained  a  vast  new 
province,  for  which  she  had  already  "  compensated  " 
other  nations — England  in  Egypt,  Italy  in  Tripoli, 
Spain  in  Tangier.  It  was  Germany's  turn  to  receive 
payment ;  and  payment  was  made  by  the  surrender 
of  the  northern  part  of  French  Congo,  a  district  im- 
portant to  Germany  both  for  geographical  reasons 
and  from  its  wealth  in  rubber.  The  convention 
embodying  this  concession,  and,  on  the  German  side, 
the  recognition  of  a  French  protectorate  in  Morocco, 
was  signed  at  Berlin  on  November  4th,  1911.^  The 
Agadir  *'  incident  "  was  at  an  end. 

The  Pan-Germans  and  the  colonial  party  were 

1  The  protectorate  was  formally  accepted  by  the  Sultan  of 
Morocco  in  March,  19 12. 


96  THE  TRIPOLITAN  WAR 

dissatisfied  at  not  getting  more  ;  but  Germany  had 
won  an  important  accession  of  territory.  She  had, 
moreover,  successfully  reasserted  her  claim  to  com- 
pensation for  colonial  advances  made  by  another 
country,  and  her  right  to  be  consulted  with  regard  to 
the  disposal  of  a  territory  in  which  her  commercial 
interests  were  comparatively  small.  The  com- 
promise adopted  must  be  regarded  as  having  been, 
on  the  whole,  in  Germany's  favour.  The  arrogance 
with  which  she  pushed  her  claims  was  not  likely  to 
improve  her  relations  with  the  Entente  Powers  ;  but 
it  is  to  be  observed — and  the  observation  is  import- 
ant in  regard  to  our  attempt  to  elucidate  the  funda- 
mental aims  of  her  policy — that,  in  the  negotiations 
about  Morocco,  Germany  never  went  so  far  as  to 
present  an  ultimatum,  as  she  had  done  in  the  Balkan 
crisis  of  1909. 

We  have  now  to  return  to  Balkan  affairs  ;  and  in 
what  follows  we  approach  the  last  stage  of  the  inter- 
national quarrel,  that  which  leads  directly  to  the 
outbreak  of  the  present  war.  Just  at  the  time  when 
the  Moroccan  dispute  was  passing  out  of  its  acute 
stage,  towards  the  end  of  September,  1911,  the  world 
was  startled  by  the  news  that  a  fresh  crisis  had  arisen 
in  the  East.  Italy  conceived  that  the  time  had  come 
to  carry  into  effect  the  arrangement  with  France 
about  Tripoli,  made  ten  years  before.  She  accordingly 
sent  an  ultimatum  (September  26th)  to  the  Porte, 
in  which  she  declared  that  the  treatment  meted  out 
by  the  Turkish  Government  to  Italians  in  Tripoli 
and  the  Cyrenaica  called  aloud  for  her  armed  inter- 
vention.   Three  days  later  war  was  declared ;   and 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE       97 

the  Italian  invasion  of  Tripoli  began.  The  Turkish 
forces,  especially  at  sea,  were  no  match  for  the 
Italians,  who  landed  without  difficulty  and  pro- 
ceeded to  occupy  the  coast  and  the  maritime  dis- 
tricts. They  were  unable  to  penetrate  far  inland ; 
nevertheless  the  whole  territory  was  early  in  Novem- 
ber formally  annexed  to  the  Kingdom  of  Italy.  In 
the  spring  of  the  following  year  Rhodes  and  other 
islands  off  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor  were  occupied. 
But  the  war  continued  till  a  fresh  storm  in  the 
Balkan  Peninsula  compelled  the  Turks  to  make  peace 
with  Italy  at  Lausanne  (October,  1912).  It  was 
agreed  that  the  islands  should  be  retroceded  to 
Turkey  when  the  Turkish  troops  finally  left  Libya  ; 
but  this  stipulation  had  not  taken  effect  when  the 
present  war  broke  out. 

The  storm  to  which  I  have  referred  was  the  work 
of  the  Balkan  League,  which  attacked  Turkey  in 
the  autumn  of  1912.  Certain  steps  had  been  taken 
some  time  before  (above,  p.  81)  which  indicated  the 
possibility  of  joint  action  between  Serbia  and  Bul- 
garia ;  but  circumstances,  in  Macedonia  and  else- 
where, were  not  favourable  to  any  real  union. 
What  really  convinced  the  Balkan  States  of  the 
necessity  of  combination  was  the  annexation  of 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and  the  fear  of  further 
Austrian  progress ;  the  occasion  which  actually 
called  the  league  into  existence  was  the  Tripolitan 
War.  Whether  the  Italo-Turkish  War  and  the 
Balkan  War  that  followed  are  to  be  connected  with 
the  visits  paid  by  the  Kings  of  Serbia  and  Bulgaria 
to  Petrograd  in  1910,  and  the  visit  paid  by  the  Tsar 
to  the  King  of  Italy  at  Racconigi  in  1911,  must 


98  BULGARO-SERBIAN  ALLIANCE 

remain  for  the  present  unknown  ;  but  it  seems  highly 
probable  that  Italy  counted  on  a  rising  of  the  Balkan 
States  as  likely  to  force  the  Turks  to  cede  Tripoli — a 
calculation  which  was  justified  by  the  results. 

It  was  in  March,  1911,  that  M.  Guechoff  became 
President  of  the  Council  in  Bulgaria.  He  was  at 
once  approached  by  the  Serbian  Government,  which 
had  made  similar  overtures  to  his  predecessors,  with 
a  view  to  a  defensive  and  offensive  alliance.  The 
Bulgarian  Premier  was  at  first  desirous  of  coming  to 
an  understanding  with  Turkey  respecting  the  re- 
forms to  be  introduced  in  Macedonia  ;  but  a  short 
experience  convinced  him  that  the  attempt  was 
hopeless.  The  negotiations  with  Serbia  were  going 
on,  when  the  declaration  of  war  by  Italy  brought 
them  to  a  head.  The  Bulgarian  minister  was  at 
once  authorized  by  his  Government  to  conclude  a 
defensive  and  offensive  alliance  with  Serbia ;  but 
the  terms  of  the  agreement  raised  considerable 
difficulties.  The  Serbs  insisted  on  the  consent  of 
Russia  being  obtained — a  point  to  which  Bulgaria 
raised  no  serious  objections  ;  but  the  settlement  of 
the  frontiers  of  the  two  States  in  Macedonia,  in  the 
event  of  a  successful  issue  of  the  conflict  with  Turkey, 
was  hard  to  arrange.  The  difficulty  would  have  been 
removed  by  the  elevation  of  Macedonia  to  the  posi- 
tion of  an  autonomous  State,  as  suggested  by  Bul- 
garia ;  but  the  Serbs  would  not  hear  of  this  solution. 
After  much  discussion  it  was  agreed  to  divide  Mace- 
donia into  three  zones,  of  which  the  northern  should 
fall  to  Serbia,  the  southern  to  Bulgaria,  while  the 
partition  of  the  intermediate  zone  was  to  be  sub- 
mitted, after  the  war,  to  the  arbitration  of  the  Tsar. 


GRECO-BULGARIAN  ALLIANCE  99 

On  this  basis  the  treaty  of  alHance  was  signed  on 
March  7th,  1912. 

A  month  later  a  mihtary  convention  was  signed, 
which  contemplated  not  only  a  war  with  Turkey  but 
armed  intervention  on  the  part  of  Austria  and  Ru- 
mania, as  a  result  of  their  convention  of  twelve  years 
before  (see  p.  79).  It  is  clear  that  Russia  was  con- 
sulted during  the  negotiations,  and  that  the  treaty, 
with  its  secret  articles,  was  communicated  to  that 
Power  on  its  conclusion.  The  Tsar  gave  his  approval ; 
but  there  does  not  appear  to  be  any  published 
evidence  for  the  assertion  of  certain  French  and 
German  writers  that  he  either  initiated  or  guided 
the  negotiation.  It  is  impossible,  however,  to  resist 
the  conclusion  that  the  alliance  had  in  view  the 
defence  of  Balkan  independence  against  Austrian 
aggression  almost,  if  not  quite,  as  much  as  the  over- 
throw of  Turkish  power. 

Meanwhile  informal  negotiations  between  Greece 
and  Bulgaria  had  been  going  on  since  May,  1911. 
They  became  official  in  consequence  of  the  outbreak 
of  the  war  between  Italy  and  Turkey,  and  the  partial 
mobilization  of  the  Turkish  forces  in  Europe  which 
immediately  followed.  The  initiative  in  this  case 
came  from  Greece,  and  was  actively  pushed  by 
M.  Venizelos,  a  personal  friend  of  M.  Gu^choff.  The 
difficulties  in  regard  to  a  partition  of  the  expected 
conquests  in  southern  Macedonia  and  Thrace  were 
similar  to,  if  less  serious  than,  those  between  Serbia 
and  Bulgaria ;  but  time  pressed,  and  they  were 
simply  passed  over  in  the  treaty  of  alUance,  which 
was  signed  on  May  29th,  1912.  The  military  con- 
vention   was    not    completed    till    the    following 


100  ATTEMPTS  AT  INTERVENTION 

September.  It  is  noteworthy  that  the  Greek  Gov- 
ernment decUned  to  enter  into  any  discussion  with 
Austria,  as  that  Power  had  given  Greece  to  under- 
stand that,  in  the  event  of  success,  it  would  claim 
Salonika.  Arrangements  with  Montenegro  appear 
to  have  been  begun  at  a  much  later  date  than  those 
with  the  other  Powers — not  till  June  1912  ;  nor  did 
they,  at  least  so  far  as  Bulgaria  was  concerned,  go 
beyond  a  verbal  understanding,  which  was  reached 
in  the  following  August. 

Meanwhile  the  Young  Turk  Government  in  Con- 
stantinople was  evidently  crumbling  to  its  fall.  The 
garrison  of  Adrianople  mutinied ;  the  Albanians 
rose  in  insurrection,  and  occupied  Uskub  and  other 
frontier  towns  ;  and  on  August  14th  Count  Berch- 
told,  who  had  become  Austrian  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  on  the  death  of  Aehrenthal,  issued  a  proposal 
for  reforms  in  European  Turkey,  based  on  the  prin- 
ciple of  decentralization  and  practical  autonomy. 
Meanwhile  peace  negotiations  between  Italy  and 
Turkey  had  begun.  The  time  for  action,  if  Austrian 
intervention  were  to  be  anticipated  and  the  Tripoli- 
tan  War  utilized,  was  evidently  come.  M.  Sazonoff 
constantly  urged  moderation,  and  advised  the  Allies 
not  to  go  to  war,  but  they  were  determined  to  press 
their  quarrel  to  extremes.  On  September  29th  the 
Turkish  Government  decreed  a  general  mobilization. 
Next  day  the  Allies  sent  an  ultimatum  to  Constanti- 
nople, and  followed  this  up  by  mobilizing  their 
forces.  The  Powers  endeavoured  at  the  last  moment 
to  stay  the  conflict  for  which  their  mutual  jealousies, 
and  their  consequent  failure  to  secure  the  necessary 
reforms,  had  supplied  an  only  too  wMghty  justifica- 


FIRST  BALKAN  WAR:    Ar.BAMA: -  '  m 

tion.  On  October  8th  the  Austrian  and  Russian 
Governments  issued  a  joint  note,  strongly  disapprov- 
ing of  a  rupture,  and  declaring  that  they  would  not 
allow  it  to  result  in  any  change  in  the  status  quo.  On 
the  same  day  the  five  Great  Powers  (Italy,  being  still 
at  war  with  Turkey,  could  not  take  part)  combined 
to  urge  reform  upon  the  Porte.  But  this  belated 
attempt  at  intervention  was  vain.  The  Porte  having 
sent  no  reply  to  the  Allies'  demands,  war  was  declared 
on  October  12th.  Montenegro  had  already  opened 
hostilities  four  days  before. 

The  first  result  of  the  war,  and  of  the  surprising 
victories  won  by  the  Allies,  was  that  the  Powers  were 
forced  to  abandon  the  position  they  had  taken  up 
with  respect  to  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo 
ante  in  European  Turkey.  So  early  as  November 
2nd  M.  Sazonoff,  in  a  circular  note,  recognized  this 
necessity.  Almost  at  the  same  time  he  informed  the 
Allies  that  Serbia  could  not  be  allowed  access  to  the 
Adriatic.  Count  Berchtold,  on  behalf  of  Austria, 
made  a  similar  communication  at  Belgrade.  It 
appears  that  the  resolution  in  favour  of  an  autono- 
mous Albania  had  been  adopted  by  Austria  in  the 
lifetime  of  Aehrenthal,  so  far  back,  at  least,  as  the 
spring  of  1911.  Herein  she  had  the  support  not  only 
of  Russia  but  also  of  Italy,  which  was  equally  loth 
to  allow  the  Serbs  a  footing  at  Durazzo  or  Valona. 
Germany  threw  her  weight  on  the  same  side.  In  the 
face  of  this  agreement,  England  and  France,  had  they 
desired  another  solution,  could  hardly  have  resisted  ; 
but  it  seems  probable  that  they  did  not  foresee  (as 
did  the  Germans)  the  disastrous  consequences  of  this 
determination  on  the  future  of  the  Balkan  League. 


jor.  CONFERENCE  OF  LONDON 

When,  therefore,  after  the  declaraticn  of  an 
armistice  (November  5th)  a  conference  of  ambassa- 
dors of  the  neutral  Powers  and  of  representatives  of 
the  beUigerents  met  in  London,  in  December,  it  was 
on  this  basis  that  the  discussion  was  carried  on. 
Even  with  this  preliminary  understanding,  a  settle- 
ment proved  very  difficult.  At  the  conference  there 
were  two  distinct  sets  of  negotiations — those  between 
the  belligerents  and  Turkey,  and  those  between  the 
Powers  respecting  the  limits  of  an  autonomous 
Albania.  Russia  pressed  the  claims  of  Serbia  to 
certain  frontier  towns ;  Greece  demanded  a  large 
portion  of  Epirus ;  Austria  supported  the  rights  of 
her  new  creation,  Albania.  The  possession  of 
Scutari,  claimed  by  Montenegro,  also  proved  a 
dangerous  bone  of  contention.  On  more  than  one 
occasion,  a  breach  between  the  Powers  seemed  im- 
minent ;  but  eventually  a  compromise  was  arranged. 
Serbia  and  Greece  were  obliged  to  acquiesce,  but  it 
eventually  required  an  Austrian  ultimatum  to  drive 
the  Montenegrins  out  of  Scutari. 

Between  Turkey  and  the  Allies,  on  the  other  hand, 
a  settlement  proved  unattainable,  largely  owing  to 
the  fact  that  the  Turks  were  still  holding  out  in  the 
fortresses  of  Scutari,  Janina,  and  Adrianople.  In 
Constantinople  opinions  were  sharply  divided  be- 
tween the  supporters  of  peace  and  those  who  wished 
to  continue  the  struggle.  In  January,  1913,  a  mili- 
tary revolution  took  place ;  the  Young  Turks 
recovered  power  ;  and  in  February  the  negotiations 
were  broken  off.  The  war  was  renewed  ;  and  before 
long  the  three  strongholds  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
Allies.    Turkey  was  now  obliged  to  yield,  and  the 


TRIUMPH  OF  THE  ALLIES  103 

Conference  was  renewed.  But  the  haggling  about 
frontiers  continued  for  many  weeks ;  and  it  was 
not  till  Sir  E.  Grey  intimated  to  the  delegates  that, 
if  they  did  not  come  to  terms  at  once,  they  must 
leave  the  country,  that  peace  was  signed,  on  May 
30th,  1913. 

The  Balkan  Alliance  was  triumphant.  A  combina- 
tion of  four  small  States  had  effected,  in  six  months, 
what  the  Great  Powers  had  hitherto  failed  to  do. 
The  Christians  of  European  Turkey  were  relieved 
from  Mohammedan  tyranny ;  the  Cretan  question 
was  solved  by  the  union  of  the  island  with  Greece ; 
and  the  Turks  were  confined  to  Constantinople  and 
a  few  miles  of  territory  on  its  landward  side.  To 
Austria  and  Germany  the  blow  was  severe.  They 
had  indeed  succeeded  in  interposing,  by  means  of 
an  independent  Albania,  a  westward  barrier  to 
South-Slav  ambitions,  and  in  checking  the  economic 
growth  of  Serbia  by  cutting  off  her  access  to  the  sea. 
But  this  gain  was  little  to  set  off  against  the  over- 
throw of  Germany's  friend  and  potential  ally  Turkey, 
and  the  establishment  of  the  Balkan  Confederation 
athwart  the  roads  to  Salonika  and  Constantinople. 
So  serious  was  the  set-back  to  German  ambitions, 
that  Germany  at  once  set  about  largely  increasing 
her  military  forces,  and  levying  a  special  war-tax  to 
support  them.  The  fall  of  Turkey,  and  the  conse- 
quent shifting  of  the  balance  of  power  to  the  dis- 
advantage of  Germany,  were  pubUcly  urged  by  the 
German  Chancellor  as  a  justification  for  these 
measures.  It  was  obviously  to  the  interest  of  the 
German  Powers  that  the  Balkan  League  should 
disappear ;    and,  unfortunately,  a  deadly  quarrel 


104  QUARREL  ABOUT  MACEDONIA 

between  its  members  came  only  too  opportunely  to 
their  aid. 

Differences  between  Serbia  and  Bulgaria  as  to  the 
partition  of  their  Macedonian  conquests  had  begun 
almost  immediately  after  the  outbreak  of  war. 
When  an  independent  Albania,  stretching  from  the 
frontier  of  Montenegro  to  that  of  Greece,  was  estab- 
lished by  the  Powers,  Serbia  put  forward  a  claim  to 
compensation  in  Macedonia,  on  the  ground  that  she 
thus  suffered  a  loss  not  contemplated  when  the 
alliance  with  Bulgaria  was  made.  A  similar  claim 
was  advanced  by  Greece,  on  the  ground  of  her  dis- 
appointment in  Epirus ;  while  the  possession  of 
Salonika,  over  which  Greeks  and  Bulgarians  had 
come  to  blows  even  before  the  peace  with  Turkey, 
was  another  cause  of  dispute.  With  a  view  to  the 
enforcement  of  their  claims,  these  two  States,  some 
time  before  the  end  of  the  first  war,  contracted  an 
alliance  against  the  third.  Bulgaria,  on  the  other 
side,  took  her  stand  on  the  letter  of  her  treaty  with 
Serbia ;  while  geographical  conditions  rendered  it 
practically  impossible  to  settle  with  Greece  until  the 
Serbo-Bulgarian  frontier  should  have  been  deter- 
mined. The  treaty,  rigidly  interpreted,  was  doubt- 
less on  Bulgaria's  side  ;  but  equity,  not  to  mention 
poUcy,  demanded  that  some  concessions  should  be 
made  to  her  allies. 

In  these  circumstances,  arbitration  seemed  to  be 
the  only  alternative  to  war.  Wisdom  dictated  such 
a  course  ;  and  to  arbitration  M.  Gu^choff  inclined. 
But  a  malign  influence  appears  to  have  intervened  ; 
it  has  been  positively  asserted  that  Austria  promised 
Bulgaria  her  support  in  case  of  war,  and  both  previous 


THE  SECOND  BALKAN  WAR     105 

and  subsequent  events  render  the  statement  highly 
probable.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  cause,  the 
minister  failed  to  convert  his  sovereign  to  his  views, 
and  therefore,  on  the  day  of  the  signature  of  peace 
with  Turkey,  resigned.  His  place  was  taken  by  the 
headstrong  Dr.  Daneff,  whose  arrogant  attitude  had 
created  a  bad  impression  at  the  Conference  of  Lon- 
don during  the  winter  before.  The  Tsar  attempted 
to  intervene,  and  pressed  the  disputants  to  accept 
his  arbitration.  Greece  and  Serbia  hesitated.  The 
Bulgarian  Cabinet,  shrinking  from  the  conflict,  was 
willing  to  submit  its  case  ;  and  Dr.  Daneff  prepared 
to  go  to  Petrograd.  But  the  King  and  the  chauvinist 
faction  in  Bulgaria  had  control  over  the  army  ;  and 
on  June  29th  the  Bulgarian  troops  attacked  their 
former  allies. 

Against  Greece  and  Serbia  alone  the  Bulgarians 
might  possibly  have  been  able  to  make  head,  but 
a  third  enemy  now  appeared.  Rumania,  which 
had  taken  no  part  in  the  Balkan  League  and  had  re- 
mained inactive  during  the  recent  war,  subsequently 
demanded — on  regular  German  principles — ^that, 
though  she  had  done  nothing  to  secure  the  victory 
over  Turkey,  she  should  receive  compensation  for 
the  gains  of  the  AUies.  The  Powers  had  assented ; 
Bulgaria  had  not  refused  ;  and  by  a  protocol  issued 
in  Petrograd  on  May  13th,  a  compensation  (accepted 
by  Rumania)  had  been  allotted  to  her  in  the  north- 
eastern portion  of  the  Bulgarian  territory.  The  out- 
break of  hostilities,  however,  afforded  too  good  an 
opportunity  of  enlarging  this  "  compensation  '* ; 
a  Rumanian  army  therefore  crossed  the  Danube 
and  marched  on  Sofia. 


io6  THE  TREATY  OF  BUCAREST 

The  Turks  naturally  availed  themselves  of  the 
situation,  and  set  about  recovering  their  lost  terri- 
tory, including  Adrianople,  which  the  Bulgarians 
abandoned  to  its  fate.  Thus  attacked  on  three  sides, 
Bulgaria  was  forced  to  accept  whatever  terms  her 
enemies  thought  proper  to  impose.  The  terms  were 
hard.  Serbia  took  the  whole  of  the  disputed  central 
zone  in  Macedonia,  while  the  coastal  portion,  in- 
cluding Salonika  and  Kavalla,  was  given  to  Greece. 
A  large  strip  on  the  north-east,  including  SiUstria, 
was  ceded  to  Rumania ;  and  the  Turks  recovered 
Adrianople  with  the  surrounding  territory.  Bulgaria 
was  shut  oft  from  the  iEgean,  except  on  a  few  miles 
of  coast,  including  the  very  inadequate  port  of 
Dedeagatch.  These  cessions  were  embodied  in  the 
Treaty  of  Bucarest,  signed  on  August  loth,  1913, 
and  in  a  Turco-Bulgarian  treaty,  signed  on  Sep- 
tember 29th.  A  more  dramatic  reversal  of  fortune, 
a  sterner  illustration  of  the  Nemesis  which  pursues 
hubristic  insolence,  has  rarely  been  seen. 

The  second  Balkan  War  modified  the  results  of  the 
first,  in  two  important  points,  to  the  advantage  of 
the  German  Powers.  In  the  first  place,  Turkey,  to 
a  certain  extent,  recovered  her  position ;  and  the 
moral  effect  of  this  revival  was  probably  worth  even 
more  than  the  territory  she  regained.  Secondly — 
and  this  was  still  more  important — ^the  Balkan 
League,  the  only  power  which  could  secure  Balkan 
independence  against  Austria-Hungary  on  the  one 
side  and  Turkey  on  the  other,  was  hopelessly  broken 
up ;  while  the  seeds  of  deadly  animosity  and  a 
craving  for  revenge  were  sown  between  its  two  most 
important  members.     On  the  other  hand,  Serbia 


EFFECT  ON  AUSTRIA  AND  GERMANY     107 

became  more  than  ever  the  hope  and  focus  of  Yougo- 
Slav  nationaUsm,  which  threatened  the  very  exist- 
ence of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire  ;  and  Serbia 
had  received  an  enormous  accession  of  power.  Greece, 
too,  in  alliance  with  Serbia,  stood  across  the  south- 
ward road  from  Vienna,  and  was  estabhshed  in 
possession  of  Salonika,  long  the  aim  of  Austro- 
Hungarian  statesmen,  and  preferable,  as  a  com- 
mercial outlet,  even  to  Trieste. 

If  Vienna  was  thus  prejudicially  affected,  it  is 
hardly  necessary  to  point  out  that  the  dreams  of  the 
statesmen  in  BerHn — ^the  open  road  to  Byzantium 
and  Bagdad,  the  great  Central  European  Customs 
Union  which  was  to  include  the  Balkan  States  and 
Turkey,  the  point-d'appui  against  England  in  Egypt 
and  the  East — faded  into  thin  air,  if  the  results  of 
the  Balkan  wars  could  not  be  undone.  A  reversal 
of  these  conditions  became,  therefore,  from  this 
moment,  the  primary  object  of  Austro-German 
policy.  It  was  only  a  good  opportunity,  a  satis- 
factory pretext,  that  had  to  be  found. 

On  more  than  one  occasion,  in  the  year  1913,  a  war 
between  Austria  and  Serbia  was  very  near.  We  have 
it  on  the  authority  of  M.  Giolitti  that,  only  three 
days  after  the  signature  of  the  Treaty  of  Bucarest, 
Austria  sounded  Italy  as  to  a  war  with  Serbia.  The 
proposal  was  declined,  on  the  ground  that  the  Triple 
Alliance  did  not  contemplate  such  an  act  of  aggres- 
sion ;  but  there  were  more  potent  reasons.  Italy, 
which  had  joined  Austria  to  keep  the  Serbians  from 
access  to  the  Adriatic,  could  not  regard  with  equani- 
mity the  substitution  of  Austrian  for  Serbian  in- 
fluence in  Albania.    Nevertheless,  the  quarrel  nearly 


io8       AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  AND  SERBIA 

came  to  a  head.  In  her  anxiety  to  reach  the  Adriatic, 
Serbia  had,  in  the  winter  of  1912-13,  pushed  a  force 
across  the  mountains  to  Durazzo  ;  and,  though  she 
withdrew  in  the  face  of  the  decision  of  the  Powers, 
she  still  retained  some  portions  of  Albanian  territory. 
Austria,  only  too  anxious  to  pick  a  quarrel,  sent  an 
ultimatum  to  Belgrade  (October  20th),  demanding 
complete  retirement ;  and  Serbia  gave  way.  Even 
after  this,  Austria  appears  to  have  persisted  in  her 
efforts  to  procure  a  modification  of  the  Treaty  of 
Bucarest  in  favour  of  Bulgaria  by  force  of  arms  ;  and 
it  is  understood  that  only  the  distinct  refusal  of 
Germany  to  support  her  in  this  attempt  induced  her, 
for  the  time  being,  to  desist. 

The  best  chance  for  intervention  had  in  fact  been 
lost.  A  slight  movement  on  Austria's  part,  at  the 
outset  of  the  second  Balkan  War,  would  have  turned 
the  scales  in  favour  of  Bulgaria,  or  might  have  pre- 
vented Rumania  from  joining  the  AUies  ;  but  either 
Austria  was  not  ready,  or,  as  seems  more  likely,  she 
failed  to  foresee  the  results  of  the  second  war,  as 
there  is  no  doubt  the  German  Powers  miscalculated 
the  results  of  the  earlier  conflict.  In  any  case,  once 
the  Treaty  of  Bucarest  was  signed,  it  seemed  to 
Germany  that  a  pretext  was  needed  before  it  could 
be  overthrown.  Moreover,  the  increase  in  the  Ger- 
man army  had  not  yet  had  time  to  take  effect ;  and 
the  widening  of  the  Kiel  Canal  was  not  complete. 

But  we  know  from  the  report  of  M.  Jules  Cambon 
to  his  Government  (November,  1913)  that  the  Ger- 
man Emperor  had  by  this  time  ceased  to  be  in  favour 
of  peace  ;  and,  after  what  has  gone  before,  we  need 
not  be  surprised.   All  efforts  to  break  up  the  Entente 


THE  WAR-PARTY  IN  GERMANY         109 

— ^in  1905-6,  in  1908-9,  and  finally  in  191 1 — had 
failed  ;  Germany  was  still  '*  encircled/'  as  its  people 
professed   to   think ;     and   the   Austro-Hungarian 
Empire,  on  whose  cohesion  the  Drang  nach  Osten 
depended,  was  threatened  with  disruption  by  the 
victorious   Serbs.     Hence   the   conversion   of  the 
Emperor  and  the  triumph  of  the  military  party  at 
Berlin.   The  fact  was  not  likely  to  escape  that  shrewd 
observer,  the  French  Ambassador;    and  his  state- 
ment is  borne  out  by  the  fact  that,  according  to 
Rohrbach  and  other  authors,  the  Emperor  sent  an 
ultimatum  to  Petrograd  that  same  year.    It  was  at 
a  moment  when  Russia  seemed  to  be  contemplating 
intervention  in  Armenia ;    and  an  obvious  threat 
was  contained  in  the  intimation  from  Berlin  that  any 
movement  in  that  direction  would  endanger  Euro- 
pean peace.    Russia,  feeling  that  the  object  was  not 
worth  a  war  in  which  she  might  not  have  had  the 
support  of  other  Powers,  desisted  ;  but  the  incident 
is  none  the  less  significant.    The  danger  passed,  but 
in  1914  all  was  ready  ;  and  the  occasion  of  rupture 
was  found  in  the  assassination  of  the  Archduke 
Francis  Ferdinand  and  his  wife  at  Serajevo  on 
June  28th,  1914. 

The  attention  of  this  country  and,  it  may  be  added, 
of  its  rulers  (as  their  attitude  during  the  Conference 
of  London  showed)  has  been  so  concentrated  on  the 
growth  of  the  German  fleet  and  (at  intervals)  on  the 
action  of  Germany  with  regard  to  Morocco,  that  they 
have  failed  to  observe  what  has  been,  for  the  last 
fifteen  years  or  more,  the  fundamental  aim  of  Ger- 
man policy.     A  study  of  Austro-German  behaviour 


no  GERMANY'S  GREAT  AIM 

in  regard  to  the  Balkans  and  of  the  possibilities 
open  to  German  ambitions,  combined  with  an 
examination  of  the  German  mind  as  displayed  in 
a  long  series  of  political  writings,  points,  in  my 
opinion,  to  the  conclusion  that  the  domination  of 
the  Nearer  and  Middle  East  was  the  essential  object 
of  their  diplomacy  and  their  gigantic  military  pre- 
parations. I  do  not  mean  that  the  statesmen  of 
Berlin  aimed  at  nothing  else — ^far  from  it.  The 
eventual  absorption  of  Holland  and  Belgium,  with 
German-speaking  Switzerland  and  other  countries 
or  parts  of  countries ;  the  conquest  of  the  French, 
Dutch,  and  Belgian  colonies ;  the  diminution  of 
France  and  Russia,  not  to  speak  of  the  destruction  of 
British  sea-power  and  the  overthrow  of  the  British 
Empire — all  these  came  within  their  purview  as 
ultimate  objects.  But  what  seemed  attainable 
within  a  calculable  time  was  the  mastery  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire  and  the  lands  that  lie  between  it 
and  the  frontier  of  Austria-Hungary ;  and  at  this 
they  have  consistently  aimed.  Acquisitions  in 
Morocco  might  come  in  by  the  way  ;  the  attitude  of 
Germany  in  the  episodes  of  Algeciras  and  Agadir 
shows  that  they  were  only  secondary.  In  regard  to 
the  Balkans  and  the  Turkish  Empire  they  were 
repeatedly  ready,  if  need  were,  to  go  to  war. 

Once  masters  in  those  territories,  the  German 
Powers  would  obtain  what  they  wanted  for  their 
economic  growth,  throw  open  a  vast  region  to  Ger- 
man enterprise  and  capital,  exclude  Russia  from  the 
Mediterranean,  and  menace  their  chief  rival,  Great 
Britain,  in  the  most  vulnerable  portions  of  her  empire. 
Russia  would  undoubtedly  resist,  and  would  be 


GERMANY'S  GREAT  AIM  iii 

aided  by  France ;  but,  for  all  the  talk  (for  home 
consumption)  of  the  Russian  bugbear,  Berlin  was  not 
afraid  of  France  and  Russia  combined ;  and  England 
might  be — and  to  a  large  extent  was — ^lulled  into 
security.  The  pacific  attitude  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment during  the  Conference  of  London,  and  its  per- 
sistent efforts  to  arrive  at  an  understanding  with 
Germany,  had  doubtless  fostered  this  belief ;  and 
capable  German  publicists,  writing  just  before  the 
war,  congratulated  themselves  on  the  agreement 
with  Great  Britain  respecting  the  Bagdad  railway 
and  German  progress  in  Central  Africa,  which  it  is 
understood  was  on  the  point  of  being  signed  in  the 
summer  of  1914. 

It  may  appear  presumptuous,  especially  at  this 
early  stage,  to  offer  an  explanation  of  the  world- 
shaking  events  which  we  are  now  witnessing,  and  to 
attempt  an  exposure  of  Germany's  secret  plans.  But 
a  survey  of  preceding  incidents  and  the  development 
of  German  ideas  convinces  me  that  the  attack  on 
France  and  Russia  was  but  a  preliminary  step, 
masking  the  real  aim.  This  could  not  be  attained 
without  the  overthrow  of  those  Powers,  but  such  a 
victory  would  be,  after  all,  only  a  means  to  an  end. 
The  frontiers  on  either  hand  once  secured,  the  forces 
of  Germany — military,  economical,  and  financial — 
could,  without  let  or  hindrance,  flood  the  Nearer 
and  Middle  East.  From  this  point  of  vantage,  with 
enormously  increased  resources  and  heightened 
prestige,  the  final  challenge  might  safely  be  issued 
to  Great  Britain  for  the  empire  of  the  world. 


GARDEN  CITY  PRESS,  LIMITED,  PRINTERS, 
LETCHWORTH,  ENGLAND 


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